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ABSTRACT 
A JUSTIFICATION FOR RIGHTS 
This thesis provides an argument in favour of there being natural rights. Such rights are 
rights which creatures necessarily have in virtue of their nature alone. These are to be 
distinguished from non-natural rights which may or may not be acquired. It is argued 
that natural rights possess three features: (1) they have correlative duties; (2) they have 
great strength; and (3) they are exclusively negative. It is argued further that that the 
strength of some natural rights must be absolute. 
One chapter is devoted to arguing against the justifications for rights advanced by 
Immanuel Kant, Alan Gewirth and John Rawls. Another chapter shows that the 
problem with utilitarianism is that it cannot satisfactorily accommodate rights. 
This thesis claims that morality must be connected to well-being and that well-being 
should be understood objectively rather than subjectively. Further, it advances the view 
that since individuals, rather than societies or temporal stages of individuals, are the 
morally significant units of existence, morality should be connected to the well-being of 
individuals. It is then argued that a moral tool possessing the features which absolute 
natural rights possess is essential to moor morality to individual well-being. 
Given the great strength of absolute rights, they must protect only the most important 
objective interests an individual subject has and they must protect against only the most 
severe violations of these interests. Various scales of harm to the individual are 
envisaged, including scales of pain, injury and restriction of liberty. The view is 
advanced that absolute rights come into existence at a particular threshold on these 
scales, absolutely protecting the individual from having to make a sacrifice of that 
I 
I 
I 
degree or greater. Although absolute natural rights have this important function they I 
are not seen as being the only principles on the moral landscape or even the only non-
derivative ones. 
A few chapters are devoted to applying the theory to a number of questions, including 
what absolute rights there are and what creatures have rights. The thesis also answers a 
number of common criticisms of natural rights. 
David Benatar 
41 Willow Road, Newlands, 7700, Cape Town, South Africa. 
August 1992 
_ ___./,__·-~------ --- . 
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INTRODUCTION 
0.1) THE RHETORIC OF RIGHTS 
Popular moral and political debate in this half-century is characterized and dominated 
by talk about rights. This is witnessed at the international level by the numerous 
international statements about human rights: the Charter of the United Nations (1945); 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the European Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966); the Helsinki Accord '( 1975) and others. At the national level numerous 
liberation struggles have appealed to a right to self-determination. At the Individual 
level, moral and political conversation is riddled with talk about and claims of rights. 
Furthermore, talk about rights has not been characteristic of only one culture during 
this period. Appeal to rights has not been the preserve of the west. Almost everybody 
has at least declared support for the concept of rights, although the interpretation of 
what this means and what rights there are has varied considerably. 
Rights are in vogue. Everybody wants them and everybody wants to say that they 
respect them. To say otherwise is to be morally and politically impolite, even boorish. 
Governments and individuals do not wish to have it said of them that they violate 
rights. It is regarded as a slur of the worst order to be accused of rights-violation. 
The preoccupation with rights over the last five decades is due in no small part to the, 
horrors of Nazism during the Second World War. The planned and methodically 
executed murder of millions of innocent people for the purposes of racially purifying 
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Europe shocked the conquering allies and spurred concerns about rights. Hence th~ 
numerous declarations of rights in the post-war years. 
The reaction to the Nazi. atrocities is understandable. However, the pendulum has 
swung its full arc. So headstrong was the attempt to restore the dignity of persons by 
recognizing their rights, that these rights have become an obsession. Though rights 
dominate contemporary popular moral debate, it is a rhetoric of rights, not a coherent 
theory of rights. The concept of rights has been and continues to be abused. In popular 
circles this trend is not easily criticised because critics of rights discourse are seen as 
moral heretics. 
As I see it, there are two important manifestations of the abuse of the concept of rights. 
Firstly, appeals to rights have popularly become a substitute for moral argumentation. 
Instead of carefully arguing what one ought to do in a particular situation, people 
simply claim a right. They then believe the moral question settled because, as I shall 
show in the next chapter, rights are a particularly strong kind of moral consideration. 
Because rights have such strength, asserting the presence of a right is an argument-
stopper. Of course, one can attempt to continue the argument by questioning whether 
the relevant person really has the right he is said to have. However, in those popular 
circles where the concept of rights is abused, such questions are not welcomed. To 
bring a person's rights into question or, worse still, to deny a person his rights, is to 
commit the moral heresy which I have mentioned. 
One example of where rights have become easy alternatives to reasoned moral 
argument is the problem of abortion. Instead of arguing about the complexities of this 
problem, many people are prone to simply assert either that the foetus has a right to life 
(if they are pro-lifers), or that the mother has a right over her own body (if they are 
pro-choicers). 
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The second manifestation of the abuse of the concept of rights is the proliferation of 
rights claims. This is, of course, related to the first manifestation. There are many 
rights claims, in part because these are an easy substitute for rational moral argument. 
However, this is not the only reason for the proliferation of rights. Another is the 
confusion that characterizes the popular conception of rights. Because the conceptual 
logic of rights is so misunderstood, people are not clear about what a right is. Thus, 
many more claims can pass as rights. In this way claims of rights have been multiplied. 
For instance, it has been said that we have a right to tourism 1, a "right to co-existence 
with nature", and a right to "social transparency"2. There is, of course, no limit to the 
number of such rights claims people can make. 
The contemporary spawning of rights has had more and less worrying features. Less 
worrying is the labelling of numerous desiderata as rights. Everything desired becomes 
a right. Claims of rights are being made to everything which is wanted. We want 
education for everybody, health care for everybody. We want paid holidays and 
fulfilling, creative work. International declarations claim that these are our rights. 
Feinberg speaks about such rights as "manifesto rights"3. No doubt such rights reflect 
an aspiration or a goal. However, the mere fact that we would like some state of affairs 
to come about does not mean that we have a right to such a state of affairs. I take such 
rights claims to be the result of conceptual confusion. Why I think so will become 
apparent in the course of this thesis. Because these claims express aspirations which are 
benevolently motivated and are intended to benefit us all, I take them to be of relatively 
little danger (though confused nonetheless). 
1. Claimed by the World Tourism Organization and cited by P. Alston, "Conjuring up new 
human rights: a proposal for quality control", in The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 78, 1984, p. 611. 
2. From a UNESCO document cited by P. Alston, "Conjuring up new human rights: a 
proposal for quality control", in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78, 
1984, p. 61 o. 
3. J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, p. 95. 
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More dangerous are those rights claims which are blatantly self-serving. I am thinking 
here of those rights claims which involve individual desires riding roughshod over the 
important interests of others. An example of this would be a claim that one had a right 
to live in a whites-only neighbourhood or to drive under the influence of alcohol. 
The abuse of the concept of rights has a number of unfortunate consequences. Firstly, 
rights become trivialized through the overuse and abuse of this concept. To use fairly 
well-worn imagery, the moral currency of rights is devalued by the overuse of the 
concept of rights. ·Part of the significance of rights is that they protect very special 
interests. By alleging that lesser interests enjoy the same moral protection there is a 
strong possibility that one will come to minimize the moral protection afforded the 
special interests. If one has rights both to tourism and to life, then the right to life may 
well lose stature. It may be argued that the right to life does not lose stature, but that 
the right to tourism gains stature. However, this is not the case when all interests are 
alleged to be protected by rights. A right can only afford special protection to some 
interests if it does not protect all interests equally. 
To invoke rights claims with regard to ordinary interests is morally irresponsible. It is 
very much like the fabled little boy who cried "wolf'. Many times he cried "wolf' in 
vain and the townspeople came running to his rescue only to find that there was no 
wolf. One day there was a wolf and he called for help. The townspeople no longer 
believed his call, did not respond and the boy was eaten by the wolf. If one cries rights 
too often to protect ordinary interests, then when one really needs to protect an 
important interest, the claim is not as potent. 
A second consequence of the abuse of the concept of rights is that it itself fosters 
conceptual confusion among people. Those who would like to see greater rigour in 
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popular thinking about moral concepts would bemoan the vicious circle of conceptual 
confusion leading to the abuse of the concept of rights which in tum leads to further 
conceptual confusion and further abuses. 
Finally, those who are sensitive to or disgruntled by the abuse of rights claims may be 
led to reject rights entirely - to throw the baby's rights out with the bathwater. This is a 
mistake because, as I shall argue, rights have a valuable role to play in moral thinking. 
However, to guarantee their effective contribution, we must not extend them beyond 
their conceptual limitations. In chapter 1 I shall examine the conceptual logic of rights 
and explain what I think characterizes them. 
In this section I have been speaking about the rhetoric of rights - how the concept of 
rights is abused. Of course, philosophers have devoted more critical attention to 
theories of rights and have been far more careful in their use of the concept of rights. 
However, the ubiquity of rights in popular moral and political debate is paralleled in 
many contemporary philosophical discussions of moral and political problems. This 
preoccupation with rights is, I believe, also inappropriate. Later (chapter 6.1) I shall 
show that there is more to morality than rights. One consequence of this is that not all 
moral problems need to be described and resolved in terms of rights. If we take the 
abortion problem as an example again, I think that this problem is not essentially one of 
conflicting rights. For example, one could concede that the foetus has no right to life, 
that the mother does have a right to govern her own body and yet claim that abortion is 
wrong under certain circumstances. It would be wrong, on this view, not because it 
violated rights, but because of other moral principles. Not everything we have to say 
about morality has to be said in the language of rights. 
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0.2) A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL RIGHTS 
' 
This thesis is not about the history of rights theory. It will not be concerned with the 
historical origin or development of the concept of rights. Although a number of 
important philosophers in the history of rights theory will be mentioned and their views 
outlined, this will not be in an attempt to trace the history of rights theory but rather to 
make reference to their conceptual contribution. 
Notwithstanding this, there is some place in this introduction for a very brief outline of 
some of the themes and milestones in the history of the concept of rights. If nothing 
else; this will facilitate an historical contextualization of those historical figures whom I 
shall mention. 
The idea of natural rights is not of great antiquity. It is often thought to be a feature 
unique to modem political thought, having its origin in the work of John Locke, the 
seventeenth century English philosopher. Although Locke is the thinker in whose work 
rights first appear with the distinctive features of their modem conceptions, the idea 
and language of rights first appeared and developed during the early and high middle 
ages4. 
The early roots of this idea do, however, extend even further back in time, most 
probably to Roman law and its Stoic influences. Two relevant concepts in Roman law · 
were those of ius and dominium. At first ius meant "rightful", but through its 
association with dominium (property) it later acquired, outside of Roman law and 
probably in the work of William of Ockham-5, a new sense - "a right"6. If one had a 
4. R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 2. 
5. M. Golding, "The Concept of Rights: A Historical Sketch" in E. & 8. Sandman (eds), 
Bioethics and Human Rights, p. 48 .. 
6. R.J. Vincent, "Human rights in western political thought" in Human Rights and 
International Relations, p. 22. 
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ius then one had dominium over that to which one had a ius - one had some moral 
possession. This moral possession was extended to include not simply possession of 
property but also, for example, possession of one's life. <· 
Roman law also had a concept of ius naturale - natural law. This was viewed as a law 
which was common to all people and was received by natural instinct rather than by 
/ 
any convention 7. The prominence of natural law increased during the middle ages 
under the influence of the Church. However, the Christian idea of natural law differed 
from that of Roman law. For one thing, natural law was· seen by the Church as 
synonymous with Divine law. Natural law also came to be seen as invalidating positive 
or human-made law when the two conflicted. I shall explain this further in chapter 
10.2. 
Since medieval natural law theories gave a place to rights, the increased popularity of 
natural law led to rights' also gaining prominence. However, the medieval rights 
theorists were conservative and advocated obedience to the absolute state. 
This changed as a result of the Renaissance and the Reformation. During this period the 
authority of the Church was questioned. Although the early reformers upheld the idea 
of obedience even to tyrannical rulers, their questioning of the Church had a spill-over 
effect. If the authority of the religious establishment could be questioned, then so could 
the authority of temporal rulers. This . questioning of authority and the growth of 
individualism to which it led, set a new revolutionary tone for natural right theories. 
These theories attacked two kinds of political absolutisms: 
(1) natural hierarchy; and (2) contractual subjection to absolute authority. 
7. R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 18. 
8. J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense on Stilts, p. 7. 
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Locke's theory, which I shall mention in chapter 2.4, is the first revolutionary natural 
rights theory. Political authority was seen as deriving in part from a social contract 
between the members of the society. The three natural rights about which Locke spoke 
- rights to life, liberty and property - are all derived from the idea of dominium and 
are, on Locke's view, possessed pre-contractually. They may not be given up by means 
of the contract. Thus, if a sovereign violates these rights of his subjects they are 
entitled to revolt against the sovereign. It is thus hardly surprising that Locke's theory 
underpinned the American and French revolutions and found expression in the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776), the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen (1789), and the American Bill of Rights (1791). 
The revolutionary nature of the new kind of natural rights theories was caused in part 
by their individualism. Firstly, the individual and his rights were viewed as preceding 
the community and the contract which produced the state. Secondly, the individual's 
claims were given priority over those of the group. 
Although Locke's theory had theological assumptions, G-d became increasingly · \ 
I 
marginalized in natural rights theories of the eighteenth century. Talk of G-d was not 
entirely dispensed with in such theories, but it no longer played a central justificatory 
role. Instead there was increased emphasis on the rational nature of natural law. 
Natural law was believed to be rationally apprehendable or rationally agreed to. The 
idea of a rational natural law is central to the thought of Immanuel Kant (1748 - 1832), 
some of whose views are outlined in chapter 2.2. 
Whereas the eighteenth century saw the flourishing of natural law and natural rights 
theories, the nineteenth century saw their decline. This is attributable in part to the 
excesses of the French revolution at the close of the eighteenth century. Critics of 
natural rights, such as Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832), were shocked by what they 
j 
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perceived as the pernicious character of talk of natural rights. They saw ideas of rights 
as inciting people to revolution. I shall discuss Bentham's views in chapter 10.2. 
n 0{v 
Another important contributing factor to the decline of natural rights theories was a 
renewed emphasis on the community or group. This had its origins in the work of none 
other than Jean-Jacques Rousseau whose own ideas ironically had been very influential 
in the French revolution. Rousseau's concept of the "general will" weakened the 
revolutionary, individualistic and rational components of eighteenth century natural 
rights theories9. Karl Marx's criticism of rights, with which I shall deal in chapter 
10.5, is one example of a group- or community-centred objection to rights. 
The nineteenth century nadir of natural rights theories lasted into this century until the 
end of the Second World War. It was then, I noted in the previous section, that the 
popularity of natural rights was restored in the wake of Nazi atrocities. However, 
twentieth century conceptions of rights are not limited to the negative "civil" rights of 
the last century - rights to non-interference in one's life, liberty and property. These 
negative rights have come to be known as "first generation rights". Two new 
"generations" of rights are now being spoken about. The "second generation rights" -
so-called welfare rights - were born with the revival of the "first generation" in the 
immediate post-war years. They include rights to education, health care and housing. 
The "third generation rights" are a product of the last two or three decades. These are 
called "environmental rights". They include rights to a clean planet and to 
conservation. In so far as these new generations of rights are regarded as natural rights, 
I believe that they are another manifestation of the current abuse of the concept of 
natural rights. 
9. R. Vincent, "Human Rights in Western Political Thought" in Human Rights and 
lnte~national Relations, p. 26. 
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0.3) CLARIFYING SOME TERMS 
Rights function as protective moral tools. Later (chapter 1) I shall discuss the features 
that characterize these protective tools, thereby clarifying what exactly rights are. Now 
I want to deal with some adjectives by which rights are qualified. Rights are sometimes 
described as being natural, moral, legal, human, inalienable or absolute. Since I shall 
be using these terms, some of them to demarcate my area of inquiry, it is important 
that they should now be clarified. 
What is meant by natural rights? What kind of rights are natural? 
One way to understand natural rights is to identify them with the rights of natural law 
theory. In chapter 10.2 I shall explain what is meant by natural law theory and the 
rights of natural law. This, however, is currently not the most common sense of 
natural rights. Neitheris it the sense which I shall be using. 
l shall use the term "natural rights" in a sense which reflects in part the most common, 
and in part what I think is the most accurate usage of the term. Broadly stated, a 
natural right is a right which a creature has because of its nature. What I mean by this 
is the following. Any kind of creature has a collection of natural characteristics. Some 
of these characteristics are morally relevant, others are not. The length of an animal's 
tail or the colour of a creature's skin or fur, though natural characteristics, are not 
morally relevant. Characteristics such as sentience and sapience are morally relevant 
natural characteristics. Needless to say, if creatures have natural rights, the natural 
characteristics in virtue of which they have them, will be the morally relevant ones. 
Natural characteristics are common to all (normal) creatures of the same kind. This is 
not to say that different kinds of creature do not share some natural properties, but only 
that aII (normal) creatures of a particular kind share a specific combination of natural 
' .. ;. ~ .. 
·~-1:~ 
·_./}-~. 
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characteristics. Because of this, if creatures of that kind have any natural rights they 
will have the same natural rights. 
Natural rights are to be contrasted with non-natural ones. Whereas natural rights are 
1 rights which creatures necessarily have, given their nature, non-natural rights are rights 
which a creature may or may not come to possess. They are rights which it may 
acquire, contingent upon certain facts about the world and the creature's relationship 
with it. These contingent facts are usually taken to include transactions and events such 
as being promised something - one acquires a right to that which one was promised; 
becoming a member of a club or society - one acquires the rights of the club members; 
and being unjustly treated - one acquires a right to compensation. I think that it 
includes other kinds of contingent facts as well, such as social conditions or 
circumstances. For example, one acquires a right to a certain level of health care in a ' 
society that has sufficient resources to provide that level of health care for its members. 
I think that social conditions and circumstances of this kind are contingent in the sense 
that is relevant to the distinction between non-natural and natural rights because I see 
no reason to distinguish their contingency from that of a promise, a club membership 
or an injustice. 
More needs to be said about the distinction between natural rights - those which are 
I-.,. ~ possessed necessarily - and non-natural rights - those which are contingently acquired. 
Depending on what exactly we understand these terms to mean, the distinction between 
them may collapse or may be preserved. I think that there is a distinction, and that if 
we use these terms in ·a way which eliminates the distinction we do not accurately 
capture what is meant by each kind of right. I think that the following considerations 
will show this. 
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Firstly, there is a sense in which all rights are acquired contingently. Whether or not a 
creature has any rights - even the alleged natural rights - is contingent upon that 
creature coming into and remaining in existence. Waldron mentions this sense of 
"contingency" in order to exclude it10. Clearly, this is not the sort of contingency that 
is meant. 
Secondly, there is a sense in which all rights - even those which are normally thought 
to be acquired - are possessed in virtue of a creature's nature and, therefore, are natural 
rights. After all, it is a creature's nature that determines whether it can acquire rights 
and if so what rights it can acquire. It is because I have the nature that I have that I 
acquire rights to that which is promised to me. By contrast, inanimate objects, for 
example, because of their nature, cannot acquire rights (see chapter 8.1). It seems to 
follow from this line of thought that contingently acquired rights would be possessed in 
virtue of a creature's nature. 
Since I think that there is a distinction between those rights which I have called natural 
and those which I have called contingent, the definition of "natural rights" must be 
refined if the distinction is to be preserved. I believe that such a refinement is possible. 
Natural rights must be those rights which are possessed in virtue of a creature's nature 
alone and not in virtue of its nature coupled with some further contingent facts about 
the world. Those rights which are not natural in this sense are contingent. It follows . 
that whereas one can determine what natural rights a creature has on the basis of its 
nature alone, to determine what contingent or acquired rights a creature has one will 
need to make reference not only to the creature's nature but also to further contingent 
facts about the world and the creature's relationship with it. 
1 O. J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 113. 
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It seems correct, given what I have said, to identify natural rights with what are called 
ab initio rights - rights which exist prior to the occurrence of any contingent events or 
circumstances. These are rights which a creature has from its 1ery origin as a creature 
of that kind. Ab initio rights are conventionally contrasted with rights that arise 
contingently or are acquired. 
Waldron dismisses a possible objection to the distinction between natural I ab initio 
rights on the one hand and acquired I contingent rights on the other hand, though he 
uses instead the terms "general" and "special" rights respectively11 . For the Sake of 
convenience, I shall restate Waldron's discussion using my terminology of ab initio and 
acquired rights. 
The objection states that every acquired right can be redescribed as an ab initio right, 
namely an ab initio right which is conditional in its content. Consider the following 
example. Imagine that A promises to pay B R5. We can say that given the promise, B 
acquires a right to be paid R5 by A. However, we can also redescribe the right by 
saying that ab initio B has a right to RS from A if A promises to pay B R5, and we can 
say more generally that each person has ab initio a right that promises made to him 
should be kept. If the objection is valid, then all rights exist ab initio and there is no 
distinction between rights that exist ab initio and those that are acquired. 
Waldron has a logical argument against the objection. His argument runs like this. He 
says that from the statements 
(1) B has a right to be paid R5 by A if A promises to pay B 
R5, 
and 
2. Ibid, pp. 117f. 
(2) A promises to pay B RS, 
we need to be able to infer 
(3) B has a right to b~ paid RS by A 
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by means of modus ponens. However, we can only infer (3) if we read (1) as 
(la) If A promises to pay B RS, then B has a right to be 
paid RS by A. 
The trouble with this, however, is that (la) does not attribute any kind of right to B, 
but merely states a condition under which B will come to have a right. On the other 
hand, if we read (1) as 
(lb) B has a right [to-be-paid-RS-by-A-if-A-promises-to-pay-
B-R5] 
then, although we now have a description of a right, we will not be able to infer (3) 
from it and (2) because the conditional seems to be bound into the context governed by 
the operator 'has a right to [ ... ]' and it is not clear how modus ponens can detach it 
from that context. 
Waldron does go on to express some doubts about whether his argument is watertight, 
noting that it might be disputed whether the "has a right to [ ... ]' context is really 
opaque in the way he claims. However, he clearly thinks that his argument has 
considerable force and it seems to me that we can conclude that it is at least reasonable 
to retain the intuitive distinction between ab initio and acquired rights. There are no 
compelling reasons to reject it. To say that we never acquire rights, but only satisfy the 
conditions of rights we have ab initio, does not seem to be a correct description of the 
moral facts. Moreover, accepting the objection entails a commitment to an unnecessary 
multiplication of rights ascriptions. It seems far more economical to say that we do not 
really have any of the "conditional rights" until their conditions are actually satisfied. 
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It is also worth mentioning that, as Waldron points out, to some extent the objection is 
"a purely verbal manoeuvre" 12 and the dispute a terminological one. Even somebody 
who insisted that acquired rights can be redescribed as ab i(litio conditional rights, 
would be forced to acknowledge that within the class of ab initio rights there is an 
important distinction between rights which are and rights which are not subject to any 
condition. That important distinction therefore emerges unscathed even if the logic of 
the view is not (as it appears to be) flawed. 
Natural rights are a subclass of moral rights. Moral rights are rights of morality and are 
to be distinguished from the rights of law. Moral rights which a creature necessarily 
has in virtue of the kind of creature it is are natural rights. Moral rights which a 
creature does not necessarily have are non-natural. For example, if someone promises 
to give me a book, then I acquire a non-natural moral right to the book. However, not 
all rights which a creature does not necessarily have are moral rights. Some are legal 
rights - rights which the law confers upon us. Thus, non-natural rights can be moral or 
legal. If non-natural moral rights are legally recognized then they are both moral and 
legal rights. 
Natural rights are possessed by their bearers irrespective of the law. Sometimes the law 
recognizes natural rights. On such occasions natural rights and legal rights are co-
extensive. However, sometimes the law does not recognize natural rights, either 
because it does not protect them or because there exist laws which mandate the 
violation of natural rights. In such cases natural and legal rights are either simply not 
co-extensive or they are conflicting. 
The terms human rights and natural rights are often used interchangeably. I believe 
that this usage is mistaken. Humans are alleged to have certain natural rights in virtue 
12. Ibid, p. 118. 
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of the kind of creatures they are. These rights would then be called "natural human 
rights" or "human rights" for short. In this thesis I shall argue that there are some such 
rights. However, it i~'·not necessarily the case that all natural rights are human rights. It 
is at least conceivable that non-human animals have natural rights. I make this point in 
chapter 2.5. Whether or not any non-human animals actually have natural rights, 
specifically absolute ones, is a question which I take up in chapter 8. To treat the terms 
"human rights" and "natural rights" interchangeably is to presuppose, at the very least, 
that only humans actually do have natural rights, but at the most, that only humans can 
have natural rights. 
Natural rights are sometimes claimed to be inalienable. Inalienable rights are rights 
which cannot be given up. It makes sense to think of natural rights, in the way in which 
I have described them, as being inalienable. If one has natural rights necessarily, in 
virtue of the kind of creature one is, then one cannot give up that right so long as one 
remains that kind of creature. Alienating. rights is to be distinguished from waiving 
rights. When one waives a right one does not give it up. One simply declines to "stand 
on" one's right on a given occasion with regard to a specific person or people. One 
temporarily releases one or more of those who have a duty to respect your right from 
that duty. 
It is sometimes claimed that rights are absolute. I shall understand absolute rights to be 
rights which can never be justifiably overridden. The opposite of an absolute right is a 
non-absolute or overridable one. Although such a right may be very strong and rarely 
be overridden justifiably, there will be at least some occasions on which it would be 
justifiable to override it. 
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I have clarified what I mean by a number of different kinds of right. In the course of 
this thesis I shall mention other kinds of rights as well. However, I shall delay 
explaining them until I have reason to mention them. 1 
0.4) THE AIM OF THIS PROJECT 
The primary aim of this thesis is, as its title suggests, to provide a justification for 
rights. However, some clarification of this aim and what it entails is required. 
To justify rights is to show that they exist. It is to show why talk about rights is not 
fictional talk. In the previous section (chapter 0.3) I distinguished between a number of 
different kinds of right. Included amongst these were natural moral rights, non-natural 
moral rights and legal rights. It is not my intention to justify the existence of legal 
rights. They are justified by the law. If rights are incorporated in the law then legal 
rights exist. Thus, to determine whether or not legal rights exist in a given society, one 
simply needs to consult its law. 
Neither shall I be seeking to justify non-natural moral rights for reasons which I shall 
explain in chapter I. I . My focus will be on natural moral rights. However, for the 
sake of brevity, I shall often speak simply about "rights" rather than "natural moral 
rights" or "natural rights". When I mean to refer to legal rights or non-natural moral 
rights, I shall do so explicitly. 
Many may think that the task of justifying the existence of rights is obviously doomed 
from the start. They may think that clearly there are no such things as rights - that 
rights are fictional entities just like unicorns, fairies, centaurs and Santa Claus. 
However, to hold this view is, I believe, to be guilty of a naive reification of rights. It 
is true that we cannot physically point to something and say that it is a right, in the way 
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in which we can point to something and say that it is a dog or a lamp or a book. 
However, a right is not claimed to be a physical thing. It is not a noun, but rather an 
abstract noun. We do not claim that a particular abstract noun does not exist simply 
because we cannot provide an ostensive definition of it. I concede that while many 
abstract nouns - such as joy, grief and relief - cannot be physically pointed to, their 
instantiations can be empirically discernable. For example, I can point to certain kinds. 
of behaviour at a wedding - such as laughter and dancing - and say that I am witnessing 
an instance of joy. I cannot do the same for a moral right. However, this too is not 
alarming. Perhaps the best way to show this is to view a moral right as a particular 
kind of moral reason for acting or failing to act in certain ways. A moral reason is a 
special sort of reason for why we ought to behave in a particular way. Rights, duties, 
rules and other moral concepts can be viewed as being different kinds of moral reasons. 
If, for example, I have a right not to be killed, then we can say that there is a particular 
kind of moral reason - or more plausibly, a particular kind of complex web of moral 
reasons - why I ought not to be killed. 'Reasons', like 'rights', is an abstract noun. 
Thus reasons and rights are not things that can be physically pointed to, yet we do not 
deny that reasons exist. We regularly and with justification cite reasons for what we do 
and for the views we hold. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS 
1.1) HOHFELD'S ANALYSIS AND THE CORRELATIVITY OF RIGHTS 
In the early years of this century, Wesley N. Hohfeld discerned four different senses of 
the concept of rights 1. Although his analysis is of legal or jural rights, attention must 
be given to it because it helps to clarify the nature and scope of natural rights. 
Hohfeld called a right in the strict sense, a "claim-right". Such a right implies a 
correlative duty or obligation on the part of some other person or people. To say that A 
has a claim-right X against B implies that B has a duty to A regarding X. This duty 
may be negative in that Bis merely required not to interfere with A's X-ing. When B's 
duty is one of non-interference then the correlative right is negative. Alternatively the 
duty may be positive by requiring active assistance to A to facilitate his doing X. Then 
the correlative right is positive. The concept of a claim right and its correlative duty is, 
according to Hohfeld, neutral between these two possibilities. However, I shall argue 
later (chapter 1.3) that there cannot be positive natural rights. 
Claim-rights, Hohfeld observes, may be in personam or in rem. Rights in personam 
have correlative duties which are incumbent upon a determinate individual (or 
individuals). Such rights usually arise contingently as a result of promises, contracts or 
laws. In a promise, for example, one person receives an undertaking from a particular 
individual or individuals. The latter then have a duty towards the former to do what 
they promised. Rights in rem have correlative duties which are incumbent on everyone. 
Such rights can either arise contingently or they can exist ab initio. An example of the 
1. W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions. 
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former is my purchasing an object. Everyone else then has an obligation not to use that 
object without my consent. If there are any natural rights - those rights which are had 
by particular creatures simply in virtue of the kind of creatures they are - then they are 
examples of claim-rights existing ab initio. If, for instance, a creature has a (negative) 
right to life, then every moral agent has an obligation not to kill the right-bearer, not 
because of any contingently acquired rights, but because that creature is the kind of 
creature it is. 
The second sense of a right Hohfeld calls a (bare) liberty or privilege. It implies a 
correlative lack of claims on the part of another person on the right-bearer. Thus, if A 
has a liberty-right to X, then he has no duty not to X. In other words, B has a 
correlative "no-claim" on A not to X. Hart provides the following example of a liberty-
right2: Two people are walking down the street. Both of them see a ten-dollar note 
lying in the street some distance away and there is no way of ascertaining who the 
owner is. The money can be regarded as ownerless. Both of the parties have a liberty-
right to pick up and keep, the money. In other words, each is entitled to pick up the 
money, having no duty not to do so, but neither person has a claim on the other not to 
pick up the money. Thus the correlative of each person's liberty-right is not a duty (of 
non-interference) but rather a no-claim - that is no claim against the right-bearer not to 
pick up the money. 
It seems to me that a right as liberty - that is Hohfeld's second sense - is different from 
a right to liberty. If I have a right to liberty then others have a correlative duty to let 
me be free. If, however, I have a (right as) liberty, others simply lack a claim that I not 
perform certain actions. The right to liberty is therefore a claim-right on Hohfeld's 
account, whereas a (right as) liberty is not. 
2. H.L.A. Hart, "Are there any Natural Rights?" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 
81. 
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The third sense of a right according to Hohfeld is that of a Gural) power. An individual 
who possesses a right in this sense, has the power to alter existing (legal) relations or 
arrangements. It implies a correlative liability on the part of others. The opposite of a 
power is a disability. If one lacks the power to alter existing relations, then one has a 
disability in that regard. 
Hohfeld's fourth and final sense of a right is that of an immunity. Someone who 
·possesses such a right is immune to an alteration of legal relations or status. It implies a 
correlative disability. In other words, other parties have a disability in that they lack a 
power to alter one's legal position. One is immune to such change. 
Not all Hohfeld's senses of a right are of equal importance to an inquiry into moral 
rights. I shall only be looking at rights in their strict sense, that is, rights which 
Hohfeld calls claim-rights. Hohfeld's concept of a jural claim-right is easily translatable 
into the language of moral rights. This is less true of the other senses of a right which 
he discerns. 
Of moral claim-rights, I shall only be concerned with those that exist ab initio, in other 
words, with those which I have identified as natural rights. The reason for this is that 
natural rights are both the strongest and the most difficult to justify. Moral rights that 
arise contingently are easier to justify because they have as their foundation those 
events or circumstances from which they arise. One important reason for their relative 
weakness is highlighted by cases in which they conflict with natural rights and duties. 
One might think that because the right contracted into temporally succeeds the natural 
right, it also supersedes the natural right. However, as a rule, this is wrong. Such a 
conflict would annul the right contracted into, not the natural right. The reason for this 
is a general principle about the relationship between earlier and later duties: prima facie 
it is the case that, if one has a duty to some person A to do (or refrain from doing) X, 
22 
. then one is not at liberty to C<?ntract into duties with another person B, which conflict 
with and make one unable to fulfil one's original duty to person A. Were this not the 
case, one would be at liberty to release oneself from duties to others without their 
consent simply by taking on new duties - including the duty not to fulfil prior duties. 
This would defeat the point of others' having a claim on one. To have a claim on Joe, 
from which Joe can release himself without the claimer's consent, is not to have a 
claim on Joe at all. 
Of course, there are some exceptions to the general principle· that one cannot take on 
duties which conflict with earlier ones. For example, an earlier duty may be trivial 
whereas there is an urgency to take on a far more weighty duty. However, contingent 
rights that conflict with natural rights do not fall under this important kind of 
exceptional case. Natural rights are far from trivial. About this I believe there is 
consensus. There is controversy, however, about just how strong natural rights are and 
whether they can ever be overridden justifiably. Later (chapter 6.2, 6.3) I shall argue 
that some natural rights have absolute strength. For present purposes it is sufficient to 
say that the only conditions under which I believe natural rights can be superseded by 
contingent rights is when the parties involved in the right producing event and affected 
by it are autonomous and explicitly provide their informed consent to the new right and 
its implications for the original one. This is tantamount to a right-waiving. The original 
natural right is waived (or partially waived) by the right-bearer. One might think that 
the relative strength of natural rights in relation to contingent rights is diminished 
because natural rights can be waived. However, this is not so because contingent rights 
can also be waived. 
Given the fact that claim-rights that exist ab initio (ie natural rights) are most difficult 
to justify and that they are stronger than contingent claim-rights (ie non-natural rights), 
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my argument will focus on the former. It is a justification of this sort of right that I 
shall attempt to provide. 
The idea of a claim-right requires further analysis. Hohfeld regards "claim" and "right" 
(in its strict sense) as being synonymous. He uses the term "claim-right" to highlight 
this alleged synonymy. I deny that "claim" and "right" are synonymous. However, a 
right is one kind of claim. I shall say more about different kinds of claim in chapter 
6.1. 
I think that some ambiguity exists in the concept of a claim-right. On the one hand, it 
can mean that a right is a moral claim which a right-bearer asserts himself. On the other 
hand, the concept of a claim-right may refer to a moral claim that is made for a 
creature who is thereby a right-bearer. Which of these interpretations one accepts will 
determine whether or not on thinks that the ability to assert a claim is a necessary 
condition for having a right. This is a matter I shall take up towards the end of the next 
chapter (chapter 2.5). 
What has been established so far about the character of natural and non-natural rights is 
that they entail correlative duties. However, this is not all that characterizes them. I 
turn now to highlight another feature. 
1.2) THE STRENGTH OF RIGHTS 
A right is a very strong moral principle. Part of its strength derives from the correlative 
duty that others have to the right-bearer. These correlative duty-bearers do not simply 
have obligations, they have obligations to determinate people, namely the right-bearers. 
This differs from an ordinary obligation where although one may have an obligation, it 
is not to any determinate individual. For example, I may have an obligation to give 
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charity, but the obligation is not to give charity to a particular person or people. It 
follows from this that no person has the right (in its strict sense) to receive charity froin 
me. I shall say more about this in chapter 1.3. 
Another aspect of a right's strength is its moral power to override, at least to a great 
degree, other moral considerations including social utility. If a person has a right not to 
be treated in certain ways, then even if collective goals require that he be treated in 
these ways, his right not to be triumphs over this consideration, at least in general. It is 
this function which rights, correctly understood, fulfil. There is consensus that rights 
have this kind of strength and cannot in general be outweighed by other moral 
considerations. There is, however, disagreement about just-how strong rights are. 
Some, like Dworkin, believe that while rights generally triumph in competition with 
collective goals, there are circumstances of emergency in which they will have to 
yield3. Nozick, by contrast, believes that rights are absolute and can never be 
justifiably infringed. 
According to Nozick rights are appropriately viewed as being what he calls "side-
constraints"4 on action. Side-constraints are to be distinguished from goals in the 
following way. Actions can be directed towards the attainment of some goal. Actions 
which are so directed have end-constraints. The goal_ or end constrains the choice of 
action. This is because not all actions will lead to the given goal. If, for example, one's 
goal is to maximize utility, then one must act only in the way that leads to this goal. 
. ' 
One could have the minimization of rights-violations as a goal and then one would have 
to act in whatever way would achieve this goal. If, for example, violating a single right 
3. J.J. Thomson is another who believes that rights are not absolute. She distinguishes 
between infringing a right and violating a right. A right is infringed if that against 
which it protects is brought about. A right is violated if it is wrongfully infringed. 
Infringements of rights may be justifiable, violations are not. See J. J. Thomson 
"Some Ruminations on Rights" in W. Parent (ed.), Rights, Restitution and Risk, p. 
51. 
4. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 29. 
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would minimize rights-violation overall, then one would have to violate that single 
right. Here we have what Nozick calls a "utilitarianism of rights". I shall show later 
(chapter 3) that the moral problem with utilitarianism is attributable to the fact that it 
cannot adequately account for the true nature of rights. Utilitarianism of rights 
succumbs to the same problems (chapter 4.1). For Nozick, rights may not be violated 
even if their violation would prevent other more extensive violations of rights. 
According to him, rights are properly seen as constraining action not "from the end" 
but rather "from the side". A side-constraint proscribes or absolutely forbids certain 
actions. If rights are side-constraints, agents are forbidden to ·violate them, not simply 
to minimize their violation. 
Dworkin, drawing on a term from the world of cards, views rights as trumps5. Rights 
trump - that is, override, outweigh or outrank, at least in normal circumstances - other 
moral considerations such as those deriving from social utility. Many moral 
considerations can be brought to bear on any moral decision, but the presence of a right 
generally trumps these. Thus if a person has a right to life, then even if his death would 
serve important collective goals, he may not be killed because his right to life trumps 
this consideration. 
Although Nozick and Dworkin employ different imagery, according to both of them 
rights are capable of defeating other moral considerations, at least to a considerable 
extent. However, there is a subtle yet significant difference between the two. A 
constraint, by its very nature, enjoins the avoidance of certain action. It requires 
desisting from acting in certain ways rather than positively acting in other ways. In 
other words a constraint imposes a negative duty. A trump, on the other hand, is 
neutral between acts and omissions. It can entail either negative or positive duties -
duties not to act in certain ways and duties to act in certain ways. 
5. R. Dworkin "Rights as Trumps" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 153. 
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1.3) WHY NATURAL RIGHTS MUST BE NEGATIVE 
I shall now argue that there cannot be positive natural rights. I shall show that it 
follows from the combination of the characteristic features of natural rights that they 
must be negative. I have already made reference to these characteristic features. They 
derive from the fact that natural rights are both rights and that they are natural. In 
chapter 1.1 I showed that for something to be a right (in the strict sense of a claim) it 
must have correlative duties. If there are no correlative duties· - duties which are owed 
to the right-bearer, then there are no rights - claims which a right-bearer has against a 
duty-bearer. In chapter 0.3 I identified natural rights as those which exist ab initio in 
virtue of the right-bearer's nature alone (and not in virtue of the right-bearer's nature 
coupled with some contingency). To demonstrate why natural rights must be negative I 
shall show why moral tools possessing this combination of features must be negative. It 
is important to stress that it is the combination of features that makes positive natural 
rights an impossibility. It is possible, as I shall show, to have positive rights which are 
non-natural and positive natural obligations which are not correlated to rights. 
What are the difficulties involved in identifying the correlative duties of positive 
natural rights? Rather than answering this question in the abstract, I shall answer it 
with reference to an example of a positive right - the right to food - which would seem 
to be one of the most plausible candidates for a natural positive right. After all, our 
very strong interests in food must arise from our nature. A positive right to food is a 
right to be provided with food, or at least some minimum of food required for 
subsistence. I shall not dispute that people may have a positive right to food but only 
I 
that such a right could be natural in the sense of natural rights which I have defended. 
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If we say that the duty correlative to the proposed natural positive right to food is owed 
to all starving poor people; then the problem that we face, I want to argue, is one of 
intolerably strong moral responsibilities. If we have a duty to every needy person to 
provide them with food, then every moment that we are not engaged in providing food 
for every starving person we are violating rights. Every moment we spend reading the 
newspaper, visiting friends, mowing the lawn, doing philosophy and visiting the sick, 
we violate the rights of some people to food. Even if we work unceasingly (itself an 
impossibility) to provide food for (some of) the starving people of southern Africa, we 
would be violating the starving Ethiopians' or Somalians' rights to food. 
This seems to me to be an intolerably strong view of moral responsibility. How can we 
be bound by unreasonable moral obligations that require us to devote our every minute 
and cent to feeding, clothing and healing people for as long as there are poor people 
who need food, clothes and health care? It is simply not humanly possible to fulfil 
one's obligations so understood. If one assumes that "ought" implies "can", then if one 
is to say that A ought to do X, then it must at least be possible that A do X. To deny 
this is to assert (a) that A can fail to fulfil his duty because it is impossible to do so, 
and (b) that he is nevertheless responsible for not fulfilling his duty. If one is held 
reponsible for that over which one has no control, then the boundaries of moral 
responsiblity have no limit. The whole point of moral responsiblity is then lost. 
In reply to this, it could be argued that our duties to the starving are more limited in 
scope, and require of us only that we do our fair share in providing assistance. This is, 
for instance, the argument of Henry Shue in his article "Mediating Duties"6. He agr~s 
that the duties correlated to a right to food cannot be owed to everybody. He agrees too 
that we cannot even be obligated to contribute to feeding each hungry person because 
even that is not possible. However, he thinks that it is a mistake to say that the right of 
6. H. Shue, "Mediating Duties" in Ethics, Vol. 98, July 1988. 
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starving poor people to food entails universal duties - correlative duties which 
everybody owes to each starving poor person. He thinks that while a right to food must 
be possessed by each starving person, there can be a division of moral labour on the 
side of the correlative duties. In other words we can share the burden of feeding the 
poor. There are some features of Shue's view of how this burden should be shared that 
are important. Firstly, it does not involve our contributing to each and every poor 
person. I have already said that he agrees that such contribution is impossible. Sharing 
the burden involves contributing (perhaps in conjunction with others) to some poor 
people, while other contributors provide subsistence for other poor people. Secondly, 
the duties of contributors would be limited by considerations such as the resources 
available to them an9 the effectiveness of their potential contribution 7. 
Shue says that the cooperation and coordination required to share effectively and limit 
each person's obligations can be achieved through the medium of institutions - not only 
existing ones which will need to be developed but also new ones which we should 
establish. Institutions ought to mediate our duties to those who have rights to food. 
Shue believes that even if duties are mediated in this way they can still be correlated to 
rights. He says that for a duty to be correlated to a right, we need to have a rationale 
for laying the duty correlative to the right at the feet of an identifiable duty bearer. 
Where it is impossible or inappropriate to ascribe the correlative duty to everybody, we 
need special connections between the prospective right bearer, say A, and the 
prospective duty bearer, say B, in order to justify why it is Band not C or D who owes 
the duty to A 8. Where A and B share community and institutions such special 
7. It might also be said that one's duties to feed others are limited by one's own claims and 
those of one's family. It is not clear though how significantly this latter restriction 
would limit one's duties. Are one's own claims only as extensive and as strong as 
those to whom one must contribute, in which case one would still be obligated to 
give up nearly everything one has? Or are one's own claims to one's own resources 
more extensive or stronger those those of others, in which case one's obligations 
would be less burdensome? 
8. H. Shue, "Mediating Duties", in Ethics, Vol. 98, July 1988, pg 701. 
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connections can be found, Shue says. However, what happens when they do not share 
community and institutions? Shue has two responses to this. Firstly, he says that there 
is a danger of building in a catch-22. The catch-22 would be that A and B cannot have 
correlative rights and duties "because they share neither community nor institutions, but 
they do not share community or institutions, at least in part, because they do not 
acknowledge rights and duties to each other"9. Secondly, he claims that it is not 
entirely true that people in different parts of the world do not share any institutions. He 
thinks that certain modern international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund 
connect people around the globe in ways of which they ·may not be aware. He 
acknowledges, that these connections are crude and primitive. He says, however, that 
rather than dismissing them accordingly, we could strengthen them by acknowledging 
reciprocal rights and duties IO. 
Now it strikes me that there is something possibly circular in this argument - that we 
are required to acknowledge reciprocal rights and duties to establish that there are such 
rights and duties. But in any event, the kind of rights about which Shue is speaking are 
not natural rights. He admits that the primitive institutions and community which 
people throughout the world share, and which lay the foundation for the rights he 
mentions, are "social, not natural facts" 11 (my emphasis). If the special connections 
which ground the rights are not natural facts, then the rights themselves cannot be said 
to be natural. Moreover, the facts that determine the extent of each individual's d_uties -
such as the available resources and the effectiveness of the potential contribution - are 
also contingent. We may or may not have sufficient resources. Our contribution may or 
may not be effective. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid, pg 702. 
1_1. Ibid, pg 702. 
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A similar point can be made about the very premises of Shue's argument. He rests his 
argument on three assumptions: (1) the world human population is large; (2) the planet 
is rich in resources; and (3) human control over these resources is extremely uneven. 
These assumptions seem to be quite correct. However, they are not true as a matter of 
necessity. It is quite possible that someday the planet's resources will be extremely 
meagre and that there will be insufficient to feed all its human inhabitants. In such a 
world, Shue would have to admit, all the starving people would not have rights to be 
fed. What this shows is that the rights to food which the starving might be shown to 
have at present, are not rights which exist ab initio, but ones which they have 
contingent upon certain facts about the world. They are not natural rights. Indeed, the 
interests people have in food are grounded in their nature, but this is not sufficient to 
say that they have a natural right. Natural rights are possessed ab initio in virtue of the 
creature's nature alone, and not in virtue of its nature coupled with contingent facts 
about the world (see chapter 0.3). 
Onora O'Neill agrees that the duty to feed the poor cannot be universal, that is owed to 
all the needy, because nobody can feed all the hungry (or, Shue might add, even 
contribute an equal share to each starving poor person). She says further that special 
duties - those owed to specific people - are unable to remedy poverty and hunger 
because most of those who are hungry have no special relationship in virtue of which 
others should feed them. O'Neill concludes that rights discourse is inappropriate to the 
problems of famine and feeding the starving poor. She concludes further that because 
rights theory cannot accommodate these problems, rights discourse is in some way 
defective. I, by contrast, do not think that rights discourse, in its entirety at any rate, is 
inappropriate to the problem of feeding the poor. I want to say that we merely cannot 
speak about natural rights in this connection. Given this, I also want to reject or at least 
qualify O'Neill's further conclusion about the defective character of rights discourse. 
Talk about rights (in the broader sense that includes not only natural rights) can 
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accommodate to some extent the problem of feeding the poor. Where I have sympathy 
for O'Neill's claim about the defective character of rights talk is that I do not think that 
·rights are the beginning and end of the problem of feeding the poor. Other important 
moral tools are correlativeless duties - usually called "imperfect" duties. These are 
duties which are owed generally, rather than to determinate people who can claim the 
performance of the duty as their right. They are duties which are uncorrelated to rights. 
O'Neill argues that on a rights-approach rights and their correlative duties - usually 
called perfect duties - have primary importance. Such obligations must as a matter of 
justice be discharged because they can be claimed as a matter of right. Imperfect 
obligations, she claims, are merely a "matter of charity or optional benefi~ence1112 • She 
says that "once the discourse of rights is established, generosity, beneficence and help 
are likely to seem less important" l 3. Perhaps O'Neill is correct if she is saying that 
people who accept a rights discourse tend to denigrate charity, beneficence and other 
correlativeless obligations. However, it seems to me to be a mistake to treat such 
obligations as less important or as morally any less obligatory than obligations 
correlated to rights 14. Simply because a duty is imperfect, does not give us license to 
ignore it and not act on it. Merely because a duty is owed generally rather than to a 
determinate claimant does not mean that the duty-bearer is at liberty to disregard the 
duty. Indeed, the duty bearer is at liberty to exercise discretion with regard to how he 
discharges his duty but not with regard to whether he will discharge the duty at all. He 
may feed this poor person or he may feed that poor person, but he is not free to feed no 
poor people. 
12. 0. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger, pg 102. 
13. Ibid. 
14. I do see why a right-based theorist would have difficulty accommodating imperfect 
obligations because they cannot be derived from rights. However, the theory which I 
shall advance is not right-based and I reject right-based theories in part because they 
would have such difficulty. I shall say more about right-based theories and how my 
theory differs from these in chapter 10.3. 
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The view that there are not positive natural rights such as a right to food, should not be 
seen as being unpalatable. In the first instance, the importance and obligatoriness of 
correlativeless obligations must not be underrated. Some acts of beneficence or charity 
may, indeed, be supererogatory, but others are morally obligatory. Sometimes, the 
state may even be justified in enforcing such moral obligations. Secondly, not all rights 
have to be natural. People can acquire rights and these rights also have importance. 
There can be contingent circumstances in which positive rights - including the right to 
food - can be acquired. These rights will sometimes be against the state, but there are 
also circumstances in which they can be against particular individuals. For example, if 
a pauper is dying of hunger before my eyes and I can provide him with the food 
necessary to save his life, and there are not fifty or a hundred others like him also 
dying before my eyes, then he acquires a right against me. The special character of the 
circumstances gives rise to this. This acquired right would not impose an intolerable 
burden on me. However, it could not be said ab initio, without knowledge of all the 
contingent circumstances that impose the duty upon me to help him, that that victim 
had a right to my aid. Similarly, if I am the first 'person to arrive on the scene of an 
accident and, for example, I am not on my way to a desperately important meeting, I 
have the ability to help a victim of the accident and there is only one victim, etc, then 
he would have a right against me. Once again it would be an acquired right, not an ab 
initio right. 
We have positive duties to the needy. Under certain contingent circumstances they have 
positive rights against us. However, these rights cannot be natural. 
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CHAPTER2 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RIGHTS 
2.1) INTRODUCTION 
There have been many kinds of arguments for justifying rights. A number of important 
justifications of rights can be grouped together because they share the common 
characteristic of being based on the rationality of persons, even though they differ in 
numerous other ways. 
In this chapter, I shall examine three important examples of arguments which justify 
rights by appealing, in some or other crucial way, to the rationality of persons. These 
are the arguments of Immanuel Kant, Alan Gewirth and John Rawls. Kant's argument 
centres around the concept of autonomy, Gewirth's around the concept of agency and 
Rawls's around the notion of contract. 
I shall commence with an exposition of each of these arguments, showing the role of 
rationality in each. This will illuminate the common ground between the arguments. I 
shall also show where they diverge. 
Though separate critiques could be offered of each of these arguments, I shall advance 
a general criticism of ration~ity as a justification for rights - a criticism that is 
applicable to all three arguments. 
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2.2) AUTONOMY AND KANT 
The language of rights is largely absent in the writings of Kant. He is far more 
concerned with the notion of duty. Duty runs to the very heart of his moral philosophy. 
For Kant, to act rightly is to do one's duty for the sake of doing one's duty. 
Given this, why is Kant, the archetypal deontologist - philosopher of duty - so strongly 
associated with rights? One might maintain that this association is inappropriate and 
that Kant himself would have been shocked and displeased to have his theory seen as a 
justification for rights which are claims which individuals make on others. He was 
interested in duties which are obligations which individuals owe to others. However, I 
think that there are two good reasons why Kant has been construed as advancing a 
justification for rights. 
Firstly, given the correlativity of rights and duties, where there is a duty, there is often 
a right. It is true that I argued in chapter 1 that whereas all rights have correlative 
duties, not all duties are correlated to rights. Some duties are not owed to determinate 
individuals and thus do not have correlative rights. However, many duties are owed to 
determinate individuals and thus do have correlative rights. Such duties have a central 
place in Kant's thinking. 
This brings me to the second reason why I think Kant is seen as providing a 
justificatory argument for rights. Though Kant does not explicitly speak of rights, but 
rather of duties, rights are implicit in his theory. They are implicit in his theory, not 
only because of the correlativity of rights and duties - a principle to which he does not 
refer - but because his theory embodies the view that persons ought to be treated as 
ends in themselves and never simply as means. This is tantamount to saying that 
persons have rights, because rights serve to protect their bearers from being treated as 
35 
means to the ends of others. Thus, any argument that leads to the conclusion that 
persons ought to be treated as ends rather than means, is also an argument for persons' 
having rights. 
According to Kant, persons ought to be treated as ends (rather than means) because 
they are ends in themselves. To be an end in oneself is to have intrinsic value. Such 
value is to be contrasted with the instrumental value of a means. Inanimate objects, for 
example, are instrumenta1ly valuable. Their value derives from the ends to which they 
serve as means. The intrinsic value of an end in itself is also to be contrasted with a 
subjective end, that is an end or goal which is chosen by a particular creature as a result 
of what Kant ca1ls "inclination". An end in itself is not an end that happens to be 
chosen by this or that person. It has independent intrinsic value. To have intrinsic value 
is, for Kant, to have "dignity". 
However, it is not sufficient to say that persons ought to be treated as ends - that is to 
say that they have rights - because they are ends in themselves or because they have 
dignity. Why are persons ends in themselves? Why do they have dignity? Kant's 
answer is not altogether clear, but it has to do with his view of the autonomy of 
persons. Persons are ends in themselves because they are autonomous. 
Kant's concept of autonomy embodies two features: freedom and rationality. On Kant's 
account these two features are closely interrelated. They are connected wi~h Kant's 
dualist view of persons. According to him, persons have both a natural and a rational 
component. All natural things, he says, are governed by causal laws which are, in his 
terminology, external to those things. Natural things function in accordance with 
scientific laws. Creatures which are governed ·in this way are not free. They do not rule 
themselves. They do not decide how they are going to act. They are determined by an 
external law. Thus, they are heteronomous. 
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The natural component of persons is subject to the causal laws of nature and is 
accordingly unfree. However, because persons have not only a natural component, but 
also a rational one, they can transcend the causal laws of nature and thus act freely. To 
act freely is not to act according to no law. It is to act according to no external law. In 
other words, persons are free from the "external" laws of nature. This freedom is 
possessed in virtue of their rationality. To act rationally is, for Kant, to act according to 
one's own law - a rationally self-imposed law. This rationally self-imposed law is what 
Kant calls the categorical imperative. One formulation of this imperative is: 
"Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall 
become a universal law." 
The categorical imperative centres around the idea of moral universalizability which is 
the idea that if an action is morally right for one person in a particular set of 
circumstances, then it is right for every other person in the same circumstances. By 
acting in accordance with the categorical imperative one legislates for oneself. 
However, one simultaneously legislates for all other rational creatures as well. This 
may sound as though these other rational creatures are then heteronomous - they are 
governed by my legislation. However, this is not so. Since self-legislation is a rational 
legislation, all other rational creatures will impose the same law on themselves (and 
others, including me). They too will legislate the categorical imperative. 
It may appear strange to say, as Kant does, that acting in accordance with Law is to act 
freely. Surely to act freely is to act according to one's desires? However, for Kant, to 
act according to desires is to act on inclination which is to act within nature. Since 
nature is regulated and determined by laws external to one, one's action is thus not 
free. To be free, one must transcend nature and to do this one must act in accordance 
with reason. Reason legislates the categorical imperative. Thus, acting in accordance 
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with the categorical imperative is to act freely. To violate the categorical imperative is 
to violate reason. 
We are creatures who can act free from the determinations of nature. However, why 
are autonomous creatures such as ourselves considered ends in themselves and thus 
creatures that ought to be treated only as ends? It is at this point that Kant's argument is 
least clear. He says that every autonomous creature necessarily conceives of himself as 
an end in himself on grounds which are valid for all other rational creatures. Thus 
Kant's view is not only that "rational nature exists as an end ·in itself' 1, but also that 
rational creatures necessarily and rationally apprehend their own intrinsic value. This 
gives rise to the following formulation of the categorical imperative: 
"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time 
as an end". 
This is the formulation which explicitly states that persons ought to be treated as ends, 
rather than simply as means. The concept of rights, I said earlier, is implicit in this 
idea. The principle of every rational agent as an end in itself, Kant takes to be the 
"supreme limiting condition of every man's freedom of action"2. Similarly, rights limit 
the liberty of correlative duty bearers. Given the strength of rights, they could be 
construed as the supreme liberty-limiting conditions. 
Autonomous creatures are then conscious of themselves as legislators of universal law, 
the categorical imperative. As such they are ends in themselves and ought to be treated 
according!y. This leads to Ka~t' s idea of a "kingdom of ends". The ends to whom he 
refers are rational beings, that is persons. By "kingdom" he means "a systematic union 
of different rational beings under common laws"3. 
1. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 66. 
2. Ibid, p. 69. 
3. Ibid, p. 74. 
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In summary, Kant's view is that all members of the kingdom of ends have dignity. It is 
because they are ends in themselves and .because they have dignity, that they ought to 
be treated accordingly - never simply as a means, but always as an end. They are owed 
this treatment because they are autonomous - that is creatures with the capacity for 
rational self-government who apprehend themselves as such. 
2.3) AGENCY AND GEWIRTH 
Gewirth rejects Kant's argument - for reasons which I shall outline later. But although 
there are some crucial differences between their views, there are also some notable 
similarities. The central idea of Kant's argument, I have said, is "autonomy". 
Autonomy, on his view, incorporates both the idea of freedom and the idea _of 
rationality. On Kant's view, it is because persons have autonomy thus understood, that 
they have rights. The foundation of Gewirth's argument is "agency". This too 
embodies two concepts: freedom and intentionality. The combination of these concepts, 
Gewirth argues, logically commits the rational agent to the moral conclusion that agents 
have rights. 
According to Gewirth, all actions - including moral actions - have two generic features. 
Firstly, there is voluntariness or freedom, the feature that agents have control over their 
actions. Secondly, there is purposiveness or intentionality, the feature that an agent 
aims to attain some goal or end, and that that goal or end constitutes his reason for 
action. These two generic features of action are the starting point for his argument. 
Gewirth makes certain claims about the methodology of his argument. Firstly, he 
claims that it is dialectical rather than assertoric. By this he means that the argument 
proceeds from the perspective of the agent himself, rather than from objective 
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statements about agents. Secondly, he says that his argument is necessary rather than 
contingent, in that every agent is logically bound to accept the argument. 
, 
Now to the argument itselt4. Given the two generic features of action, Gewirth claims, 
whenever an agent A performs an action he must, wittingly or unwittingly, be assenting 
to the proposition: 
1) 11 I do X for end or purpose E. 11 
This is true, says Gewirth, because in accordance with the two generic features of 
action all actions are free and are directed to some end. Now, if a person freely chooses 
to act so as to achieve E, he must hold E to be valuable. Hence, the agent must accept: 
2) "E is good." 
In other words, A must hold E to be good (whether or not it actually is). Otherwise 
why would he have freely chosen to act so as to achieve that goal? 
Now, in order to act for E, the agent needs certain conditions of action, according to 
Gewirth. These necessary conditions for action are, he claims, closely related to the 
generic features of action. He calls them freedom and well-being. Well-being amounts 
to substantive conditions and abilities which are necessary either to act at all or to act 
with general chances of success in achieving one's goals. From the agent's standpoint, 
(2) therefore entails: 
3) "My freedom and well-being are necessary goods." 
4. Gewirth's argument is found if! a number of places. It is most extensive in his Reason and. 
Morality, but is also found in his Human Rights: Essays on Justification and 
Applications and "The Epistemology of Human Rights" in E. Paul, F. Miller (jnr.) and 
J. Paul (eds.), Human Rights. 
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This he says is equivalent to: 
4) "I must have freedom and well-being." 
If we take "must" in a strong sense - that is, as indicating genuinely necessary 
conditions of action - it follows from this, says Gewirth, that: 
5) "I have rights to freedom and well-being." 
The "rights" mentioned here are what Gewirth calls "generic rights" or "prudential 
rights", rather than moral ones. They are called generic because they are required for 
the satisfaction of the generic features of action - that is, they make action possible. 
They are called prudential because their only justification is that they satisfy the 
necessary conditions for the particular agent's own action. However, these prudential 
rights do entail moral rights, Gewirth claims. He argues in the following way: It 
follows from the foregoing that the agent A must accept: 
6) "I have rights to freedom and well-being because I am a prospective purposive 
.. _ .... ---. 
agent." 
Agent A cannot claim that he has these prudential rights only because he possesses 
some other more restrictive characteristic than being a prospective purposive agent, 
such as being white or being British. Were he to make such a claim, he would have to 
concede that were he not to possess that more restrictive characteristic, he would not 
have the prudential rights. He would then be in the position in which he would have to 
say "I do not have rights to freedom and well-being". However, that would_ involve 
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him in a contradiction with premise (4) which claimed that "I must have rights to 
freedom and well-being". 
It follows from (6) that: 
7) "All prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-being." 
This follows, Gewirth says, because of the principle o.f universalization. It is at this 
point, Gewirth claims, that the rights become moral rights. Finally, he says that since 
all humans are actual or prospective agents, these moral rights belong equally to all 
humans. 
Gewirth claims that the dialectical nature of his argument - that it proceeds from the 
perspective of the agent himself - does not detract from the stringency or categorical 
nature of the rights. This is because his argument is also a necessary one. "Whatever is 
necessarily justified within the context of agency is also necessary for morality", he 
claims5. 
I said earlier that Gewirth rejects Kant's argument for the rights of persons. Now that I 
have provided a brief outline of Gewirth's own arguments for rights, I shall say why he 
is not satisfied with Kant's. 
Autonomy, on Kant's understanding of it, is not an empirical feature of persons. The 
natural component of persons is empirically discernable and observable. However, the 
autonomy of persons is not connected with the natural component of their existence but 
with their rational component. This rational component is not empirically observable. 
5. "The Epistemology of Human Rights", in E. Paul, F. Miller (jnr.) and J. Paul (eds.), Human 
Rights, p. 21 . 
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Things which are not (empirically) observable are not things as they appear, but rather 
things in themselves. They are, in Kant's terminology, noumena not phenomeria. 
Gewirth takes the non-empirical nature of Kantian autonomy to be a defect. In his 
view, any justificatory argument for rights should satisfy a "condition of empirical 
reference116. Kant's argument fails to do so, while Gewirth's does not because it 
proceeds from empirically discemable agents and actions. 
Notwithstanding this, Gewirth provides a re-interpretation o(Kant along the lines of 
Gewirth' s own view, but in a way that seeks to satisfy the condition of empirical 
reference. Again he starts from the generic features of action. By virtue of the 
voluntariness or freedom of an agent's actions, he has autonomy. By virtue of his 
purposiveness or intentionality, an agent takes his aims or ends to be valuable. He goes 
on to say that the worth of the agent's ends entails the worth or dignity of the agent 
himself. Since the agent is the locus of the ends which have value and since he is the 
source of value attribution, afoniori the agent himself has value. If his ends have value 
or worth, and he is the source of their worth, then they only have worth if he has worth 
himself. 
Gewirth concedes, of course, that this is a re-interpretation of Kant. I suspect, though, 
that this re-interpretation is sufficiently drastic to sever it from Kant. The empirically 
discemable ends of purposive action are the equivalent of subjective ends in Kant's 
theory. They are ends which some agents have and other do not. Their value is thus 
relative to the agent. They are not objective ends - ends which all rational agents must 
have - which are valuable in themselves. Now, because they are subjective ends, we 
cannot derive the worth of persons from them, or so Kant would say. We can concede 
that the particular agents that have these ends do value them and are the source of their .... 
6. Ibid, P'· 10. 
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value, but that does not entail that the valuers are valuable. It appears then that the 
arguments of Kant and Gewirth constitute distinct and incompatible justifications for 
rights of persons. 
2.4) CONTRACTUALISM AND RAWLS 
Traditionally, rights have featured prominently in contractualist thought. However, 
their precise character and function varies from one contractualist theory to the next. 
Locke, for example, believes that in the state of nature one has three negative claim-
rights: to life, liberty and property. Locke takes these rights to be part of the law of 
nature, which he regards as synonymous with the law of reason and divine law. Thus, 
these rights are rationally apprehendable. He also takes them to be inalienable, which 
means that they cannot be discarded by contractual bargaining. Therefore, all three 
rights are taken into civil society - that is, into the society governed by the contract. 
Locke's contractualist view does not constitute a justification for rights. Rights are 
theoretically prior to the contract. They do not arise from, and are not justified by the 
contract. Since, in this chapter, I am examining contractualism as a justification for 
rights, I shall not devote further attention to a contractualist view of this kind. 
Rights have a different role in Hobbes's contractual theory. His view of the nastiness of 
the state of nature is well known. In it, one is free to do whatever one wants. There are 
no moral constraints, only practical ones. One is at liberty. One has liberty-rights. 
However, such liberty is not satisfactory, because everybody else also has it, and one 
lives with the constant dread of robbery, rape, maiming and violent death. Thus, 
rational agents agree to forgo many of their liberties because the mutual agreement to 
do so ensures a level of security. In both Locke's and Hobbes's theory rights exist pre-
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contractually. Because these rights exist in the state of nature, they are natural rights. 
However, whereas the rights in Locke's state of nature are claim rights, the rights in 
Hobbes's state of nature are liberty-rights. Furthermore, Hobbesian natural rights are 
with one exception not inalienable. You can give them up. The one right that you do 
not give up, on the Hobbesian view, is the right to preserve your own life. You retain 
this liberty right in the contract. On Hobbes's view of the contract you also acquire a 
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claim-right to life as well as a number of other claim rights. Since Hobbes's natural 
rights are liberty rights and are not justified by his contract, and since his claim rights 
are all non-natural, I shall not consider Hobbes's contract. -Rather I shall consider 
Rawls's theory of justice, in which natural rights do not precede the contract and which 
justifies natural claim rights. 
My construal of the place of rights in Rawls's theory is not uncontroversial. Dworkin 
for one, believes that there is a right that underlies the very bargaining conditions of 
Rawls's contract. I shall explain and respond to Dworkin's argument later. 
Rawls is concerned with justice. He regards justice as the first virtue of social 
institutions. The subject of justice, therefore, is the basic structure of society. Since it 
is this basic structure that distributes certain primary goods which are at its disposal -
rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth - Rawls is concerned 
with the justice of this distribution. 
Rawls describes a hypothetical position in which agreement about a choice of moral 
principles is to be reached. He calls this position the original position. Rawls does not 
believe that there ever was an historic original position in which moral principles were 
chosen. Rather he sees it as a hypothetical device for arriving at just principles. 
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Parties in the original position must be both free and equal. However, there is much in 
an ordinary bargaining situation that would compromise the freedom and equality of the 
parties. Different people are subject to different social circumstances. Some are rich 
while others are poor. Different people have different natural aptitudes. Some are 
strong and others weak. Some are clever and others not. Furthermore, different people 
have differing conceptions of the good. All these factors generate biases that would 
preclude a fair agreement. 
The equality of the parties in the original position is ensured by depriving them of 
certain knowledge, so that they are forced to choose from behind a "veil of ignorance". 
Rawls claims to impose only those constraints on that knowledge which are necessary 
for free and equal choice. In constructing the original position he claims not to assume 
more than he has to. In other words, he claims that he does not make unnecessarily 
strong assumptions. 
The restrictions that are placed on parties in the original position are designed to 
prevent them from knowing certain kinds of panicular facts. Knowledge of general 
facts about society, such as principles of economic theory and general psychological 
laws, is not restricted in any way. I shall mention the facts which the veil of ignorance 
conceals and explain why access to these facts would, according to Rawls, compromise 
the circumstances of equality required in the original position. 
First, and most obviously, a person in the original position is not allowed to know the 
place in society which he occupies. The justification for this is quite straightforward. 
Were he to know this information, he might well choose principles to favour those 
occupying such a position. This is exactly the chief obstacle to agreement in actual 
situations. If any kind of fair agreement is to be reached, parties to it will have to be 
deprived of knowledge of their social position. 
0 
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Allied to this restriction is the restriction against knowing one's natural talents and 
endowments. Were parties in the original position to know these facts about 
themselves, they could again choose principles to favour those possessing such features. 
Having talents, just as belonging to a certain class or racial group, is accidental. There 
is no reason, Rawls claims, why having them should benefit one in the way in which it 
would were parties in the original position to choose under conditions of knowledge 
about their particular circumstances. The same applies to the generation to which one 
belongs. Therefore, knowledge of this is also eliminated. 
Rawls also denies parties in the original position knowledge about their own conception 
of the good. He says that if this restriction were not imposed, people in the original 
position could choose principles that favoured their particular view. A communist, for 
example, could choose principles that favoured state control of the means of production 
and a capitalist could choose principles that favoured free enterprise. Under these 
conditions, agreement would not be attainable. 
Each party in the original position is also barred from knowing the special features of 
his psychology such as whether he has a brave temperament or an optimistic 
disposition. Rawls says that this knowledge may also prejudice them in the choice of 
principles. 
In addition to these restrictions, a party in the original position may not know the 
particular circumstances of his own society. For example, he does not know whether he 
lives in a very rich society in which only a few people live below the breadline or in a 
very poor society in which only a lucky few have enough to eat. This prevents him 
from calculating the probabilities of his being in any particular position in society and 
the conditions of that position, which Rawls thinks. would be unfair. 
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Knowledge constraints are not all that characterize the original position. Certain 
assumptions are also made about the motivation of parties in this position. 
Parties in the original position reason so as to advance, as far as possible, whatever 
system of ends they will turn out to have. Given the knowledge constraints operative in 
the original position, the assumption of altruistic or benevolent motivation - that parties 
in the original position will pursue systems of ends which others will turn out to have -
is simply not required. Thus, in accordance with his policy of not assuming more than 
necessary, Rawls does not make the assumption that parties in the original position are 
benevolent. 
Parties in the original position are also not malevolent in that they are not motivated by 
envy at all. This may seem to be an unnecessarily strong assumption, but Rawls 
provides justification. for it. One line of argument is his claim that parties in the original 
position would realize that it would be collectively disadvantageous to allow any 
envious motivations in the selection of principles. Their position in an actual society 
would be jeopardized if that society were subject to principles selected under the 
influence of envy. 
Rawls is not clear about who the parties in the original position are. He asserts that the 
original position is not a meeting of all actual or possible persons. Sometimes he asks 
us to consider it rather as a gathering of representative persons, that is persons 
representing different strata of society. On other occasions he speaks about a rational 
person. He is concerned with the free choice of a rational person in an original position 
of equality. He fluctuates between speaking about a single or plural number of rational 
persons. I do not think that this makes a difference. If there is a purely rational choice 
48 
to be made in the manner in which Rawls assumes, then any number of rational people 
would make the same choice. 
The characterization of the parties in the original position as rational persons is relevant 
to my inquiry here into rationality and rights-justificatory arguments and is particularly 
clear where Rawls argues that the original position is a procedural interpretation of 
Kant's ethics and where he provides a Kantian interpretation of his own theory. 
Rawls claims that it is not generality or universality that is central to Kant's ethics, but 
rather the idea that moral principles are the object of rational choice. Moral principles 
are chosen under conditions in which persons are free and equal rational beings, that is, 
as noumenal rather than phenomenal agents. Suitably deprived of knowledge, the 
parties behind the veil of ignorance choose under such conditions. Acting 
"autonomously" for Kant is to act according to principles which are the expression of 
one's nature as a free and equal rational being. Thus, because Rawls sees the original 
position as being occupied by free and equal rational beings, the parties in the original 
position, he claims, cannot choose "heteronomous" principles. The principles chosen in 
the original position must be categorical imperatives because they apply to a person in 
virtue of his being a free and equal rational person. 
Rational persons are the occupants of the original position. They choose their principles 
rationally. Rawls understands rationality in much the same way as other contractualists 
have done 7 - as the ability to take the most effective means to a given end. However, 
as we have seen, persons in the original position do not _know their particular ends. 
They do not have what Rawls calls a "thick" conception of the good. However, they do 
have what he calls a "thin" conception of the good: they know that they prefer more 
rather than less of the primary social goods. The basic primary social goods are, I have 
7. This point is made by L.W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights, p. 153. 
I 
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said, rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, and income and wealth. The parties 
in the original position know that they prefer more of these goods because these goods 
are, according to Rawls, all-purpose means to any ends, whatever the latter may be. 
That is to say, whatever "thick" conception of the good a person may tum out to have, 
he will require primary social goods to attain it. Thus, the primary social goods are 
things that any rational man would want and would want more of. The desire in the 
original position for these primary goods does not render the chosen principles 
hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives. This is because it is rational, Rawls 
claims, for the parties to desire those primary goods. Rawls has a theory of moral 
personality which illuminates why it is rational for the persons in the original position 
to want the primary social goods which Rawls says they want. His view of moral 
personality is a view of what it means to be a moral person. He claims that a moral 
person is moved by two highest-order interests which are interests to realize and 
exercise two powers of moral personality. Rawls claims that persons in the original 
position are moved by these interests. 
One of these is the capacity for a sense of right and justice. This is the ability to honour 
fair terms of co-operation. The implication is that since the persons in the original 
position are moral persons, as Rawls claims, they will adhere to the principles which 
they choose from behind the veil of ignorance. It would simply .be unjust to agree to 
principles when deprived of knowledge in the original position and then, when placed 
in society, to renege because one could advance one's own position by doing so. It 
would be unjust because justice is decided in the original position. The public 
knowledge of everyone's commitment to those principles chosen in the original position 
is what gives them the strength to be collectively chosen. In other words, it is the 
knowledge that all are agreeing to the principles that makes them worth agreeing to. 
The condition of publicity is suggested by the concept of a contract. 
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The second power of moral personality is the capacity to decide upon, revise and 
rationally pursue a conception of the good. 
Given this, one can see that of the primary social goods, basic liberties and freedoms 
are required for the rational pursuit (and revision, if desired) of a conception of the 
good, and for the development and exercising of a sense of right and justice. Powers 
and opportunities are necessary to give scope to various self-governing and social 
capacities of the self. Income and wealth are all-purpose means to achieving many 
ends. The social bases of respect, which are also primary social goods even though less 
basic, are necessary for persons to have a well-developed sense of their own worth as 
moral persons and to be able to realise their highest-order interests and advance their 
particular ends with self-confidence. 
It can be seen, Rawls says, that it is not necessary for persons in the original position to 
' 
have the same conception of the good in all its details. It is sufficient that they are 
moved by the two highest-order interests of moral personality, and that they therefore 
• all need the same primary social goods. Claims to these goods are known as 
"appropriate claims". 
Much has now been said about the original position and its conditions. What principles 
would be chosen by rational parties in this position? According to Rawls, they would 
choose the following two principles, which he calls the principles of justice: 
1) Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. 
2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; and 
b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of equality and fair 
opportunity. 
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The first of these principles is known as the principle of equal liberty. The second 
principle has two parts. The first of these is called the difference principle, and the 
second is the principle of fair equality of opportunity. 
One reason why parties in the original position would choose the second principle of 
justice, Rawls claims, is because it is rational for them to "maximin". To maximin is to 
maximise the minimum, that is, to make the position of the worst-off members of 
society as good as it could be. According to maximin we rank alternative choices of 
principles by their worst possible outcomes. We consider the worst that could happen 
as a result of a proposed choice and avoid that choice if the worst outcome of another 
choice is less bad. 
The decision to maximin would not necessarily lead a person to opt for an equal 
distribution of the primary social goods because inequalities might improve the position 
of the least advantaged members of society. This could happen in the following way. 
Additional social resources might be generated as a result of incentives that would be 
created by a relaxation of stringent and enforced equality. The one barrier that would 
lie in the way of this would be the presence of envy, but this has been shown not to be 
operative in the original position. 
However, as far as rights are concerned it is not the second principle but the first one 
which is most important. When the first principle speaks about a right to a scheme of · 
equal basic liberties, it is not referring to liberty rights, but to claim rights to liberty. 
This is evident from the list of liberties which Rawls provides. These include the right 
to vote and to be eligible for public office, the right to freedom of speech and assembly 
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and the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest8. These are claim rights. Unlike liberty 
rights, they have correlative duties of non-interference. 
There is a redundancy in Rawls's formulation of the first principle. This is made 
explicit when one highlights that the liberties to which the first principle refers are in 
fact rights. We see then that the first principle states that each person has an equal right 
to the most extensive scheme of equal basic rights compatible with a similar scheme of 
rights for all. It is redundant to speak of having a right to a right9. However, the 
redundancy in the first principle does not amount to a substantive problem. 
Alternatively phrased, the first principle could avoid it. 
The purpose of the principles of justice is to determine the distribution of the primary 
social goods. Of these primary goods, rights and liberties are distributed according to 
the first principle. According to this principle rights are to be distributed in a strictly 
equal manner. The remaining primary social goods - powers and opportunities, income 
and wealth - are distributed according to the second principlelO. 
Furthermore, the first principle is, in Rawls's words, "lexically" prior to the second. 
This means that the first principle must be satisfied before the second principle except 
in very poor economic conditions. There can be no compromise in the egalitarian 
distribution of rights, as prescribed by the first principle, for the purposes of achieving 
greater social and economic benefit, which is distributed according . to the second 
principle. 
So far I have outlined Rawls's original position and shown why Rawls takes the nature 
of its conditions to justify the chosen principles it yields. However, this is not 
8. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 61. 
9. Rex Martin makes this observation: R. Martin, Rawls and Rights, p. -29. 
10. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 61. 
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uncontroversial. Dworkin argues that the original position is not the foundation of the 
justificatory argument, but rather "one of the major substantive products of the theory 
as a whole" 11 . There is, he says, a "deeper theory" that provides philosophical 
arguments for the conditions of the original position. According to Dworkin, this deep 
theory must be one that, to use his famous phrase, takes rights seriously 12. This is 
because the very idea of a contract accords each party in the bargaining position a 
power of veto which can be used to protect interests and rights. Since agreement must 
be unanimous, if a particular party does not agree then there is no contract. Dworkin 
discusses what the basic right could be and concludes that it must be a right (of all 
pe~sons) to equal concern and respect13. 
If Dworkin is correct, there is a right that does not arise from the contract and thus is 
not justified by the contract. Rather it is precontractual. If this is so, then it appears that 
Rawls's theory is not unlike Locke's in the way in which I have suggested. 
However, there are two responses to this: one less bold than the other. Firstly, one 
could accept Dworkin's view and also claim that Rawls's contractualism justifies rights. 
To concede that there is a right that is pre-contractual does not preclude the possibility 
that the contract justifies further rights, even if it does .not justify the basic right to 
equal concern and respect. By contrast, the contractualist views of Locke and Hobbes 
do not justify any new natural rights. One problem might appear to remain on this 
interpretation, however. Dworkin takes a "natural" right to be one that is not the 
"product of any legislation, or convention, or hypothetical contract" 14. Accordingly, 
the only natural right could be the basic right - that is the pre-contractual right. Any 
right that was justified by the contract would, on Dworkin 's view, not be a natural 
right. But I do not share Dworkin's conception of a natural right. I agree that a right 
11. R: Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 158. 
12. Ibid, p. 169. 
13. Ibid, pp. 179, 180. 
14. Ibid, p. 176. 
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that arises from law or convention is not natural, but a hypothetical contract, such as. 
Rawls's, is not a law or convention. It is precisely because it is not an actual contract, 
but rather a rational tool or expository device for arriving at principles of justice, that it 
can justify natural rights. 
That then, is the meeker reply to Dworkin's challenge to the justificatory function of 
Rawls's theory. The bold response is to deny that Dworkin is correct or, more 
accurately, to deny that his arguments for that conclusion are correct. 
When he says that the original position is some mid-point between deep theory and 
principles, rather than being itself the foundation of the principles, is he ascribing this 
view to Rawls himself, or is he saying that this is what is in fact the case? I think that 
Dworkin is making both claims. 
In support of his claim that Rawls does not view the original position as a foundation 
for his argument, he quotes the following description by Rawls of the original position: 
I have emphasized that this original position is purely hypothetical. It is natural 
to ask why, if this agreement is never actually entered into, we should take any 
interest in these principles, moral or otherwise. The answer is that the 
conditions embodied in the description of the original position are ones that we 
do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so 
by philosophical reflection. Each aspect of the contractual situation can be given 
supporting grounds. . .. On the other hand, this conception is also an intuitive 
notion that suggests its own elaboration, so that led on by it we are drawn to 
define more clearly the standpoint from which we can best interpret moral 
relationships. We need a conception that enables us to envision our objective 
from afar: the intuitive notion of the original position is to do this for us. 15 
15. Ibid, pp. 157, 158. Quoted from J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 21, 22. 
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Apparently Dworkin understands by the statement that we are persuaded to accept the 
conditions of the original position by philosophical reflection, that there is an 
underlying deep theory that leads us to accept the said conditions. However, I disagree 
with this reading of Rawls. When he makes the claim about philosophical reflection 
persuading us of the need to accept the conditions of the original position, I understand 
him to be referring to the kinds of argument for each condition of the original position 
which I have already mentioned. Thus, for example, we are persuaded to accept the 
condition that parties in the original position do not know their place in society because 
that would lead to bias. Reflecting on this reason is a philosophical ground for 
accepting the condition of ignorance about one's social standing. This is what Rawls 
means when he says that· "each aspect of the contractual situation can be given 
supporting grounds" 16. 
I think, therefore, that Dworkin misconstrues Rawls's own view of the function of the 
original position. Rawls, I think, does not take it to be the mid-point between a deep 
theory and the principles of justice. This is sufficient to justify my classification of 
Rawls's theory as a contractualist view that purports to justify rights. I am claiming that 
Rawls is attempting to defend a contractualist view that does not presuppose, but rather 
seeks to justify rights. 
However, to understand Dworkin clearly we need to ask why he thinks that Rawls's 
original position is actually a mid-point between a deep theory and the principles of 
justice. The starting point of Dworkin's argument is that a "hypothetical contract is not 
simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all1117. The question then 
arises, why one should abide by principles one would agree to but did not actually 
16. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21. Quoted by R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 
157. 
17. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 1 51 . 
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agree to. This is what Rawls meant when he said: "It is natural to ask why, if this 
agreement is never actually entered into, we should take any interest in these 
principles" 18. 
The obvious response, and one which Dworkin anticipates19, is that the original 
position is intended to model conditions of fairness and this is why we should accept 
t.he principles it justifies. However, Dworkin claims that the conditions of ignorance in 
the original position do more than simply set boundaries within which rational 
calculations of self-interest can be made. They actually · affect the calculations 
themselves. This he takes to be unacceptable. He says that if people were to know their 
talents, some might prefer different principles which would allow them to take 
adva.ntage of their talents. Thus, the ignorance enforced on the parties in the original 
position affects their calculations themselves. Rawls's response to this is that it is 
precisely because knowledge of one's natural talents could lead to a biased choice of 
principles, that parties in the original position should be denied such knowledge. This, 
Rawls claims, is what fairness dictates, even if the nature of the calculations themselves 
are altered as a result. 
Dworkin goes on to consider the role of moral "reflective equilibrium" in Rawls's 
theory and its significance for the original position. There is often a .tension between 
our moral intuitions on the one hand - our specific judgements about what we take to be 
right and wrong - and our moral theory or principles oQ the other. According to 
Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium, this tension is not properly resolved by blindly 
following either one's intuitions or one's principles. Rather, one must attain a reflective 
equilibrium between intuitions and principles. This means that, on the one hand, our 
moral theory or principles must take account of our moral intuitions, but at the same 
time, our intuitions should be sensitive to our theory. Thus, we need both to ammend 
18. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21. 
19. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 153. 
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our theory to suit the intuitions and also to adapt our intuitions to suit our theory. The 
balance that is achieved is called reflective equilibrium. 
Dworkin argues that it is not clear what the connection is between the original position 
and reflective equilibrium. The original position is neither part of our moral intuitions 
or judgements, nor part of our moral theory or principles. He alleges that reflective 
equilibrium is operative between the two principles of justice and our particular 
judgements. The implication of this is that the original position is obsolete as a 
justificatory device. 
However, it seems to me that Rawls does account for the justificatory significance of 
the original position. In his book A Theory of Justice, he has a section entitled "The 
original position and justification", which title is itself illuminating. In it he seems to 
propose a two-prong idea of justification. Firstly, justified principles are those which 
are chosen under conditions of fairness which Rawls believes characterizes his original 
position. Secondly, the principles chosen in the original position must "match our 
considered convictions or extend them in an acceptable way"20 - that is, they must be 
in a state of reflective equilibrium with our moral intuitions or judgements . 
. 
Dworkin does consider something like the first of these justificatory features. He 
suggests that perhaps "it is one of the conditions we impose on a theoretical principle, 
before we allow it to figure as a justification of our convictions, that the people the 
p~nciple would govern would have accepted that principle, at least under certain 
conditions ... 1121 . He rejects this view because it "is certainly not part of our 
established political traditions or ordinary moral understanding that principles are 
acceptable only if they would be chosen by men in the particular predicament of the 
20. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 19. 
21. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 157. 
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original position 1122 . That, however, is beside the point. It is precisely this criterion 
that Rawls is suggesting we adopt in keeping with the contractualist tradition. Other 
theories have other notions of justification. There is no one notion of justification 
which is part of our "ordinary moral understanding". There are a variety of competing 
ideas of what counts as justification. The contractualist idea of choice under certain 
circumstances and by the parties concerned is one such idea. It may be a weak idea but 
to show this it is not sufficient to state that it is not part of our "established political 
traditions" or "ordinary moral understanding", because no other idea of justification is 
either. 
I have argued against Dworkin's arguments that Rawls's original position constitutes a 
mid-point between a deep theory and the principles of justice. Other critics of Rawls 
have argued for a similar conclusion to Dworkin's, but in different ways. Nage123, for 
example, has argued that the original position is not neutral. It models rather than 
justifies the conclusions which it yields. Thus, it presupposes, even if unwittingly, a 
particular view - a brand of liberalism. 
To an extent, Rawls can concede that the original position is modelled to produce the 
particular principles which it does. This is part of the idea of reflective equilibrium. 
Thus, whether the criticism is damaging to Rawls depends on whether the original 
position is illegitimately tailored to yield the principles it does. I shall not consider the 
specific arguments of Nagel and others that the original position is illegitimately 
tailored. Rawls's justificatory enterprise may or may not succumb to these arguments, 
but they are not of primary interest here. In this section I have simply wanted to 
provide an account of Rawls's theory and to point to one important kind of criticism -
one that attacks the justificatory power of the original position. I focused on Dworkin 
22. Ibid. 
23. T. Nagel, "Rawls on Justice" in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls. 
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m this regard because he ascribes to Rawls the view that there is a deep theory 
underlying the original position. This ascription, I argued is mistaken. 
In the next section, I shall offer a criticism that is applicable to Rawls's as well as 
Kant's and Gewirth's arguments for justifying rights. 
2.5) CRITIQUE 
The rationality of persons is central to each of the justificatiohs for rights discussed in 
this chapter. For Kant, it is the rationality of persons that makes them ends in 
themselves who ought to be treated accordingly. Rights ensure that they are treated as 
ends and not simply as means. For Gewirth, an agent is logically committed to the 
proposition that all agents have rights. Only rational creatures can be genuine agents. 
For Rawls, principles of justice - including an equal distribution of rights - would be 
·chosen by rational persons in an original position of equality. 
I have not attempted to evaluate each of these.justifications in turn, to determine 
whether or not they succeed in justifying rights. Rather, I want to offer a criticism that 
attacks the very starting point of each of these justifications. I want to show that their 
starting point - the rationality of persons - is wrong. 
By taking the rationality of persons as the relevant starting point, these arguments make 
the assumption that rationality - or, in Rawls's case, being a member of a rational 
species - is essential for having rights. If rationality is the basis of an argument for 
rights, then where rationality - or membership of a rational species - is lacking, rights 
are lacking. For Kant, a non-rational creature cannot be autonomous and therefore 
0 
cannot have rights. For Gewirth, non-rational creatures cannot be genuine agents and 
therefore cannot have rights. When agents universalize their prudential rights, thus 
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yielding moral rights, they universalize their rights to all other agents. Agents are 
logically committed to the rights only of other agents. For Rawls, non-rational 
creatures are not parties in ·the original position. The principles that parties in the 
original position choose govern the treatment of rational creatures. Rawls does think 
that parties in the original position will choose a principle of paternalism "to insure 
themselves against the possibility that their powers are undeveloped and they cannot 
rationally advance their interests, as in the case of children; or that through some 
misfortune or accident they are unable to make decisions for their good, as in the case 
of those seriously injured or mentally disturbed1124. However, there are simply no 
principles governing the treatment of non-human non-rational creatures. This is not 
only the case in the original position, but also in the other stages of Rawls's sequence: 
at the hypothetical constitutional stage, the legislative stage and the judicial stage. No 
later stage is constrained by principles concerning the treatment of non-rational animals 
and rational non-benevolent parties in each stage have no reason to give a thought to 
non-rational animals, except in so far as it affects them. This is not to say that at one of 
the later stages - perhaps at the legislative stage - rules governing the treatment of non-
rational animals will not be enacted, but there is nothing that necessitates this. 
Rawls acknowledges this deficiency in his theory. He maintains that "it is wrong to be 
cruel to animals1125 and that there are requirements about how they should be treated. 
However, he admits that the contractarian idea does not tell us how "to conduct 
ourselves towards animals"26 and that "it does not seem possible to extend the contract 
doctrine so as to include1127 animals. 
I am not saying at this stage that non-rational creatures, such as animals, do have 
rights. I am only saying that we cannot assume from the outset that they do not. By 
24. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 248-249. 
25. Ibid, p. 512. 
26. Ibid, p. 17. 
27. Ibid, p. 512. 
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using rationality as the starting point for the justification of rights, we make just this 
assumption. It is possible that rationality is a sufficient condition for having rights, but 
it cannot be assumed that it is a necessary condition, that if one is not rational then one 
necessarily lacks rights. One could possess some other relevant characteristic. 
There is nothing about the nature of a right that entails that it can only be possessed by 
a rational creature. In the previous chapter, I highlighted an ambiguity in the concept of 
a "claim-right". I said that it could mean that a right is a moral clajm which a righ,t-
bearer asserts. If this is so, then being able to assert a moral claim is a necessary 
condition for having rights. I imagine that only rational creatures could assert a moral 
claim. Therefore, if we adopted this interpretation of "claim-right", being rational 
would be a necessary condition for having rights. However, "claim-right" may also 
refer to a moral claim that is made either by or on behalf of the right-bearer. If this is 
so, then being rational is not a necessary condition for having rights. I see no reason 
why we should opt for the former, more exclusive interpretation of the idea of a claim-
right. Why should only those creatures that are capable of asserting a moral claim have 
a moral right? It is in the nature of moral claims that they can be asserted on behalf of 
others, for instance, in the context of the treatment of animals, infants, unconscious 
adults and senile geriatrics, as well as slaves and prisoners. In doing so we do not 
violate the conceptual logic of a claim. There is no reason why the same could not be 
true of rights which are trumping moral claims. The notion of a trumping moral claim 
does not imply that only rational creatures can have such claims, though they may in 
fact be the only creatures that have them. In other words, it may be the case that moral 
claims as strong as rights can only be made/or creatures that happen to have the ability 
to make claims. However, it would not be because of this ability that they have rights, 
but for some other reason, perhaps because they have certain higher-order interests. 
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Whether rationality is a necessary condition for having rights is related to an important 
distinction between two types of rights theories: Choice or Will theories, on the one 
hand, and Interest or Benefit theories, on the other. Choice theories see rights 
essentially as powers to exercise claims. The right bearer has a power over the 
correlative duty bearer. He can either demand that the duty be fulfilled or he can 
release the duty-bearer from the duty. Interest theories see rights as essentially 
guaranteeing certain benefits for the right bearer. 
Clearly, choice theories will treat rationality as a necessary condition for having rights. 
It is only rational creatures which have the capacity to choose whether or not to 
exercise powers over duty bearers. Interest theories can accommodate the view that 
rationality is not ~ necessary condition for having rights, but they are not committed to 
this view. There are no conceptual barriers to a non-rational creature being benefited as 
there are to a non-rational creature exercising discretion over the fulfilment or release 
from duties. At the same time, the fact that non-rational creatures can be benefited by 
the possession of rights, does not entail that they must be so benefited. Thus, interest 
theories are neutral with regard to whether or not non-rational creatures have rights. 
Benefit theories of rights have been criticized because they make the notion of a right 
redundant. If there is a correlative duty which must be fulfilled and this duty benefits 
the creature to whom the duty is directed, then what conceptual wo~k does a right do? 
In choice theories, both the correlates - right and duty - do conceptual work. The duty 
captures what is owed by the duty-bearer to the right-bearer. The right is the power to 
enforce the duty - morally or legally, as the case may be - or to release the duty-bearer 
from the duty~ 
Benefit theories can, I believe, respond to this. For them, the right is the ground of the 
correlative duty. It is the important interest which the right-bearer has in whatever the 
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right is protecting that gives rise to the correlative duty. Not all duties arise in this way. 
Many duties are not correlated to rights. In the previous chapter I mentioned the duty 
to give charity as an example. This duty is not correlated to any right to receive 
charity. Thus, the important conceptual work which rights do, is that they (1) ground 
some duties and (2) distinguish those duties which are owed to determinate creatures 
from others which are not. 
Criticism has also been directed against choice theories. In the legal domain, choice 
theories are better suited to rights in civil and contract law. Here, the right-bearer does 
exercise powers over the duty-bearer. He can stand by his right and demand the 
fulfilment of the correlative obligation or he can extinguish the correlative obligation. 
However, there are also legal rights protected by the criminal law, such as rights not to 
be killed or maimed. In most legal systems, the right bearer does not have the choice 
whether or not he wishes to enforce those rights. One is rarely permitted to waive 
them. Those who violate them are prosecuted irrespective of whether the right-bearer 
lays charges28. 
Choice theorists could respond. They may say, for example, that their view is not a 
descriptive one - that they are not purporting to reflect current legal concepts of rights. 
Instead they are making a conceptual claim about what rights essentially are rather than 
how they are interpreted - a claim which shou~d be heeded by all who engage in rights 
discourse, including legistators and judges, to attain conceptual clarity. 
I think that the choice to enforce or waive a correlative duty can constitute an important 
feature of some rights. However, I believe that there is a more basic value from which 
the importance of choice stems. That value is the interest of the right-bearer. Some· 
right-bearers have deep interests in having a power over the correlative duty. It is 
28. H.L.A. Hart acknowledges this problem. See H.L.A. Hart, "Bentham on.Legal Rights" in 
A.W.B. Simpson (ed.), OxfordEssaysinJursiprudence, Second Series, p .. 197. 
64 
important for them to be able to waive the duty. In fact, it is sometimes just as 
important to be able to waive the duty as it is to enforce it. For example, many people 
think it valuable to have a right to life. This is because we have a deep interest in 
living. However, sometimes it is not in your interest to continue living. You might say 
this if you were suffering excruciating pain from a terminal disease. In such cases, it 
may be equally important to you to be able to waive the correlative negative duty not to 
kill you. Failing to have this choice makes rational creatures slaves to their rights, 
when rights are actually intended to serve their bearers. However, not all creatures 
have interests in having or exercising powers over the correlative duty bearers. Some 
creatures lack the cognitive equipment that makes this valuable to them. It is because 
they have no interest in choice, that choice cannot be an important feature of any rights 
which these creatures may have. 
Thus, I am suggesting that interest or benefit is more basic than choice. Rights protect 
interests, though some creatures will have interests in choice in addition to other 
interests. My view then could be construed as a benefit view or alternatively as some 
kind of hybrid view. Either way, it can accommodate the possibility that non-rational 
creatures may be capable of having rights. 
Kant, Gewirth and Rawls take the rationality of persons as the starting point for their 
justifications of rights. I have argued that this starting point is mistaken because it 
excludes, by assumption, non-rational creatures as possible rights bearers. All that this 
shows is that rationality is not necessary for having rights. However, it may be the case 
that rationality is a sufficient condition for having rights. Whether or not the arguments 
of Kant, Gewirth and Rawls succeed in showing that it is, is a question which I have 
not addressed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UTILITARIANISM AND RIGHTS 
3.1) WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM? 
Consequentialist moral theories judge the moral character of an action by the kind of 
consequences it produces. Good actions are those that have only good consequences, or 
whose good consequences outweigh the bad ones. Similarly, a bad action is one with 
exclusively or overall bad consequences. The consequences considered include both 
immediate and distant ones. No consequence of an action, if indeed it is a consequence 
of that action, can be considered too distant to be excluded from consideration. 
Consequentialist, or goal-based theories (as they are sometimes known), prescribe 
actions that maximize good consequences and minimize bad ones. The concern with the 
maximization (of good) follows from the focus on consequences. If an action is judged 
by the kind of consequences it produces, then the better the consequences the better the 
action. Therefore, the action with the best (that is, maximum good) consequences is the 
best action and the one which one ought to perform. Consequentialists claim that moral 
actions have a goal - the production of the best consequences. Thus they say that one's 
choice of action ought to be determined by what will best attain this goal. 
Utilitarianism is one form of consequentialism. Since it is the most influential form, I 
shall consider it alone. The kind of consequence which utilitarianism seeks to maximize 
is the production of utility. Utilitarianism seeks the maximization of utility (and 
minimization of disutility). 
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Utility has been variably understood. Some, such as Bentham, have viewed it as 
pleasure (and the absence of pain). More popularly and plausibly, it has been taken as 
the satisfaction of desires or preferences. The latter interpretation, which will be the 
view which I shall explore, is more plausible simply because we think that there is 
more to good than pleasure alone. We want more than mere pleasure. I shall say more 
of this later (chapter 5.1). Sometimes we do not even want pleasure. 
Thus utilitarianism is a goal-based theory that seeks to maximize utility. In utilitarian 
calculations of the utility of possible outcomes, everybody's preferences count equally. 
' 
That is to say, nobody's preferences count for more or less simply because they belong 
to a particular person. However, strong preferences or intense desires count 
proportionally more than weaker ones, irrespective of whose are whose. The 
satisfaction of a desire which is more intense and I or is shared by more people will 
have a greater impact on the total utility, which consists of the sum of all satisfied 
desires (minus the disutility of frustrated desires). 
Needless to say, the above description of utilitarianism is very terse. However, it 
captures the essential features of such a view. There are many forms of utilitarianism, 
but my intention is not to provide a description and examination of each. Rather, I shall 
discuss utilitarianism very generally, showing why it must fail. I shall mention forms of 
utilitarianism which attempt to overcome the problems which I shall raise, but shall 
argue that these too must fail. 
3.2) PROBLEMS WITH UTILITARIANISM 
Utilitarianism· has a number of problems of considerable importance. For example, it 
has a maxima.I view of responsibility. On the utilitarian view, responsiblity for an act 
implies responsibility for all its consequences. Whereas non-consequentialist theories 
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may be concerned with some consequences, one characteristic feature of 
co,nsequentialist theories (including utilitarianism) is· that they are concerned with all 
the consequences of one's actions. The more consequences of one's actions for which a 
theory holds one responsible, the greater the scope of responsibility. Since 
utilitarianism holds one responsible for all the consequences of one's actions it has a 
maximal view of responsibility. 
However, there is more to utilitarian responsibility than this. One is responsible not 
only for one's own acts and their consequences, but also for one's omissions and their 
consequences. Williams calls responsibility for one's omissions "negative 
responsibility" 1. Furthermore, one is responsible for the consequences of one's actions 
and omissions even if these include the acts or omissions of others2. Thus, on a crude 
utilitarian view, if a terrorist threatened to kill ten innocent people unless I killed one, I 
would be responsible in a strict sense for the death of nine people if I failed to obey his 
ultimatum. 
It is evident from this that related to the utilitarian's maximal view of responsibility is 
what Nagel has called3 an agent-neutral perspective. From such a perspective, what is 
of ultimate importance is not what an agent does, but rather what happens. 
Another type of problem for utilitarianism is epistemological. How can one know what 
the consequences of one's actions are going to be? While it is true that we often have a 
very good idea what the immediate consequences will be, this is not always the case 
and the more distant the consequences the less sure we can be of them. Yet the 
utilitarian must, I believe, acknowledge that even these consequences count. If only 
those consequences of which we can be reasonably sure, can count, utilitarianism will 
1. J.J.C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, p. 95. 
2. Ibid, p. 93. 
3. T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, pp. 152, 1 53, 158 -163 and chapter IX. 
'---· 
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end up considering very few consequences. The consequences of an action include not 
only those of which we can be sure in advance, but all others as well. Accordingly, 
they must all bear on determining the utility of the action. 
Another epistemological problem pertains to the measurement of utility. How does one 
compute the strength of opposing desires? It is all very well to say that we count 
everybody's preferences of equal strength equally, and that proportionally stronger 
desires weigh more, but how exactly does one apportion weight? How does one 
measure quantity of desires against intensity of desires? It is the indeterminacies in 
these areas that have allowed utilitarians to circumvent, at the practical level, a number 
of embarrassing implications of their theory. Consider, for example, the band of nazis 
whose desires would be satisfied were they to kill their Jewish prisoner. On a crude 
utilitarian view, utility would be maximized were the Jew killed. However, a utilitarian 
seeking to avoid this consequence of his theory might exploit the indeterminacies I have 
mentioned, by claiming that the intensity of the Jew's desire to live is so strong that it 
overrides even the sum of desires of all the nazis to have him killed. This may be 
plausible when the band of nazis is relatively small. The bigger it gets, the less 
plausible such an approach becomes. 
I do not intend to discuss any of the above problems. While I think that they are very 
signficant problems that pose serious threats to utilitarianism, they are not closely 
related to the question of rights. The problem which I wish to examine is, as I shall 
show, closely connected to the concept of rights. 
This problem is most obviously faced by utilitarianism in its "direct" or "unrefined" 
form. This form of utilitarianism, which is known as act-utilitarianism, assesses the 
utility of individual acts and omissions. The problem is that it justifies and requires 
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actions which our deepest intuitions tell us are immoral. It can, for example, require us 
to kill one person for the benefit of a group of others. Consider the following situation. 
A doctor has six patients in a ward. Five of these require vital-organ transplants if they 
are to survive. The sixth patient is in hospital for a simple appendectomy. He is 
otherwise in perfect health. By some miracle, their tissue types are all compatible. 
There are no (brain-) dead donors and so the doctor's only (or best) chance of saving 
the lives of the five patients is to use the organs of the sixth. This would, of course, 
entail killing the sixth patient. Utility would be maximized wete five lives saved, even 
if one other person had to be killed. Therefore, it would seem that an (act-) utilitarian 
would have to prescribe killing the one patient to save the other five. (A utilitarian may 
try to confound this example by saying that the five prospective organ recipients are all 
childless, bachelor tramps, while the sixth patient is an important scientist with a 
family. Such considerations may equalize the utilities, but in constructing our example 
we can easily suppose that it is the sixth man who is a childless bachelor tramp while 
the other five are all scientists with families. A utilitarian may also try to avoid the 
problem by pointing to unfortunate consequences of killing the one. For example, one 
consequence is that people will feel insecure about entering hospitals for minor surgery. 
However, once again we can construct the example in such a way as to exclude such 
consequences or have them overridden by others.) 
It seems quite clear that in appropriately described circumstances, the act which would 
maximize utility would be to kill the one to save the five. To leave the five to die, 
while successfully performing the appendectomy would not produce the maximum 
utility. The utilitarian's course of action would, therefore, have to be to kill the one. It 
is this kind of moral judgement which violates our deepest moral intuitions. Moral 
theory and moral intuitions often conflict and while our intuitions should not be the sole 
determinants of our behaviour, we cannot ignore our most deeply rooted ones. 
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An act-utilitarian would contest this. He would say that the utilitarian theory is correct. 
If our intuitions - even our most deeply rooted ones - conflict with utilitarianism, then 
it is our intuitions and not the theory that must be discarded. Intuitions that conflict 
with utilitarianism are irrational superstitions which we have as a result of our non-
utilitarian upbringing. 
I do not think that we are in a position to be so bold as to simply discard our most 
deeply rooted intuitions in favour of utilitarian (or any other) theory. The utilitarian 
must concede this. After all utilitarianism is based on other intuitions - about aiming for 
more, rather than less, of what is good, that is, of utility. How can the utili~an be so 
sure that the intuitions which clash with utilitarianism are faulty and that those which 
inform his theory are not? Like it or not, our moral theories are informed by our 
intuitions and, in tum, affect our intuitions or moral beliefs. I agree with Rawls that 
rather than tailoring intuitions to theory or tailoring theory to (often contradictory) 
intuitions, we should seek a "reflective equilibrium"4 of theory and intuitions, whereby 
both are altered and adapted so as to take account of each other. In pursuing such a 
task, we can say, using an analogy with Quine, that "peripheral" intuitions are more 
likely to be discarded than "central" ones. The problem with utilitarianism is that it 
discards the most central ones, rather than more peripheral ones. 
We can exemplify this moral problem of utilitarianism in another way. Some 
philosophers have, by way of a thought experiment, conceived of a utilitarian monster. 
This is a creature which derives immense degrees of utility (perhaps, but not 
necessarily, in the form of pleasure) from inflicting pain and suffering. Because the 
amount of utility which it derives is just so large, it swamps the disutility of the pain of 
those on whom it is inflicted. There are no such things as utilitarian monsters (certainly 
4. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20. 
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not any of which I know), but it is only a contingent fact that there are not. If there 
were, the utilitarian would be forced to prescribe that this creature inflict pain, no 
matter how terrible this pain may be for the person or people who suffer it. 
' What is it about utilitarianism that causes it to give rise to such unacceptable moral 
judgements? What, in this regard, is the underlying problem of utilitarianism? There 
have been a number of explanations. 
Some argue that utilitarianism is unconcerned about the distribution of utility. It does 
not attach any weight to considerations of desert, merit or equality. In the case of 
equality, it is observed that utilitarianism is neutral between (roughly) equal and 
(radically) unequal distributions, quantities of utility being equal. When I speak here, 
and after, of "distributions", I am referring to the distribution that results, say, from 
the utilitarian calculation. I am not referring to any distributive components of the 
calculation itself, such as the equal consideration of all desires by the utilitarian 
calculation. 
If the achievement of maximum utility required a radically unequal distribution of 
utility, it would still be the utilitarian choice. From this, some conclude that 
utilitarianism conflicts with justice and equality. 
However, this conclusion is only true on one interpretation of justice and equality - one 
on which equality is assumed to be a matter of achieving a substantively equal 
distribution of goods. Nagel has argued that different theories (utilitarianism, rights, 
egalitarianism) can all value equality and maintain that people should be treated 
equally, and yet disagree about how people should be treated equally5. For example, 
utilitarianism treats people equally in that it counts everybody's preferences equally. 
5. T. Nagel, "Equality" in Mortal Questions, p. 111. 
I 
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Rights theories treat everybody equally in that they deem everybody to have equal 
rights. Both treat people equally, but in different ways. 
Hare takes a stronger view than Nagel. He says that the utilitarian interpretation of 
justice and equality is the best one. He says that when asking how one is to be just 
between competing interests of different people, "it seems hard to give any other 
answer other than by giving equal weight, impartially to the equal interests of 
everybody"6 (my italics). And this, he says, is what yields the utility principle. I am 
not convinced that this is the only just way of handling conflicting interests of different 
people, but it does appear to be one kind of just way. However, it is not necessarily a 
distributively just way. Hare himself acknowledges that the resulting distribution may 
not be equal7. He does argue, howe~er, that because of various empirical facts, 
utilitarianism would not justify gross distributive inequalities. For one thing, inequality, 
especially extreme inequality, tends to produce envy, hatred and malice. Since these 
have disutility, it is better to avoid them. Hare also points to the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility which states that, with many commodities, an increase 
means less to - that is, it has less utility for - someone who has more than to someone 
who has less. The consequence of this is that equalizing distribution tends to produce 
greater utility8. Of course, as Nagel observes, there are also utilitarian reasons against 
pursuing equal distributions. Most obvious would be decreased incentive which results 
in less overall utility9. Even if we accept that in general there are good utilitarian 
.reasons to aim at more equal distributions, there will, of course, be cases where 
maximum utility requires unequal (and even radically unequal) distribution. There will 
be actual cases of this kind, but even if it were only possible that there could be 
circumstances in which radically unequal distribution was required, this would be 
6. R. Hare, "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" in H. 0. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British 
Philosophy, p. 117. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid, p. 118. 
9. T. Nagel, "Equality" in Mortal Questions, p. 107. 
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problematic for utilitarianism. Later (chapter 3.3) I shall discuss further the matter of 
hypothetical cases. 
It seems then, that the failure of utilitarianism cannot be attributed to its unequal oi 
unjust treatment of people. As I have indicated, it does treat people equally and justly, 
on one interpretation of these concepts. However, its failure may lie in the way in 
which it treats people equally, in the kind of justice it promises. In other words, it may 
employ an incorrect interpretation of justice and equality. However then the problem 
with utilitarianism would not lie in its injustice or inequality, ·but in something deeper 
which made its view of justice the wrong view. 
According to the Kantian view, this problem is that utilitarianism treats persons as 
means rather than ends. However, I prefer to say that utilitarianism fails to take 
account of what has been called the "separateness of persons" or the "distinction 
between persons". This is the terminology of NozicklO and Rawls11 . Later (chapter 4) 
I shall argue in some detail that separate individual persons are the significant units of 
existence and show why they ought to be treated accordingly. For now, I shall simply 
say that utilitarianism uses a method of moral calculation which is appropriate within a 
single life, but not between separate lives. For example, it is rational and appropriate 
for me to incur some minor suffering now, if this will avoid greater suffering for me 
later. However, when it comes to the societal level, it is inappropriate to reason in the 
same way. We cannot say that a life of suffering for one man is justified by the benefits 
it brings to the rest of society. This is because in the interpersonal case we are dealing 
with separate persons. One cannot calculate as if one were dealing with a single 
person. As Nozick says, there is no such thing as a "societal entiry12 with a good that 
undergoes some sacrifice for its own good" 13. 
10. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 33. 
11. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 27. 
12. I prefer the term "societal creature". 
13. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 32, 33. 
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I shall show later that what is needed to ensure that people are treated as separate 
entities are absolute rights. These must restrict the way in which people can be treated 
even if utility would be maximized were those constraints not present. These constraints 
on action take the form of rules (prescribing what may and may not be done). A right 
entails a rule - a rule about how the right-bearer may be treated. 
It is precisely because utilitarianism, properly understood, cannot account for and 
incorporate sufficiently strong rules and rights that it leads to· the kind of unacceptable 
moral judgements I have described. 
As I have indicated, hard-nosed utilitarians - that is, thorough-going act-utilitarians -
would accept the judgements that result from their theory. They would say that while it 
is true that these judgements offend our intuitions, we must simply adapt our intuitions 
to utilitarianism because it is the correct moral theory. However, some utilitarians have 
realised the importance of rules and rights and have sought to incorporate them in 
refined versions of utilitarianism. These attempts to solve the moral problem with 
utilitarianism, I shall now argue, have been unsuccessful in one way or another. 
3.3) RULE-UTILITARIANISM 
Rules and rights are incorporated in a number of refined versions of utilitarianism. Not 
every form of utilitarianism which gives a place to rules is a rule-utilitarianism. In fact, 
even act-utilitarianism can accommodate rules, though the kind of rules it incorporates 
are very weak. These are rules of thumb, or, as Lyons calls them, cautionary rules14. 
Since an understanding of the nature of these kinds of rules is important for my 
14. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, pp. 119ff. 
75 
discussion of the relationship between utilitarianism and rights ·generally, and of rule-
utiltarianism specifically, I shall now devote some attention to them. 
Simple act-utilitarianism can justify rules of thumb. A simple act-utilitarian seeks to 
maximize the utility of each act. Whenever he is faced with a choice about how he 
should act, he must choose the option that will maximize utility. Now there are a 
number of problems for a person who seeks this goal. 
Firstly, there is a great deal of time that would need to be ·devoted to making each 
decision about how one should act. Spending this time has considerable disutility and so 
an act-utilitarian may reason that the best way for him to maximize utility is to follow 
certain rules of thumb rather than painstakingly reflect on each situation. The utility 
that is lost on the few occasions when reflecting on the situation would yield a 
prescription at variance with the rules, is more than made up by the utility that is 
generated by not wasting time in all other situations. 
Secondly, there is the problem of insufficient information. Often one will lack the 
' 
information required to make the best utilitarian decision. This includes knowledge of 
the consequences of one's prospective actions. Similarly, there is the problem that one 
might reason erroneously. Both these problems can cause one to choose actions that do 
not maximize utility. Following a rule of thumb would avoid these pitfalls, or so some 
utilitarians claim. Of course, it will sometimes happen that acting according to the rule 
of thumb will not maximize utility, but it is in the nature of the problems that one is · 
seeking to overcome by acting on the rule, that they are not always identifiable in 
advance. While I can see how the problem of insufficient time can be overcome by 
employing rules, I cannot say the same for problems of insufficient information and 
faulty reasoning. If these latter problems prevent us from knowing which action will 
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maximize utility, they should also prevent us from knowing which ru./es will maximize 
utility. 
The point about a rule of thumb is that it is simply that - a rule of thumb. It is not a 
firm rule, but only a guide. Given the reason for its adoption, the act-utilitarian will 
have to keep a "utilitarian eye" open for exceptional circumstances in which utility 
would not be maximized by following the rule of thumb. If one spots an exception, one 
must not act in accordance with the rules. Now it is exactly in these kinds of 
exceptional cases when the considerations of utility conflict with our rules that the 
moral problems of utilitarianism arise. Of course, they do not arise in cases when 
utility and rules offer the same prescription. It is in the nature of a utilitarian rule of 
thumb that when it is known to clash with the maximization of utility, it must defer to 
utility. We see from this, the weakness of an act-utilitarian rule - a rule of thumb. The 
incorporation of such a rule into utilitarianism does not solve our problems. A stronger 
kind of rule is required. I shall turn now to discuss rule-utilitarian rules, which are 
purportedly sufficiently strong to overcome our problem. If they turn out to be 
equivalent to rules of thumb, then the distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism 
will be collapsed and the utilitarian will be back where he started. 
Rule-utilitarian theories are classically two-tier theories. The two tiers are rules and 
acts. The rules are justified by utilitarian considerations much like the ones I mentioned 
above. The rules which are chosen are those whose general acceptance would maximize 
utility. However, utilitarian considerations of any sort are excluded from the level of 
casuistry - that is, in the application of these rules to particular acts. The rules, but not 
the individual acts, are justified by utilitarian considerations. Thus the rightness or 
wrongness of actions is determined (not merely efficiently pursued) by the rules. The 
result of this is that even when utility would be maximized by breaking the rules, the 
rules are still followed. 
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Hare is one writer who advocates a two-tier theory 1 5~ He speaks of level-1 and level-2 
principlesl6. Level-2 principles are those arrived at as a result of moral thought under 
ideal circumstances: without time-constraints; with full knowledge of the facts; and 
untainted by self-interest or some other "defective" reasoning. These are the principles 
of an archangelic act-utilitarian. However, given the fact that circumstances are usually 
far from ideal, these level-2 principles cannot guide our every action. Furthermore, it 
is not possible, at the earliest stages of moral education, to inculcate the kind of 
thinking that produces level-2 principles. It is for this reason that level-1 principles are 
needed. They are for use in practical moral thinking, especially under conditions of 
stress. These principles are much more easily taught to those, such as young children, 
who are incapable of the higher-level thinking that produces level-2 principles. Level-1 
principles are not, Hare insists, mere rules of thumb that can be broken without 
compunction. In choosing level-I principles, the aim of the archangelic act-utilitarian is 
to choose those level-1 principles "whose general acceptance will lead to actions in 
accord with the best level-2 principles in most situations that are actually 
encountered .. l 7. 
Hare charges that opponents of utilitarianism employ the "trick" of taking "fantastic 
cases" and "highly unusual situations" and confronting "them with what the ordinary 
man would think" 18 - that is, confronting them with level-1 principles. This, he says, 
makes the utilitarian, who reasons with level-2 principles, look like a moral monster. 
However, he says that utilitarians should not be concerned about this. Since the level-1 
principles of the ordinary man were not chosen to deal with fantastic cases, but with 
"most situations" that these principles would encounter, it is, he says, unfair to wield 
15. R. Hare, "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" in H.D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British 
Philosophy. 
16. In his Moral Thinking he calls level-1 the intuitive level and level-2 the critical level. See 
pp. 25, 26. 
17. Ibid, p. 123. 
18. Ibid. 
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his intuitions as a weapon against the judgements utilitarians would make in fantastic or 
unusual cases. Thus, for example, it would be highly unusual for a doctor to be in the 
position where he was faced with a clear choice between killing a healthy patient to 
save the lives of five sick patients and allowing the five to die by not killing the one. 
Accordingly, his level- I principles need not be geared to such a situation. Similarly, a 
utilitarian monster, though logically possible, is a fantastic case. Level- I principles 
need not be able to cope with it. 
I think that Hare's defence against such examples is inadequate. We may ask how an 
archangelic act-utilitarian would act were he faced with such a case. Of course, he too 
would have level-1 principles (for stress situations). However, imagine that in the 
comfort of his arm-chair, pondering the finer points of act-utilitarian reasoning, he 
gave thought - cool, unstressed thought, the kind that produces level-2 principles - to 
exactly the situation of the doctor which I have described. It does not seem implausible 
that he would have given such thought to a whole host of such examples. Imagine then 
that he was faced with an actual case like this. How would he act? Hare may object to 
this. He may say that one can never know, in the heat of the moment, whether the 
situation at hand is like the case about which one previously thought. I think that at 
least on some occasions this would not be a difficulty. However, for argument's sake 
we can imagaine that we can never know. All we need to do is ask our archangelic act-
utilitarian to give unstressed thought to our example and tell us ho.w one ought to act in 
such a situation. The point about his (act-) utilitarian reasoning is that it will produce 
level-2 principles that would require the doctor to kill the one to save the five - the kind 
of judgement which has caused utilitarianism the moral problem which I have been 
discussing. Even if a utilitarian would never actually do this because of uncertainty -
and this is itself implausible - the very fact that this is what he ought to do (if, without 
needing time to think, he knew the nature of the situation, etc), makes utilitarianism 
morally unacceptable. If a moral theory is unacceptable and is only made palatable by 
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our inability to act in accordance with it, this does nothing to strengthen the theory 
itself. 
So much for Hare's particular two-tier theory and why I think it fails. I shall now 
discuss rule-utilitarianism more generally to show why I think all forms of this theory 
must fail. 
The real incentive to restrict utilitarian considerations to the level of rules is, I believe, 
that in this way an apparently utilitarian account can be given of rules which are 
sufficiently strong to avoid the moral problem that has been highlighted. This is the 
utilitarian's incentive, but is such a rigid distinction between two levels justifiable from 
a utilitarian point of view? Why should a utilitarian confine his maximizing principle to 
one level of his theory? 
If he is a genuine utilitarian then he must have a utilitarian reason for doing so. If, like 
Hare, he does, then the absence of utilitarian considerations at this level is itself 
justified by utilitarianism. This has the implication that in all known exceptional cases -
that is, in all cases where it is known in advance that utility would be maximized by 
violating the rules - violation of the rules will be prescribed. Of course, there may be 
exceptional cases which are not known to be such, or where there is considerable doubt 
about their exceptional nature. In such cases, the rules may still be followed for reasons 
that I have outlined earlier. However, in situations which present themselves 
unequivocally as exceptiona~ - and I believe that there must be at least some such 
situations - violation of the rules will be prescribed. There does not even have to be 
complete certainty. If one is more confident that breaking the rule will produce greater 
utility than not breaking it, then breaking the rule seems rational and justified even if 
one turns out to be wrong. In cases where the violation of rules is prescribed, this is 
because the original utilitarian reasons for restricting utilitarian considerations from the 
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level of casuistry will, in these cases, require that they not be so restricted. This poses a 
problem for the rule-utilitarian who sought to insulate utilitarian considerations from 
the level of casuistry. This is because he would now be subscribing to the principle: 
Act according to the rule that maximizes utility except where deviating from the 
rule maximizes utility19. 
I do not see how this principle differs substantively from the principle which governs 
the. act-utilitarian' s behaviour: 
Act so as to maximize utility20. 
A rule-utilitarian who has a utilitarian reason for restricting utilitarian considerations to 
only one level of his theory subscribes to a principle that is indistinguishable from that 
which governs act-utilitarian behaviour. It seems that two-tier, refined versions of 
utilitarianism lose their refinement if there is a utilitarian justification for the two tiers 
(as genuinely distinct levels). 
However, what if the rule-utilitarian does not have a utilitarian reason for confining his 
maximizing principle to one level? This is, from a utilitarian point of view, an 
impossibility because it would indicate that the rule-utilitarian's primary concern is not · 
consequences. He would have a more basic interest. Thus, fundamentally, he would not 
be a utilitarian. His theory would not be goal-based. Rule-utilitarianism is, therefore, 
not an option for a genuine utilitarian. It appears that the extent to which a utilitarian 
can accommodate the kind of rules which are necessary to treat people as separate 
persons is the extent to which he is not a utilitarian. 
19. Some formulations of the rule-utilitarian principle may differ. For example, they may 
speak of "set of rules" instead of "rule". However, these differences do not, I think, 
provide a way to avoid my point. 
20. Once again, there may be various formulations of this principle so as to accommodate, 
for example, the differences between simple and generalized utilitarianism (see D. 
Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism). However, once again these differences do 
not, I think, defeat my point. 
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I have said that rule-utilitarianism ~sually takes the form of a two-tier theory. It need 
not always be formulated in this way. Mill, for example, had a three-level theory21. 
However, a close examination of it reveals that it is simply another description of the 
same idea. For Mill, the most basic, concrete level is the level of particular acts. The 
middle level is that of moral principles, including rights and obligations. The highest 
level is that of values. These values - in Mill's case, utility - establish the moral 
principles at the intermediate level. These principles determine the rightness or 
wrongness of particular acts - which constitute the bottom level. According to Mill, 
each level has a direct relationship with its adjacent one(s), but each is insulated from 
non-contiguous ones. In Mill's picture, utilitarian considerations are seen as a distinct, 
third level, whereas in the two-tier theories they are not seen as constituting a third 
level, but still as informing the second level - the level of rules. This is not a 
substantive difference, but only a descriptive one, and the criticism I levelled at the 
classical two-tier rule-utilitarianism applies equally to Mill's theory. 
Scanlon has a two-tier theory which he argues is immune to these criticisms22. I shall 
outline his view and say why I think that it too is mistaken. Scanlon suggests that the 
view that there is a certain kind of moral right is justified by a conjunction of three 
claims: 
I) An empirical claim about what things would be like were the right/s in question 
absent. 
2) A moral claim that this would be unacceptable. 
3) An empirical claim about how the proposed right/s would yield a different outcome. 
These three claims which Scanlon takes to justify rights make reference to the 
· consequences of having those rights. Thus rights are justified by the consequences they 
21. See D. Lyons "Utility and Rights", in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, pp. 134ff. 
22. T. M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and Fairness" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights p. 
138. 
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yield. If the consequences of having certain rights are better than the consequences of 
not having them, then the rights are justified. This view is consequentialist in that it 
appeals to consequences. It is two-tier because it appeals to the consequences of having 
rights rather than the consequences of individual acts. To show why Scanlon thinks that 
his view is immune to the problems with rule-utilitarianism which I have mentioned, an 
account must be given of which consequences he believes should be considered when 
evaluating outcomes. He rejects the conventional utilitarian view that we should aim to 
satisfy subjective preferences. Instead, he says, we should aim at producing certain 
objective benefits and avoiding certain objective burdens. These benefits and burdens 
which, he says, are of varying degrees of importance23 "must include not only things 
that may happen to people but also factors affecting the ability of individuals to 
determine what will happen"24. He maintains that it is objectively beneficial for us to 
have some control over what will happen to us. Rights enhance and ensure an equitable 
distribution of such control over important factors in our lives. This equitable 
distribution of control is not only instrumentaliy valuable, he says. It also has 
independent value25. For this reason the rights which ensure this equitable distribution 
of control "are supported by considerations which persi~t even when contrary actions 
would promote optimum results1126. Even if better consequences could be produced on 
a particular occasion by violating the rights, this would not be justified because of the 
independent value of the state of affairs which is produced by upholding the right. It is 
this feature of Scanlon's view which allegedly explains why his two-tier theory does 
not collapse into act-utilitarianism and its moral problems. 
However, rights are not absolute on Scanlon's view and may on some occasions be 
overridden, although not simply to produce "optimum results1127. The reason why 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid, p. 139. 
25. Ibid, p. 143. 
26. Ibid, p. 145. 
27. Ibid. 
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rights may on some occasions be overridden is that although the equitable distribution 
of control which they ensure is an objective good to be aimed at, it is not the only 
objective good28. According to Scanlon, there are other objective benefits at which we 
must also aim. Rights arejustifiably overridden when the intrinsic goods which they 
protect are sufficiently outweighed by other more intrinsically beneficial ·states of 
affairs. However, merely having better consequences is not in itself intrinsically more 
beneficial. 
The problem for Scanlon is this. Although the equal distribution of control which rights 
morally guarantee is very important and is not usually outweighed, it can sometimes be 
outweighed by other benefits29. However, Scanlon is not clear about what the 
competing benefits are, or how important these would have to be to outweigh the 
benefits protected by rights. Presumably, if the competing benefits are sufficiently 
strong, then the individual's control over what happens to him can be sacrificed 
entirely. In other words, even an individual's important interests can and must be 
sacrificed for greater goods. Scanlon may decide to stipulate a particular list of benefits 
and their relative importance, such that the equal distribution of control may very 
rarely be outweighed. However his theory is like utilitarianism in allowing that the 
benefits protected by rights can in principle be overridden, and this, as I shall show 
later, is problematic. 
3.4) DWORKIN: UTILITY AND THE RIGHT TO MORAL INDEPENDENCE 
I turn now to another view about how utilitarianism may be made palatable by the 
inclusion of rights. This is the view which Ronald Dworkin expresses in his "Rights as 
Trumps"30 and in Taking Rights Seriously3 1. The essence of his claim is that equality 
28. Ibid, p. 139. 
29. Ibid, p. 145. 
30. R. Dworkin, "Rights as Trumps" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights. 
31. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 234 - 238. 
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is a more basic value than utility, and furthermore, that equality not only gives rise to 
utilitarianism, but also yields a right to moral and political independence (from which 
other rights can be derived). He argues in the following way. 
He claims that the appeal of utilitarianism is its "egalitarian cast"32 - that it counts 
everybody's preferences equally. He says, quite correctly, that were a version of 
utilitarianism to count some people's preferences for less than those of others (because 
these people or their preferences were less worthy) this version of utilitarianism would 
have no appeal. He then goes on to say that if utilitarianism is· unchecked by something 
like a right to moral independence it disintegrates into exactly such a version of 
utilitarianism. To illustrate this he asks us to consider a community of many people 
including Sarah. Were the constitution of that society to require Sarah's preferences to 
count twice as much as those of others, it would be a non-egalitarian, and therefore 
unacceptable version of utilitarianism. As it happens, the constitution does not require 
this. However, everyone likes Sarah very much and wants her preferences to count for 
twice as much as theirs. Dworkin claims that if these Sarah-loving preferences were 
counted, it would defeat the egalitarian cast .of utilitarianism. Thus, he says, an 
apparently neutral utilitarianism (that is, one that would include Sarah-loving 
preferences) is a self-defeating utilitarianism. Properly understood, utilitarianism is not 
neutral between preferences for equal and non-equal calculation. It cannot allow 
preferences for non-egalitarian calculation of utility. 
Dworkin concludes that utilitarianism must be qualified so as to restrict the preferences 
that count. The kinds of preference that he wishes to rule out are what he elsewhere33 
calls "external" preferences. These are preferences which one has for others. They are 
preferences one has that others receive some benefit or harm. External preferences are 
32. R. Dworkin, "Rights as Trumps" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 1p4. 
33. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 234ff. 
85 
constrasted with "personal" preferences. Personal preferences are preferences one has 
for one's own benefit. 
Dworkin asserts that "one very practical way to achieve this restriction"34 of 
preferences is provided by the idea of rights as tools to overrule unrestricted 
utilitarianism. Therefore, utilitarianism, properly understood, yields a right to moral 
independence (from the preferences of others affecting how one's own preferences are 
counted). 
Dworkin's argument may have some.plausibility when we consider preferences that the 
desires of others count for either more or less. This is because we appear to face a 
formal clash between an egalitarian way of counting preferences (that is, all counting 
equally) and a non-egalitarian way. However, even if we concede that, the matter is not 
as straightforward as Dworkin's description makes it seem. Imagine that in the Sarah-
loving society, instead of everyone wanting Sarah's preferences to count for twice as 
much as the sum of their personal preferences, they simply desire for Sarah that which 
she prefers for herself. This is formally very different from the scenario which 
Dworkin describes, but substantively it is identical. Sarah's preferences do not count 
for any more than anybody else's, but yet what she wants will have greater weight in 
the utilitarian calculation simply because everyone else prefers for her that which she 
prefers for herself. Now it is not a matter of someone's preferences formally counting 
twice as much as everyone else's, but the effect is the same. 
Now these preferences which everybody has for Sarah are also external preferences 
because they are preferences others have for Sarah. However, I think that it is more 
difficult to justify not counting them, without the risk of sacrificing equality. Why 
should preferences be excluded simply because they are preferences for other people? 
34. "Rights as Trumps" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 158. 
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By not counting such preferences, are we not treating unequally those people whose 
preferences they are? 
Hart35 charges that not counting people's external preferences is to treat them 
unequally. Dworkin responds to this charge. In doing so he draws a distinction between 
votes and preferences. Votes, he says, can be used up. If one votes for the success of 
another, then one could not, for example, also vote for one's own. Not to count 
people's vote (even if they are for others) would be to treat people unequally, but in the 
case of preferences it is different, he claims. One can have (many) preferences for 
others and for oneself. In fact, the more preferences one has, the more one increases 
the role of one's preferences overall36. This is because the more preferences one has 
the more preferences one has to be counted in the utility calculation. Thus not to count 
someone's preferences, unlike not counting someone's vote, is not, Dworkin maintains, 
to treat him unequally. 
I think that Dworkin misses the point. I do not think that the distinction between votes 
and preferences is that tight. We are all free to have many preferences. It is like having 
many votes. Now imagine two people: Al and Sally. Al, an altruist, has few personal 
preferences. He is such a thorough-going altruist that the overwhelming majority of his 
preferences are for the well-being of others; they are external. Sally, by contrast, is 
very selfish. She has few, if any, external preferences. Most of her preferences are for 
her own well-being. According to Dworkin's utilitarianism, most of Al's preferences 
- will not count, whereas most, if not all, of Sally's will. If, as Dworkin says, having 
more preferences which are counted in the utility calculation increases the overall role 
of one's preferences, then decreasing the number of preferences which count must 
35. H.L.A. Hart, "Between Utility and Rights" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, pp. 
92, 93. 
36. R. Dworkin, "Rights as Trumps" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 160. 
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decrease the overall role of one's preferences. Any version of utilitarianism that does 
that, treats people unequally. 
Of course, Al could increase his influence by having more personal preferences, but he 
simply does not have these, nor does he want to. He does not desire that which benefits 
him but rather that which benefits others. If others are not discriminated against 
because of what they prefer - an important point in the egalitarian nature of utilitarian 
calculation - then why should he be? Why should his only way of having an equal say 
be to change his say? 
Dworkin's first premise was that it is the egalitarian nature of utilitarian calculations 
that gives utilitarianism its appeal. He stresses that it is the egalitarian nature of the 
calculation itse{f, not the outcome of the calculation, about which he is concerned 
(though he seems temporarily to slip from the former to the latter in one place, where 
he says: "If these special [Sarah-loving] preferences are allowed to count ... Sarah will 
receive much more in the distribution of goods and opportunities than she otherwise 
would. I argue that this defeats the egalitarian cast of the apparently neutral utilitarian 
constitution ... 11 37.) Dworkin's professed concern for the equal calculation rather than 
the equal outcome is indeed in keeping with utilitarianism. However, I hope that I have 
shown that the very restriction he wishes to place on utilitarianism to preserve its 
egalitarian calculation, compromises its egalitarian calculation. External preferences 
cannot be excluded from calculation in order to preserve equality in utility calculation. 
There is a further problem with Dworkin's view. His view rests on the idea that both 
utilitarianism and rights arise from a more basic value - equality. However, I referred 
earlier to Nagel's point that equality can play an important part in diverse theories. 
Having equality as one's basic concern does not entail being a utilitarian. In other 
37. Ibid, p. 155. 
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words, if one's basic value is equality, this does not require one to understand equality 
in the way utilitarianism does. One could adopt an interpretation of equality that 
conflicts with utiliarianism. 
I have argued now at quite some length for the failure of utilitarianism. I have shown 
how this failure results from its inability to provide an adequate account of rules and 
rights. In dispensing with utilitarianism and goal-based theories, I am not proposing a 
rights-based theory in their place. Later (chapter 6), I shall show how both utility and 
rights play an important role in morality. My theory, however, will not be subject to 
the criticisms raised in this chapter because it will not be goal- or utility-based, but will 
incorporate these considerations in another way. 
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CHAPTER4 
INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 
4.1) INDIVIDUALS AND UTILITARIANISM 
One of the failures of utilitarianism is its inability to account for our deeply held 
intuitions that there are certain things that may never justifiably be done to individual 
persons. I shall still argue for why these intuitions are correct. (The argument will 
commence in the remainder of this chapter and will continue in chapters 6 and 7.) 
According to utilitarianism, individuals may be sacrificed if overall maximum utility is 
thereby achieved. While an adequate moral theory may contradict some of our 
intuitions, it should at least remain moored to the most basic and deeply held ones. 
Rights - especially absolute ones - appear to be one important moral tool which restrict 
the way individuals may be treated. It is for this reason, I think, that refined versions 
of utilitarianism seek to incorporate rights. However, as I have already argued, such 
versions, often known as rule-utilitarianism, are doomed to failure. A similar fate is 
shared by what Nozick calls a "utilitarianism of rights" 1. Such a theory has the non-
violation of rights as its goal. It seeks to maximise the non-violation of rights. Such a 
theory does not guarantee that rights are not violated because if the non-violation of 
rights can be maximised by the violation of some rights, these rights are justifiably 
violated. 
Rights cannot fulfil their real role within a utilitarian framework, which, of necessity, 
overlooks the individual in the interests of securing maximum social utility. This is one 
reason why utilitarianism is ill-fated as an adequate moral theory. 
1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 28. 
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Utilitarianism has strong prima facie appeal, but I think that this is because it connects 
morality with benefit, well-being, or interest. Morality must be about furthering well-
being. It appears to me that there is a straightforward, almost self-evident connection 
between morality and well-being or benefit. If (morally) good actions are not those that 
further well-being, then I do not think that it can be clear what good actions are. Now, 
of course, the well-being of different creatures can and does conflict. As a result, moral 
action sometimes may not serve the well-being of a particular person at a particular 
time. However, this is inevitable where conflict exists, and it does not mean that 
morality is not founded on well-being. In the case of conflicting interests, those which 
have the most justification to be fulfilled should be served. Because this justification is 
a moral justification, it too would be rooted in well-being. Thus, if, for example, 
someone has committed a crime, his punishment may be justified even though it will 
not further his well-being. 
My view that morality is founded on well-being alone stands in oppostion to the view 
of some philosophers, such as Isaiah Berlin2 and Bernard Williams3, that there is an 
irreducible plurality of sometimes conflicting values. I am not able to engage in a 
lengthy discussion of this question. I shall simply provide a very brief defence of my 
view. I have said that there is a near self-evident connection between "good" and 
"benefit". I do not think that anything else connects as obviously with "good". One 
who wishes to claim that there is an irreducible plurality of values has to accept both 
(a) that these are not reducible to well-being; and (b) that they can still be justified or 
still have plausibility as moral values. Let us take as a complicated but illuminating 
example, the principle of autonomy. Speaking in a non-Kantian sense, we can say that 
we sometimes a~t autonomously against our own interests. However, I think that the 
value we attach to autonomy can still be justified by its connection to well-being. One 
2. 8. Williams, "Conflicts of Values", in A. Ryan (ed.) The Idea of Freedom, p. 222. 
3. 8. Williams, "Ethical Consistency" in Problems of the Self. 
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of our interests is to act autonomously, even if acting in this way sometimes conflicts 
with other interests we have. If one denies that autonomy is founded on well-being, 
then one has to provide some other reason why it should be valued. The connection 
between "good" and "autonomy" is far less clear than that between "good" and "well-
being" or "benefit". If autonomy is not beneficial, why should we value it? Should we 
not reject it as irrational? 
It is, of course, always possible for the sceptic to ask the same question of benefit or 
well-being: Why should we value that which is beneficial?· What is so good about 
benefit? I think, however, that this question is not very profound. There is as close a 
connection between "good" and "beneficial" or "well-being" as we can possibly hope 
for. The very meaning of the words makes this so. There does not appear to be 
anything intrinsically good about autonomy, but there does seem something intrinsically 
good about well-being. 
If we accept that morality is about furthering well-being, then, since more well-being is 
better than less, it is not much of a jump from here to the utilitarian thesis of 
maximising utility. This jump is, however, an illicit one. While utilitarianism is correct 
in connecting morality to well-being, it should not be connected to total or average 
well-being but rather to the well-being of individuals. The reason why individual well-
being is what is morally most significant, is that it is individuals and not society that 
are the significant units of existence. This view is subject to criticism from two sides. 
4.2) NON-REDUCTIONIST VIEW OF SOCIETY 
On the one side there is the view that it is society and not the individual which is the 
unit of existence. We can, following Parfit, call this view the non-reductionist view of 
society, or, following Popper and Quinton, the ontological collectivist view. It takes 
92 
social groups t~ be "mass-persons"4 or "super-organisms115 which are not reducible 
(without remainder) to the individuals that constitute them. Societies are viewed in the 
same way that we ordinarily view individuals. In extreme cases of this view, such as 
that of Hegel, social groups are deemed to be more real than the individual humans 
they contain. Hegel speaks of an Objective Mind. He takes the state to be a self-
conscious ethical substance. As a living mind it is an organized whole, not simply a 
collection of individuals. It has a rational, universal will. This is not a mere sum of 
"individual" wills. 
Quinton notes6 that Hegel's theory clearly affirms three propositions: 1) that man is 
essentially social; 2) that the group is more real than its members; and 3) that groups 
are themselves minds or persons. Quinton explains why Hegel might have believed 
each of these and argues against them. 
In providing an explanation of the first proposition, he says that man is characterized 
by his rational and moral capacities. To become rational beings and moral agents 
requires incorporation into a linguistic and moral community. These communities are 
human communities. The individual person is thus taken to be dependent on a society 
or community for his personhood. This is evidenced, for example by the few cases of 
"wild children" who have been reared by non-human animals. More precisely, a person 
is dependent on society for the formation of his personhood because, after all, it is 
possible for a person (such as Robinson Crusoe) to be cut off from society without 
losing his personhood. 
However, against this argument it can be said that there is not an asymmetrical 
dependence of persons on society. Just as there cannot be persons without society, there 
4. T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, p. 134. 
5. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 331. 
6. A. Quinton, Thoughts and Thinkers, p. 79. 
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cannot be society without persons. Such a view was expressed by Popper who claimed 
that even though in a certain sense man is a product of his society, society is also a 
product of man 7. Man can shape his society, at least to some extent. (While Popper 
does not specify that he is speaking about individuals, his arguments are true of 
individuals and their relation to society.) Thus ·society is at least as dependent on 
persons as persons are on society. Society may even be more dependent on individuals 
than individuals are on society if it is the case that personhood without society is not 
logically impossible and a memberless society is logically impossibles. 
The dependence of individual persons on society is taken by those who hold a non-
reductionist view of society to be analagous to the dependence of attributes on 
(Aristotelian) substance, or the dependence of states of mind on conscious subjects. 
This is the purported justification for society being more real than the individuals that 
comprise it - the second proposition which Quinton claims Hegel's theory affirms. An 
attribute has no real existence without the substance of which it is an attribute. A state 
of mind similarly cannot exist other than as a state of mind, and that mind is a subject. 
However, these analogies fail. Individual people are not attributes of society. This 
becomes clear even if we look at something like the population of a society. A society 
can have the attribute of a large population, but no individual people are the attribute "a 
large population". Similarly, people do not stand to society in the way mental states do 
to conscious subjects. It is much easier to conceive of individual persons existing 
independently of society than it is to conceive of a mental state which is a mental state 
unattached to any mind. 
Quinton says that it is the analogy between society and persons, on the one hand, and 
the mind and its states, on the other, that facilitates the conclusion that societies are 
7. K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, p. 208. 
8. A. Quinton, Thoughts and Thinkers, pp. 84, 85. 
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minds. This is the third proposition which Quinton says Hegel's theory affirms. 
Whatever its source, the identification of society and mind is clearly wrong. I am not 
denying that it is possible for there to be a group creature with a mind of its own - a 
mind independent of the minds which constitute it. Such a group mind is possible9. I 
am simply denying that societies are in fact (group) minds. It is ontological facts and 
not ontological possibilities that determine what we ought to do. 
The version of ontological collectivism which I have described and rejected is a radical 
one. It takes social groups to be more real than the individuais that constitute them. 
According to Quinton, a moderate version of ontological collectivism need only claim 
that social objects, for example groups, are not analysable in terms of the individuals 
who compose them 10. This moderate doctrine does not pose a problem for the view I 
am advocating. It does not claim that a group is a creature with a mind of its own. It 
simply claims that a group is not reducible without remainder to the individuals that 
constitute it. If a group is not a creature with a mind of its own, then, as I shall argue 
later, its ontology has no intrinsic moral significance. That is, what is morally right and 
wrong is not connected to the well-being of such entities because they cannot care about 
their own well-being. 
4.3) REDUCTIONIST VIEW OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONS 
Opposed in a different way to the ontological view I am advocating, there is the view 
that it is not individuals, but temporal stages of existence that are ontologically and 
morally significant. According to this view, temporal stages stand to individuals in the 
way I have claimed individuals stand to society. The existence of continuous 
9. D. Brooks, "Group Minds" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64 No. 4, 
December 1986. 
10. A. Quinton, Thoughts and Thinkers, pp. 77, 78. 
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individuals is regarded as a fiction. All that there are are many short-lived phases of 
existence. 
This is the view of Derek Parfit11 . Parfit argues against the conventional view that 
personal identity has a special nature - this nature being that unlike clubs and nations, 
for example, persons are "separately existing entities". A separately existing entity, not 
being a construct, is not the kind of entity about which one can be a reductionist. One 
consequence of Parfit's view is that an answer to a question about personal identity may 
be indeterminate. In other words, it can happen that there is n·either an affirmative nor 
a negative answer to some questions of personal identity. In such cases, it is neither the 
case that personal identity obtains, nor that it does not obtain. It is a matter of degree. 
However, Parfit argues further that it is not the existence of persons over time that is 
important, but rather psychological continuity and psychological connectedness (of 
temporal stages of existence). 
In arguing for his views, Parfit imagines a number of cases. These include 
teletransportation; non-sexual meiotic reproduction by humans; and brain transplants. I 
shall consider the last kind of case. If my brain were "transplanted" into another body, 
most of us would agree that, strictly speaking, what had happened was not that my 
brain was transplanted, but rather that I had had a body transplant. 
The brain consists of two cortical hemispheres and a brain stem. If one hemisphere is 
damaged, the other often takes over its functions. Imagine that the compensatory 
powers of the brain were such that even if only one hemisphere and half the brain stem 
were transplanted into a new body, I would still survive. Now imagine that my body is 
mutilated in a car accident and a talented neuro-surgeon decides to bisect my brain and 
"transplant" each half into two bodies previously housing irreparably damaged brains. 
11. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity", in J. Glover, The Philosophy of Mind; D. Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons, part 3. 
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(Perhaps he does this because he hopes that he might increase my chances of survival in 
case the one transplant does not work; or because he has an insatiable and perhaps 
ruthless interest in personal identity.) There can be one of four possible consequences 
to this operation: 
1) I do not survive. 
2) I survive as one of the two resulting people. 
3) I survive as the other. 
4) I survive as both. 
Parfit rejects the first possiblity for the following reasons: Since it is the case that I 
survive if only one half of my brain is successfully transplanted, then I cannot fail to 
survive if two halves are successfully transplanted. A double success cannot equal a 
failure. Parfit also rejects the second and third possiblities because we have no greater \ 
reason to say that I survive as one rather than the other. We are left then with the final 
possibility - that I survive as both. 
This may appear absurd but Parfit argues in the following way that it is not: One 
treatment of epilepsy was the surgical severence of the corpus collosum which connects 
the two cerebral hemispheres. The procedure (cerebral commissurotomy) had the effect 
of terminating inter-hemispheric communication and led to the creation of "two 
separate spheres of consciousriess"l2. Parfit then imagines what it would be like if one 
-
could voluntarily split and reunite one's consciousness. He speaks, for example, of his 
physics examination during which he divides his mind for fifteen minutes. In such a 
temporary case of split consciousness, we have little doubt that I survive with a divided 
mind. If we extend this to the case of hemi-brain transplants, we see that it is not 
absurd to think that I survive as two people. 
12. R.W. Sperry, quoted by D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 245. 
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However, there are problems even with this option. When we speak of surviving the 
operation, do we imply (strict) identity? If we do, then the fourth possible outcome 
must also be rejected since it makes no sense to say that I am (strictly, ie numerically) 
identical with two people. If survival does not imply identity then it is not a solution to 
our dilemma, which is about personal identity. 
Parfit responds to this latter problem by arguing that it disappears if we give up our 
beliefs in the special nature of personal identity and in the determinate nature of 
answers to all questions of personal identity. Imagined cases such as that of hemi-brain 
transplants encourage us to give up these beliefs. 
Parfit argues that the forfeiture of these beliefs is not serious. Contrary to the popular 
view that important questions hinge on the question of personal identity, he claims that 
that which really matters is dependent on psychological continuity or psychological 
connectedness. Psychological contintuity is a relation that holds between any points on 
the same path in a psychological history - whether branching or otherwise. Consider the 
following example in a non-branching case: Today I have certain memories, intentions, 
ambitions, etc. Tomorrow my set of memories, intentions and ambitions will be much 
the same as it is today though, for example, I shall probably have a few new memories 
and perhaps have forgotten a few old ones. In twenty years' time I shall have a 
significantly different set of memories, intentions, etc. Yet my mental state then will be 
psychologically continuous with my present mental state. If A is psychologically 
continuous with B and B is psychologically continuous with C then A is psychologically 
continuous with C. Thus psychological continuity is transitive. Psychological 
connectedness, by contrast, is not transitive. It is the relation that holds between 
significantly overlapping selves in a psychological continuity. If A is psychologically 
connected to B (because they have a significant intersection) and B is psychologically 
connected to C (because they have a significant intersection) one cannot conclude that 
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A and C are psychologically connected. Both psychological continuity and 
psychological connectedness, unlike personal identity, are relations of degree. (Parfit 
\ 
shows by means of his exposition of quasi-memory, quasi-intention, etc, that these 
relations of degree do not presuppose personal identity.) 
The apparent importance of personal identity arises from the contingent fact that it 
coincides with psychological continuity and connectedness. However, thought 
experiments such as the double hemi-brain transplant show that it is at least logically 
possible for personal identity and psychological continuity to. become unhinged from 
each other. When we are faced with such a case, we realise, Parfit argues, that it is not 
personal identity - the separate existence of persons over time - that is important, but 
rather psychological continuity and survival. These, being matters of degree, are 
appraised in terms of short-lived temporal selves. Individual persons are thus not basic. 
They are reducible to a series of these short-lived temporal selves. 
4.4) UTILITARIAN IMPLICATIONS 
Both the rival theories of ontology which I have described, have been claimed to lead 
to, or, at least, support utilitarianism. Parfit denies that this claim is true of the first 
view - the view that society is the unit of existence13. He says, however, that the other 
view - reductionism about persons - makes utilitarianism more plausible, even though it 
does not entail it. I shall now argue, contra Parfit, that the non-reductionist view of 
society (as I have described it) does lead to utilitarian reasoning. I shall then argue that 
(extreme) reductionism about persons is neutral between (i) utilitarianism and (ii) a 
view that applies distributive principles to temporal stages within lives. Which moral 
conclusion one draws from reductionism about persons depends on what premise one 
adds to this reductionist thesis. (I shall argue that Parfit suppresses the additional 
13. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 332. 
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utilitarian premise.) Finally in this subsection, I shall make the more significant claim 
that even if Parfit is right that personal identity is not as deep as we think it is, he has 
nevertheless not shown that it is so shallow as to eliminate the need for interpersonal 
distributive principles. 
Parfit's argument that the non-reductionist view of society does not lead to 
utilitarianism is as follows. He cites Hegel as one example of someone who holds the 
non-reductionist view of society. The kind of group or society about which Hegel 
spoke was the nation. He and his followers regarded the nation as a super-organism. 
This; Parfit observes, conflicts with utilitarianism, which ignores national boundaries. I 
agree, but the non-reductionist view of society may more accurately be taken to focus 
on Society rather than a society, on mankind rather than on nations or groups. This 
view, I think, does lead to utilitarianism. If Society is the unit of existence - if it is a 
mass-person possessing a single mind - then well-being should be connected to it and 
no attention need be paid to distributive principles applicable between individual lives 
that comprise it. Similarly, since there is only one Society (with a capital "S") there is 
no problem of distribution between it and "other" societies. 
Parfit sees the non-reductionist view of Society not as an explanation of utilitarianism, 
but rather as an objection to it. He argues that since this view of Society is so clearly 
false, utilitarians are unjustified in rejecting the said distributive principles on these 
grounds. However, I believe this argument begs the question. If one accepts this view 
of Society, then one will be led to utilitarianism. It is a distinct question whether this 
view of Society has any merit, and I have argued that it does not. 
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On Parfit's reductionism about persons, the divisions within lives are taken to be like 
the divisions between lives. Therefore, they ought, Parfit points out, to be treated 
similarly. This, he notes, may be done in one of two ways14: 
a) we can apply the distributive principles previously applied between lives, 
within lives as well. 
b) we can desist from applying these distributive principles between lives in 
much the same way as we ordinarily desist from applying them within 
lives. 
If we adopt (a) we extend the scope of distributive principles, thus leading us away 
from utilitarianism which is characterized by a lack of concern for distributive 
principles. If we adopt (b) we reduce the scope of distributive principles, thus leading 
us closer to utilitarianism. 
How do we choose between (a) and (b)? Reductionism about persons does not favour 
one over the other. Whether one proceeds from reductionism about persons to (a) and 
to a non-utilitarian view, or alternatively to (b) and to utilitarianism, depends on what 
premise one adds to the reductionism. If the premise one adds is utilitarian, then the 
utilitarian conclusion will be produced. If a distributive premise is added, a non-
utilitarian conclusion will be reached. But the addition of these premises would be 
question-begging. 
In providing an argument which he claims is for the adoption of (b), Parfit seems to me 
to import a utilitarian premiselS. His argument goes as follows: He asks why it is that 
within a single life we usually ignore distributive principles and opt for maximization. 
He suggests that some people answer that maximization is only justified because it is 
within one life. He notes that utilitarians would object to this answer, They would say 
that suffering is bad and pleasure is good and it is better to have more of what is good 
14. Ibid, p. 334. 
15. Ibid. 
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and less of what is bad. This, and not the unity of a life, is the justification for 
maximization. It is because of this view, Parfit says, that the utilitarian can justify 
maximization over different lives without assuming that humankind is a mass-person. 
Parfit argues that the reductionist view of persons supports the utilitarian here because 
if the unity of a life is less deep than we thought, then it is less likely to be the unity of 
a life that justifies maximization within a life. 
I would suggest that Parfit is conjoining the reductionist and utilitarian theses to show 
how the former leads to the latter. He is invoking a utilitarian argument to yield a 
utilitarian conclusion. He looks to uncontroversial maximization - that which is within 
one life - settles on a utilitarian justification for this, and then applies this justification 
to highly controversial cases. Unaided by such an argument, reductionism about 
persons does not lead to utilitarianism. The reverse may occur, however. Utilitarians 
may be led to reductionism because the view I have advocated - what Parfit calls non-
reductionism about persons - is incompatible with utilitarianism. 
It seems that there is no way of choosing between (a) and (b) without begging the 
question. However, if it could be shown that it made no difference whether one adopted 
(a) or (b) because both led to utilitarianism, then it would not matter that we are unable 
to choose. Whatever we chose, we would be led to the same moral conclusion. But, I 
have already said that to adopt (a) is to extend the scope of distributive principles - the 
opposite effect of adopting (b). Parfit notes, however, that if the extension of the scope 
of the distributive principles were accompanied by a reduction of their weight or 
importance so that they counted for nothing, the net result would be utilitarianism. 
Impotent principles, no matter how extensive their scope, remain impotent. Some 
attention must therefore be given to Parfit's arguments about how the distributive 
principles lose their weight. 
102 
Broadly, Parfit's argument is that distributive principles are often held to be founded on 
the separateness of persons and since, on the reductionist view, this fact is less deep, it 
is more plausible to give them less weight. He says that "if we cease to believe that 
persons are separately existing entities and come to believe that the unity of a life 
involves no more than the various relations between the experiences of this life, it 
becomes more plausible to be more concerned about the quality of experiences and less 
concerned about whose experiences they are"16. 
I would argue, by contrast, that the weight of distributive principles is not founded on 
the separateness of persons. It is only the conventional scope of these principles that is 
fixed by the separateness of persons. The weight of distributive principles is based on 
separateness of existence, irrespective of whether these existences are temporal stages, 
persons or societies. Distribution is important so long as at least two separate existences 
can be discerned. The "size" of these existences does not matter (though their nature -
including their degree of sophistication - may matter). The scope of distributive 
principles is fixed by one's determination of what entities have separate existence - of 
where the boundaries of existence are. If, like Parfit, one wishes to claim that personal 
identity is less deep, then one can change the scope. It should not have any effect on 
the weight. This is a point made by Nagel l 7. Parfit responds: 
Why should the effect be only on the scope? A change of view about the facts 
often makes it plausible to give to a moral principle a different weight. If this 
cannot be plausible in the present case, this needs to be shown. I believe that it 
could not be shown. . . . Nagel talks of the unit over which a distributive 
principle operates. If this unit is the whole of a person's life ... a Principle of 
Equality will tell us to try to make better, not the lives of the people who are 
worst off, but the worst states that people are in. 18. 
16. Ibid, p. 346. 
17. T. Nagel, Mortal Questions, p. 124, footnote 16. 
18. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 343, 344. 
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One might agree that "a change of view about the facts often makes it plausible to give 
a moral principle a different weight" without having to accept that the change of view 
for which Parfit has argued is one that makes it plausible to change the weight of 
distributive principles. If the unit of existence is a temporal stage, then our distributive 
principles will require us to make better the worst off temporal stages. Parfit believes 
that this makes distributive principles less plausible. Citing Haksar, he says the reason 
why this is so is that, although suffering is bad, it is worse when the same individual 
keeps on suffering. If the temporal stage is the unit of existence, then one individual 
cannot keep on suffering. There is, on this view, no such thing as a continually existing 
individual that could be suffering on and on l 9. Because there is no possibility of 
compensation at one time for suffering at another, Parfit believes that distributive 
principles have less weight on a reductionist view of individuals. However, I think that 
this is wrong. Distribution is not primarily about intra-personal compensation, though 
this may play some role. It is primarily about inter-personal, or, on the reductionist 
view, inter-temporal stage apportioning of benefits and burdens. Thus the fact that 
intrapersonal compensation becomes less plausible on a reductionist view does not 
entail distributive principles becoming less plausible and therefore losing weight. 
It seems that Parfit is relying on his claim about personal identity both to extend the 
scope and reduce the weight of distributive principles. One can, in my view, quite 
easily accept Parfit's claims about personal identity and yet .accord equal weight to 
distributive principles, simply by extending their scope so that they apply to temporal 
stages rather than merely individuals. 
Parfit, I think, realizes the relative weaknesses of his claims throughout, and thus keeps 
drawing weak conclusions. For example, he says that accepting the reductionist view 
about persons makes utilitarianism less implausible20. He says that on his view 
19. Ibid, p. 345. 
20. Ibid, p. 346. 
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distributive principles are less plausible and contrasts his "cautious" view with that of 
Wachsberg - that distributive principles lose their plausibility (altogether)21 . 
It seems then that we cannot choose between (a) and (b) and that it does make a 
difference which of these views we adopt. I wish to turn now to what I take to be a 
more significant criticism of the conclusions Parfit tries to draw from his views about 
personal identity. 
Parfit argues that the separateness of our existences is less deep than we thought, that 
persons are reducible to series of temporally fleeting selves. He argues that 
psychological continuity is more important than personal identity. On this reductionist 
view of persons, our experiences are not unified and not sharply differentiable from 
those of others, he claims. What I wish to point out is that even if it is the case that the 
unity of our lives is compromised by Parfit's arguments, there are still stronger 
connections between intra-life experiences than between inter-life experiences. Parfit 
would certainly not deny this in the case of strong psychological connectedness between 
contiguous or even close "selves", yet he often seems to ignore it and moves subtly 
from modest claims that the separateness of persons is less deep, to the very bold 
position that it has no depth. It is this that enables him to draw utilitarian conclusions. I 
think that even if Parfit is right that personal identity is not as deep as we think it is, he 
has nevertheless not shown that it is so shallow as to eliminate the need for 
interpersonal distributive principles. Personal identity is sufficiently deep to justify our 
linking morality to the well-being of individuals rather than to the well-being of their 
temporal stages. I shall say more about why this is so in the next section. 
21. Ibid, p. 344. 
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4.5) THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIVIDUALS 
I want to go one step further and claim that even when only weak psychological 
continuity exists between the experiences of successive "selves", the unity of these is 
still significant and differentiable from the experiences of others. I think that the 
inescapability of this fact is evidenced, for example, by Parfit speaking of experiences 
"within" and "between" lives. These expressions only have meaning if one accepts that 
our separate existences have some unity. Now Parfit may retort that his terminology 
reflects the common usage and is, in fact, inaccurate. I think that he would be unable to 
express his views adequately in any other meaningful way. But rather than pursue this 
particular point, I wish to say more about the unity of successive temporal stages and 
the moral significance of this. 
I said earlier that morality must be connected to well-being. While we can conceive of 
the well-being of non-conscious (rather than unconscious) things such as cars and trees, 
this well-being cannot compare to that of conscious beings. The well-being of non-
conscious things makes no difference to them. They could not, cannot, nor will be able 
to care about their own well-being or the lack thereof. The well-being of conscious 
beings, by contrast, makes a very real difference to them. The sort of well-being to 
which morality must be connected, is the kind which makes a difference, otherwise 
morality would make no difference. Thus it is the well-being of conscious creatures, 
(or at least creatures which are capable of consciousness), which counts. This is not to 
say that we cannot have obligations concerning the treatment of non-conscious objects. 
However, these obligations are founded on the interests of conscious beings. Thus, for 
example, I have an obligation not to vandalize a car because it belongs to someone else 
and his interests would be harmed if I damaged his car. 
While it is true that there are different temporal stages to an individual's life, there is 
much that binds these together. One example is our awareness, as conscious subjects, 
of our existence over time. One temporal stage feels connected to others. This is the 
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"feeling of connectedness". It is a consciousness of continued existence. Memory links 
the present temporal stage with prior ones. Anticipation is a future-orientated analogue 
of memory, linking the present temporal stage with future ones. 
The consciousness of continuous existence is itself a strong argument for our existence 
over time. Consciousness of continuous existence is, I think, supported by some kind 
of Parfitian psychological continuity - though I am not sure whether it is psychological 
continuity (in its narrow sense), psychological connectedness, or something in between. 
Whichever it is, consciousness of continuous existence has sorne foundation in Parfit's 
analysis. This is one phenomenon which gives some depth to the unity of lives on 
Parfit's reductionism which, I have claimed, is a relatively moderate thesis. On an 
extreme reductionist account (which I believe is indefensible), our feeling of existence 
over time would be taken to be an illusion. This, I think, is radically counter-intuitive. 
However, even if we were to grant that our existence over time is an illusion, its 
illusory status would not detract from the moral significance of the feeling. It is the 
feeling of connectedness, of a continuous self, that is morally significant. Now 
someone who accepted Parfit's arguments might object that the feeling of continuous 
existence cannot be morally significant because the belief in continuous existence is 
irrational. But I am arguing that whether or not the belief is irrational (say from an 
ontological perspective), it is neverthelss morally significant - or rational from a moral 
perspective. 
Let me now say why it is morally significant. I have already said that the kind of well-
being to which morality must be connected is the well-being of conscious creatures 
because the well-being of such creatures matters to them. In other words, it is the fact 
that their well-being matters to them that gives their well-being an intrinsic moral 
status. Now, when such creatures· are concerned about their well-being, it is, as a 
matter of fact, their well-being as consciously existing individuals rather than their 
well-being as temporal stages, about which they are concerned. Thus, for example, 
I 
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when one temporal stage makes prudential calculations knowing that although it may 
not experience the benefit and harms, pleasures and pains, that result from its decision, 
the self that decides and the self that experiences will be subjectively indistinguishable. 
It is this that will matter. It certainly does not seem irrational to undergo some 
discomfort now in order to secure pleasure or to prevent greater pain for a subjectively 
indistinguishable entity that exists at a latter time. 
A society exists as a collection or construction of individuals. Societies, unlike 
individuals, have no subjectivity. A decision taken by one constituent member can have 
beneficial or harmful consequences for subjectively distinguishable co-members of that 
society. Since it is the subjective feeling of identity that counts in morality, (he 
distribution of benefits is important. 
Since individuals are the significant units of existence, morality should be attached to 
individual well-being rather than to the well-being of society. A theory, such as 
utilitarianism, that overlooks individuals and focuses on fictitious creatures they 
collectively constitute, or on arbitrary time-slices of individual existences, is not 
appropriately recognizing the metaphysical reality and its moral significance. A moral 
theory that ignores the facts, morally relevant facts, does so at its own expense. 
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CHAPTERS 
WELL-BEING 
5.1) PLEASURES, DESIRES AND NEEDS 
I have argued that morality should be connected to individual rather than social well-
being. What, however, is well-being? Some people have sought to reduce well-being to 
one or other basic kind of state, such as pleasurable mental states, the state of having 
one's desires satisfied, or the state of having one's needs fulfilled. What is meant by 
"pleasures", "desire satisfaction" and "need fulfilment"? 
Pleasurable mental states are simply subjectively pleasurable conscious states. The 
concept of a pleasurable mental state does not make any reference to extra-mental 
phenomena, including how or why the mental state arose. The feel of the mental state 
is the sole determining feature of whether it is pleasurable or painful. 
To desire something is to want it. A desire is satisfied when the state of the world 
which is wanted comes about. It is not necessarily accompanied by a feeling of 
satisfaction. Amongst desires, I include both short term instrumental desires (such as a 
desire for a haircut or some entertainment), as well as far reaching goals and life's aims 
(such as bringing up intelligent, well-mannered and well-adjusted children, composing 
a symphony or winning a gold medal in the Olympics). 
Whereas mental states and desires must be predicated of conscious creatures, needs are 
not necessarily ascribed to subjects of experience alone1. A need is, near tautologically, 
a necessary condition. If Xis a need then it is a necessary condition/or something, Y. 
1. J. Griffin, Well-Being, p. 41. 
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If Y is to be, then X must be. Need fulfilment, like desire satisfaction, is a state of the 
world rather than a state of mind. It is not the feeling that one's needs have been 
fulfilled. It is the objective fact that they have been fulfilled. 
Well-being, I shall argue, cannot be reduced to any one kind of state, whether it be 
pleasure, desire satisfaction or need fulfilment. Each plays at least some role in a 
person's well-being. 
On some interpretations of utilitarianism, well-being is identified with pleasurable 
mental states and the absence of pain2. The action whose consequences produce the 
greatest amount of pleasure is the right action. Robert Nozick has shown, however, that 
we value more than just our experiences. He does this by means of a thought 
experiment in which he imagines an experience machine3. This is a marvelous piec~ of 
technology which can give one any experience or series of experiences one desires. 
One is given the opportunity of choosing the (presumably pleasant) experiences one 
wants and is then plugged into the machine, (perhaps for only a limited time after 
which one can choose another series of experiences). Nozick asks whether we would 
plug ourselves in. It seems, he argues, that for at least three reasons we would not. 
Firstly, we want to actually do certain things and not just have the experience of doing 
them. We want to run the race, draw the picture, write the poem, go to the party, and 
not simply have the experience of doing these things. Secondly, we want to actually be 
a certain way, without simply having the experience of being that way. We want to be 
rich, or famous, or strong, or tall, and not simply have the experience that we are any 
(or all!) of these. Finally, with the experience machine, we have no actual contact with 
any deeper reality than the man-made reality of the machine. Nozick suggests that our 
reluctance to be plugged into the experience machine indicates that something more 
2. Theories that identify well-being with pleasurable mental states are often called Hedonist 
theories. See D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 493; A. Buchanan & D. Brock, 
Deciding for Others, p. 31 . 
3. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 42 - 45 
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than the way our lives feel from the inside, matters to us. We value more than just 
pleasant experiences. 
While one is plugged into Nozick's experience machine, one does not know that one's 
experiences are "artificial". Thus the fact that the experiences originate in something 
man-made would not concern those who were plugged in. Though we believe that we 
are not presently plugged into such a machine, we cannot be sure that, in fact, we are 
not. Imagine that we currently are in a plugged-in state and are faced with the 
experience of being offered the choice whether or not we would like to be plugged in. 
The fact that even if this were to be true we would choose not be plugged in shows that 
if we found out that our experiences were from a machine we would be very 
disappointed. We would value at least some of our pleasurable experiences that much 
less. 
Nozick's argument shows us that our well-being is not reducible simply to pleasurable 
mental states. His argument does not, nor does it purport to, show that our mental 
states are irrelevant to our well-being. Clearly the nature of our mental states 
constitutes part of our well-being. Pleasant rather than painful mental states have both 
intrinsic and instrumental value. 
To a large degree, we regard pain as bad because of the way it feels. It is no 
consolation to learn that one's pain was caused not by hitting one's thumb with the 
hammer, but artificially by a machine which gave the (false) impression that one had 
hit one's thumb. Similarly, pleasurable mental states have some intrinsic worth. 
Consider, for example the pleasure of eating well-seasoned brussels sprouts4. Imagine 
that one found out that one had not eaten these little vegetables, that all one was "fed" 
4. A pleasurable experience for me, but evidently not for many people, especially many 
children who have to be coaxed into eating their brussels sprouts by a dubious 
argument about starving children in Ethiopia. 
111 
was the experience of eating them. Knowing that the pleasure one had was caused 
artificially would not eliminate the actual experiential pleasure. 
(However, it is possible for this pleasure to be compromised. Imagine a gourmet who 
knows while he is having the experience of eating brussels sprouts, that his experience 
is artificially induced. He may well be so depressed by this knowledge that his actual 
experience is altered for the worse. Clearly this is only possible if the knowledge and 
the experience are concurrent. Once one has had a pleasurable experience, this cannot 
be compromised by later knowledge. Certainly one may then view one's earlier 
experience in a different light, evaluate it differently and be disappointed, but the 
pleasant nature of the experience itself, once lived, cannot be altered.) 
In addition to their intrinsic harm or value, painful and pleasurable mental states can 
also have instrumental harm or value. Firstly, pain and pleasure are often (though· not 
always) indications of whether other components of a creature's well-being are being 
served. Thus injury, which, as I shall show, is adverse to well-being, usually results in 
pain. The pain draws our attention to the injury in such a way as to encourage us to 
avoid it, or to seek repair. Similarly, the satisfaction of needs and the fulfilment of 
desires often result in pleasant mental states. For example, filling our stomachs with 
food gives us pleasure. This is one of the reasons why we fill our stomachs with food, 
something which, pleasure aside, fosters our well-being. Were pleasure and need 
fulfilment to become disconnected from each other there would be less incentive to 
pursue the sati_sfaction of our needs. I am told of the scientific experiment in which 
electrodes were attached to a rat's brain. Pleasure could be artificially stimulated every 
time the rat pushed a bar in its cage. The rat soon sought all its pleasure in this way and 
starved to death. 
/ 
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There is a second way in which pain and pleasure have instrumental harm and value. 
Painful mental states can debilitate. A person who is compromised by pain is unable to 
pursue his desires and n~s satisfactorily. Positive mental states, or at least the absence 
of negative ones, better equip one to satisfy one's needs and desires. 
So much for the importance of mental states to well-being. Satisfying desires is another 
important component of well-being, not only because we desire pleasure and the 
absence of pain, and not only because we desire much that we need, but also because 
the satisfaction of desires is in itself valuable to us. Sometimes we desire things which 
are not good for us. Sometimes satisfying these desires brings pleasure (or relief), as in 
the case of the drug addict's desire for another dose. On other occasions, satisfying 
non-beneficial and harmful desires brings no pleasure. Consider, for example, the case 
of the political prisoner on a hunger-strike. Doing without food is neither pleasurable 
nor good for him, and yet he desires to go without food. Satisfying this desire is, for 
him, a very important component of his well-beings. This desire satisfaction has an 
importance which is independent of the pleasures it may bring and the needs it may 
fulfil. 
Needs also play a vital role in well-being. Needs, I said earlier, are necessary 
conditions for something or other. They are not necessarily desired. There are a 
number of kinds of needs. Griffin distinguishes two kinds of needs: instrumental ones -
those we have because of the particular ends we happen to have; and basic ones - those 
we have simply because of the kinds of creatures we are6. Both kinds are important to 
well-being. Because Vladimir Horowitz wanted to be a pianist, he had an instrumental 
need for a piano. I, on the other hand, have no desire even occasionally to tinkle on a 
piano, so I have no need for a piano. However, given our nature as social beings, both 
5. This example is not unproblematic. It raises the question of objective and subjective 
views of well-being - a matter to which I shall turn later in this chapter. 
6. J. Griffin, Well-Being, p. 41. 
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Horowitz and I have basic needs for friendship and communication. We do not have 
these needs because of the particular ends we happen to have but rather because we are 
the kind of creature we are. 
I should like to make an alternative distinction between three different kinds of needs: 
essential needs, non-essential needs and instrumental needs. I use the term 
"instrumental needs" in Griffin's sense. By essential needs I mean those needs which 
must be satisfied if the bearer of that need is to continue existing. If our essential needs 
are not satisfied, we simply cannot live. Given our biological makeup, all mammals, 
including Horowitz and I, have a need for oxygenated air, a minimal amount of fo~d, 
water, and perhaps clothing and shelter. Without these, we die. By contrast, if non-
essential needs are not satisfied we do not drop dead, or even die slowly, though we 
may, as a result, live a deprived life. Most of us could live on far less food and less 
expensive food. None of us has an essential need for more than one set of clothes (and 
perhaps a change for wash days). However, simply because the "excess" that we have 
is not essential does not mean that it is not needed. The excess can be classified as a 
non-essential need until a particular threshold of excess is reached. After that point, 
further increments may be desired, but cannot be said to be needed, even non-
essentially. Similarly, one does not have an essential need for one's spouse's fidelity. 
One can survive without it, but yet one does still need it in a non-essential way. 
\ 
It may be objected that there is an incoherence in speaking about a non-essential need. 
If a need is a necessary condition then a non-essential need is a non-essential necessary 
condition, and that sounds like a contradiction. However, this is not so. When I speak 
of an essential need, I mean a need which must be satisfied for the very continued 
existence of the bearer of that need. The bearer of a non-essential need can survive if 
the non-essential need is not fulfilled, but in a "sub-satisfactory" condition. Thus, a 
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non-essential need is a necessary condition - not for survival but for survival under 
"satisfactory" conditions. 
Essential needs are the bedrock needs. Less basic, but also important are our non-
essential needs and our instrumental ones. I believe that there is a difference between 
non-essential needs and instrumental ones, though they may intersect. Some non-
essential needs are not instrumental. Oliver Twist's hoped-for extra bowl of gruel was a 
non-essential need. Without it he would not, indeed did not, die. However, it was not 
instrumental in Griffin's sense. It was not a need that arose from particular goals or 
desires that Oliver had. It was a need which anyone of us would have in Oliver's 
nutritional state. Needless to say, there is no clear divide between essential needs and 
non-essential ones, and between non-essential needs, on the one hand, and instrumental 
needs and some desires, on the other. 
Very often we have desires for that which we need. However, the satisfaction of needs 
is important to well-being whether or not what we need is also desired, and whether or 
not the satisfaction of our needs gives us pleasure. In fact, it is usually the case that 
need satisfaction is more important to well-being than the occurrence of pleasurable 
mental states. Consider, for example, the biologicat need for. nourishment. It is 
conceivable for one to receive nourishment without the feeling of satisfaction (as in the 
case of one fed by an intravenous drip) and it is conceivable for one to have the feeling 
of satisfaction without actually receiving the nourishment (as in the case of someone 
who eats well, but suffers from a severe gastro-intestinal absorption problem). 
Nourishment is more central to well-being than the feeling of gastronomic satisfaction. 
Without nourishment one dies. It is quite possible to survive without the feeling of a 
full stomach. 
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We can conclude from the preceding discussion that pleasurable mental states and the 
satisfaction of desires and needs all contribute, to various degrees, towards well-being. 
We have also seen that pleasure, desire and need converge to a significant degree. 
Generically, we can refer to the pleasures, desires and needs as interests 7. These 
particular interests are to be distinguished from a person's overall interest, or well-
being. Particular interests are the building blocks of well-being. However, particular 
interests of a single individual often conflict. Different pleasures can conflict with each 
other, just as desires can conflict with each other, and just as one need can conflict with 
another. There can also be conflict between each kind of interest: between desires and 
needs, pleasures and desires, etc. Solving the conflict is a matter of weighing up the 
interests. Consider the following example. Pavarotti may have an interest in cheering 
for his favourite soccer team because he has a desire to show his support in this way. 
However, it may not be in his overall interest, because it will damage his voice, thus 
adversely affecting his singing. Since the interests he has in singing are so much more 
important to him than his interest in cheering for his favourite soccer side, his overall 
interest is not served by pursuing his interest in soccer cheering. This is an example of 
an uncomplicated conflict - a straightforward conflict between a strong interest and a 
weak one. Sometimes it is more difficult to weigh the interests, as in the case where 
Pavarotti has the choice of singing in either one of two prestigious operas, but not both. 
Another complicating consideration is that in different circumstances different aspects 
of well-being can be ranked in different ways. In other words, what is more important 
to one's well-being in some circumstances can be less important in others. Thus the 
determination of which interests take precedence over which is dependent, in part, on 
the precise nature of the circumstances. 
7. This usage of the word "interest" differs from that of Feinberg, for example. For him 
interests are a narrower class. They exclude some desires for example. See J. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others, chapter 1. 
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Having said this, though, we can give some examples of what ordinarily benefits a 
creature and fosters his well-being. I am not suggesting that the important examples 
which I shall provide benefit creatures without exception. There are certainly occasions 
on which that which usually benefits can impair well-being. I shall mention some such 
examples, but I deny now that their existence poses any problem to the concept of well-
being. If, in a particular instance, something does not benefit a creature, then in that 
instance it is not part of his well-being. The fact that it is usually beneficial is 
significant and will be important to my discussion of what rights there are. 
Perhaps most central to a creature's well-being is its life. Speaking in the first person, I 
can say that my (continued) life is in my interests for two reasons. Firstly, the intrinsic 
importance of my life to me: in an important sense, anything is important to itself, 
because without itself, it is not. Without me, I am not. Thus, my life is very important 
to me. I cannot have a greater interest than my own life. Whatever other interests I 
have, they are interests of my life. Secondly, most other interests which I might have 
are dependent on my living. I cannot have pleasurable mental states or pursue my 
desires or life's plans unless I am alive. It is in the interests of a creature capable of 
enjoying pleasant experiences and desirous of attaining certain goals to continue living. 
He needs to live if his well-being is to be advanced in these important areas. Thus, to 
summarize both these reasons, I have an interest in my life because my life is a 
necessary condition not only for pursuing most of my other interests, but also for 
merely having them. Interests are not ownerless. They have to be interests of 
something. 
I said that most of my other interests are dependent on my being alive. I say this 
because some of one's interests can be served or frustrated if one is no longer living. 
Feinberg has shown that posthumous interests are possibles. Some of a person's 
8. J. Feinberg, "Harm and Self-interest" in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality 
and Society, pp. 299ff; J. Feinberg, Harm to Others, pp. 79f. 
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interests do not survive his death. These are the interests which Feinberg calls "self-
confined"9 interests. They are based on desires such as the desire to be a self of a 
certain kind or the desire for self-respect. However, we also have interests in states of 
affairs that extend beyond our experience and to some time in the future. For example, 
we have interests in having a good reputation. These interests are not limited to our 
experiences or even to our lives. If we are defamed and do not know about it, either 
because we are alive but unaware of it or because we are dead, we are still harmed. 
That which can harm or benefit one can extend beyond the bounds of one's subjective 
experience and of one's life itself. Posthumous interests are those interests that can still 
be served or frustrated by posthumous events. Aristotle also accepted that posthumous 
events can affect the interests of the deceased, (though he denied that these could be 
sufficiently influential to render a "happy" man "unhappy" 10). 
Not everyone agrees that posthumous interests are possible. Lucretius is one who 
maintained that evil cannot befall the dead because they do not exist to suffer any 
evil 11 . One cannot suffer harm, he says, if one does not exist. Thus, death and 
posthumous events cannot constitute harms. Lucretius's argument is similar, though not 
identical, to those who argue against the possibility of posthumous interests by claiming 
that the dead cannot be harmed or benefited because they cannot know about it. 
However, as we have seen, one can be harmed without knowing that one is harmed, as 
in the case where sombody besmirches my reputation without my knowledge. If 
knowledge is not a necessary condition for harm before death, it is not a necessary 
condition for harm after death 12. 
9. J. Feinberg, "Harm and Self-Interest" in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.) Law, Morality 
and Society, pp. 304, 305; J. Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 86. 
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 1, chapter xi. 
11. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, book Ill 822-871. 
12. J. Feinberg, "Harm and Self-Interest" in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality 
and Society, p. 306. 
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Even though posthumous interests are possible, death itself in not usually in one's 
interests. It is living that is in one's interests. Many of our interests do not survive 
death. Those that do are resilient interests, but they remain the interests of the life that 
was. 
Although life is usually in one's interests, we can conceive of some kinds of case in 
which it is not so. Some people who suffer prolonged unbearable pain, perhaps as a 
result of a terminal disease, often say that it is not in their interests to continue living, 
that death is preferable to the excruciating pain they suffer. In some of these cases 
continued life might well not be in their interests. 
Health and the absence of injury or maiming are other states which we need and desire. 
They are required for the effective avoidance of pain and for optimal functioning in 
order to pursue the satisfaction of needs and desires. In so far as a creature's health is 
impaired, its well-being is adversely affected. 
Once again, we can think of counter-examples. To avoid a 25- year conscription of 
young boys into the Tzarist army, many parents chose to cut off a finger of their sons 
so as to render them exempt. These parents believed, not without at least some 
justification, that they acted in their sons' interests by inflicting this injury on them. 
Just as injury is not always harmful, so healing is not always beneficial. This is what 
the "ex-leper" in Monty Python's Life of Brian claims. He complains to Brian that once 
he was a leper with a trade - begging. He was cured of his leprosy, but then he had no 
income (because people give alms to lepers, but not to ex-lepers). This did not strike 
him as being a good deal. He wanted a disability bad enough for him to beg, but not so 
bad that he suffered excessively. However, these exceptional cases aside, we are 
justified, I think, in claiming that health is usually in a creature's interests. 
I 
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Living creatures have certain essential biological needs such as for food and oxygen. 
The satisfaction of these needs is required for the preservation of health and life. 
The satisfaction of more sophisticated needs and desires, such as for friendship and 
belonging, good wine and philosophy, as well as the realization of one's conception of 
the good, are also components of well-being. 
There is much that goes into well-being and there may well be more to it than I have 
mentioned, but I think that I have pointed to its main features: However, these require 
further exposition to highlight an important problem. This is the problem of subjective 
and objective views of well-being. It is a problem which takes on particular 
significance when we connect well-being to morality. 
5.2) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE VIEWS OF WELL-BEING DEFINED 
There can be more than one kind of conception of a particular individual's well:-being -
a "subjective" one and an "objective" one. 
An objective conception of well-being maintains that there is some objective standard 
of well-being which we can sometimes fail to recognize because we are irrational. On 
an objective view there need not be only one objective standard of well-being which is 
true of all creatures or even all creatures of a particular kind. There may be a different 
objective standard for each individual. For example, acquiring a good quality violin . 
may be in Yitzchak Perlman's interests, but not in mine. However, it seems to me that 
these variations will usually only concern what I shall call the details rather than the 
general structure of well-being. The general structure of a creature's well-being 
consists of the constellation of general features of its well-being that it shares with 
other creatures of the same kind. It is not easy to give a complete account of the 
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general structure of the well-being of a particular kind of creature or object, but an 
outline can be attempted. I have already described the kinds of features that 
characterize human well-being. Some of these features are shared by non-human 
animals. Such creatures also have interests in pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, they 
have essential as well as non-essential needs, and they have some desires. One general 
feature of the well-being of humans that distinguishes human well-being from the well-
being of other animals is that humans have more sophisticated desires. By more 
sophisticated desires I do not mean more important desires, but desires such as those 
that concern music, art, literature, and the long-term future. -The particular kinds of 
sophisticated desires and the instrumental needs they yield will vary from individual to 
individual. Amongst those who have a desire to play a musical instrument, some will 
choose the piano, others the violin, others the oboe or the guitar. Amongst those who 
choose the violin, some will prefer one make and others another. These are all the 
details of well-being. The general features shared by all humans are that they have 
sophisticated desires and attendant instrumental needs and these are related to the other 
features of their well-being in characteristic ways. 
A subjective view is one in which the subject's evaluation of his own desires and needs 
is granted authority. In other words, a subject is taken to be the best judge of his own 
interests. A subjective view can allow that we can be uninformed or misinformed and, 
as a result, fail to recognise our interests. For example, I may desperately desire to lay 
my hands on a particular book because I believe that it contains some information 
which I need. Imagine, however, that my belief that the book contains the requisite 
information is false. I may then think that it is in my interests to obtain the book, but 
clearly it is not. The subjective view can account for such cases. It would simply claim 
that were I to be correctly informed, my desire would be amended accordingly. The 
objective view, by contrast, maintains that I may be correctly informed of all the facts 
and yet still have irrational desires. 
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5.3) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE VIEWS OF WELL-BEING EVALUATED 
I shall now argue in favour of the objective view of well-being. Since I think that rights 
are best linked to well-being objectively conceived, it is important to argue for the 
objective view of well-being as a prelude to my discussion in the next chapter of how 
rights can be linked to and grounded in well-being. 
The objective view reflects the common sense view that thete are different levels of 
well-being and that some are objectively more basic than others, even if some 
individuals think otherwise. For example, the satisfaction of basic biological needs such 
as the need for water seems to be objectively a more basic level of well-being than the 
desire to contemplate philosophical problems. A philosopher who values philosophy 
above water, taking the former to be more basic to his well-being, will not be a 
philosopher for long after he is faced with a choice for one or the other. It seems that 
he is wrong about what is most essential to his well-being. Yet the subjective view 
would claim that he is not wrong. 
On the subjective view the achievement or at least the pursuit of one's own conception 
of the good is itself an important part of a rational creature's well-being. One has 
strong interests in acting according to one's desires. If, according to one's conception 
of the good, philosophical reflection is more valuable than life because a life without 
philosophy is not worth living, then one's well-being would, in an important way, be 
compromised, were one to opt for a life without philosophy. 
The objectivist can respond to this in one of two ways. One way would be to deny that 
the pursuit of one's conception of the good is more basic than the satisfaction of 
biological needs. He could argue that by looking at less sophisticated creatures which 
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lack a conception of the good it becomes apparent that one's conception of the good 
occupies one of the most sophisticated levels of well-being, objectively speaking. If 
only sophisticated creatures which have sophisticated desires have a conception of the 
good, then such a conception would appear to have to occupy a sophisticated level of 
well-being. Thus biological needs are more basic and any attempt by a conception of 
the good to suggest otherwise is an illegitimate attempt to make itself the most basic 
level of well-being. 
The other way an objeetivist could respond to the subjectivist ·is more plausible in my 
view. This way would be to agree that an important part of a rational creature's well-
being is the achievement or, at least, the pursuit of his own conception of his well 
being 13. Such creatures desire that their perceived interests be served. (This is what 
pursuing one's conception of one's own well-being is about.) The objective view can 
take account of these desires. It can say that the satisfaction of a subject's ·perceived 
interests is relevant to his well-being, viewed objectively.· The objective view can 
consistently hold that while it might have been best of all if the subject had not had 
certain perceived interests, the fact that he does have them is relevant to an objective 
appraisal of what constitutes his well-being. In other words, all things being equal, 
those interests which he mistakenly perceives he has, would not be his interests, 
objectively viewed. However, since he does perceive these to be his interests, all things 
are not equal and they are objectively relevant to his well-being. 
There are two ways in which a subject's conception of his own well-being can be 
recognized. One way is to accord it supreme importance so that in any conflict between 
a perceived interest and an interest which, one's perceptions aside, one objectively has, 
13. Buchanan and Brock seem to treat self-determination and well-being as competing 
values, at least at a certain level. (See A. Buchanan & D. Brock, Deciding for Others, 
p. 40). While I agree that self-determination can conflict with other aspects of well-
being, it is part of well-being itself. Just as desires, needs and pleasures, which are 
all part of well-being, can conflict, so can self-determination conflict with other 
aspects of well-being, without having to be distinguished from well-being. 
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the perceived interest is given priority in determining what the person's well-being is. 
If this is the case then one's perceptions of one's interests conclusively determine what 
one's interests are. This way is not open to the objective view because it would then be 
equivalent to the subjective view. The alternative way is to say that, although perceived 
interests are relevant to an objective view of well-being, they are intrinsically no more 
important than other interests. Thus, in a conflict between perceived interests and 
interests which, one's perceptions aside, one objectively has there is no rule about 
which should predominate in determining what the person's well-being is. All the 
interests of both kinds will have to be weighed up in a given case in order to make such 
a determination. 
Take the example of the hunger-striker which I raised earlier. His perceptions aside, his 
hunger-strike is objectively not in his interests. Without food his health will become 
impaired and he will then die. However, he has a desire to achieve certain political 
aims by starving himself, until he dies if necessary. Since he has an interest in 
satisfying this desire, it is relevant to determining his well-being, objectively viewed. 
However, to say that this desire is relevant to his well-being is not to say that it 
conclusively determines that his overall interest is served by starving himself to death. 
It is simply that this desire must be considered in an objective appraisal of what 
constitutes his well-being. It is conceivable that his political goals are so important to 
him and are such a crucial part of his life that for him to be prevented from dying for 
the sake of achieving these goals would be to thwart his overall interest objectively 
viewed. Although this is conceivable, it will rarely be the case. Usually interests in 
continued life will override the interest in dying for one's cause, but even then the 
interest in dying will be relevant to an objective appraisal of his well-being. In such a 
case, an objective determination of his well-being will have to weigh his interest in 
being a martyr and while it can be acknowledged that it has some weight, it will have 
to be shown that this is outweighed by other interests. 
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The same considerations apply to the philosopher who values philosophy above life 
itself. The fact that he values philosophy above his life is a relevant consideration in 
objectively determining what constitutes his well-being, though it would not - except 
perhaps in rare circumstances - be a conclusive consideration. 
To highlight the fact that perceived interests do have objective importance for well-
being, , imagine a person with many misperceived interests. If none of these interests 
were satisfied, then even if many of the interests which, his perceptions aside, he 
objectively had were satisfied he would regard himself to be in a sorry state and might 
be miserable about it. There seems little doubt that such a person's well-being would 
then be in a compromised state, though perhaps he would not be as badly off as he 
would think. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that sometimes our perceived interests play a vital role in 
filling a gap in cases where there do not exist interests which, perceptions aside, are 
objectively had. Consider the following example: Two people are diagnosed as having 
terminal cancer. Both are correctly informed of all the relevant facts. Neither of them 
have had their rationality impaired by the suffering, this not having set in yet. One 
decides that the anticipated pain and suffering is not worth the relatively minimal 
pleasure that he can obtain in the few months he has to live, so he decides to end his 
life. The other decides that notwithstanding the suffering he must face if he continues 
living, it is worth enduring this for the extra time he will have. It seems that in such a 
case it cannot be said of only one of the options that, perceptions aside, it is in the sick 
person's objective interests. His subjective preference is all that goes towards 
determining what, under the circumstances, would serve his well-being objectively 
viewed. 
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One of the alleged advantages of the subjective view is that it provides an easy and 
appealing answer to the question about who is to decide what is in each individual's 
interests. Each person decides for himself. By contrast, the objective view does not 
provide such an easy answer to this question. Who, on the objective view, should 
decide what is in each individual's interests or in everyone's interests? Is it the 
government or the religious leaders? Is it Marx or Freud (both of whom expounded 
objective views of well-being)? If no person can set himself up as an authority on his 
own interests, then how can anyone be so bold as to decide about the interests of 
others? Perhaps there are some people who can decide both about their own interests 
and about those of others, but who decides who these people are? Part of the appeal of 
the subjective view, then, is that it says that each person should decide what his 
interests are, and that no person should decide for another (except in obvious cases such 
as small children). The reason why this is appealing is that it rules out coercing people 
to do something or refrain from doing something which is purportedly in their interests 
but against their will. Since the objective view claims that what a person wants is not 
always what is good for him it is claimed that this opens the way to coercion. It is this 
that is found to be an obnoxious implication of the objective view. However, I deny 
that this is an implication of the objective view. There is a difference, after all, between 
an objective view of well-being - which claims that there is an objective standard by 
which an individual's (true) interests can be judged - and the moral claim that this 
ought to be pursued even against his will. 
An objectivist could be opposed, for epistemological reasons, to coercing a person even 
for his own good. We find coercion so morally unattractive because we cannot be sure, 
even if there is an objective account of well-being, what it is. Forcing people to do 
what they do not want appears a sufficient evil to offset the merely possible benefit 
which they may gain as a result of one's coercion. 
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Mill employed a similar argument in support of freedom of expression 14. He argued 
that we can never be sure that an opinion is untrue. Any opinion may tum out to be 
true. Thus no opinion should be stifled or suppressed. To deny this and to suppress an 
opinion one takes to be false is to assume one's infallibility - that is, to assume that 
one's judgement of the opinion as a false one cannot possibly be incorrect. Returning to 
the case of well-being, we can ask how anyone can be so sure that he is right in his 
determination of what constitutes it, that he will inflict an immediate evil - forcing 
people to do what they do not want to do. 
However, it could be objected that there is something paradoxical about a view which 
asserts that something is objectively harmful to a person and yet requires one to stand 
by and allow him to bring this harm upon himself, simply because it is his autonomous 
decision. Although one may not be certain that one is right, moral action does not, nor 
can it, require certainty. The objectivist could respond. He could say that it is not 
simply that we are not certain about what a person's objective well-being consists in. 
We are in a great deal of doubt about it. If this is the case then the policy of non-
coercion does make sense. 
5.4) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE THEORIES 
Many, if not most, teleological moral theories have objective views of well-being. 
They tend to have a particular view of what a creature's nature is. Usually they believe 
that all creatures of the same species share that nature. (Such theories usually focus 
their attention on the nature of humans.) Given all this, what benefits a creature is not a 
matter of individual choice, but is rather that which will fulfil its nature. Such accounts 
of well-being are also called "perfectionist" accounts. They often speak of the "good 
life" for a species and provide an objective description of which actions would produce 
14. J.S. Mill, On liberty, chapter 2. 
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this. The most notable example of this kind of teleological theory is that of Aristotle 
(and his philosophical heirs). 
Utilitarianism is a teleological moral theory that has a subjective view of well-being. It 
does not dictate what an individual's real desires are. It allows each individual to 
determine what would benefit him. It is these subjectively determined appraisals of 
well-being that are entered into the utilitarian calculation to yield a moral prescription 
which everyone ought to follow. In other words, each individual is given a "vote" in 
each moral decision. Utilitarianism only prescribes how votes are counted, not how 
people ought to "vote". How - that is, for what - one "votes" is a matter of individual 
choice. 
Thus while utilitarianism connects morality to well-being, its view of well-being is a 
subjective one. As such it has the advantages and is subject to the problems of a 
subjective view outlined above. Although some deontological moral theories do not 
connect at all with well-being the deontological theory which I am advancing connects 
overtly with well-being; A deontological theory may have either a subjective or 
objective view of well-being. I have argued for the adoption of the objective view of 
well-being. In the next chapter I shall argue that natural rights can only plausibly be 
connected to an objective view of well-being. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONNECTING RIGHTS TO WELL-BEING 
6.1) WELL-BEING AND THE VARIETY OF MORAL CONCEPTS 
Having discussed different ways of looking at well-being, I shall now focus on how 
morality - more specifically natural rights - might connect with these. To be successful 
in connecting morality to well-being is to found morality. 
Natural rights do not exhaust moral discourse. There is much more to morality than 
such rights alone. Natural rights are just one type of moral tool - a very strong moral 
tool. They are claims we are entitled to make in virtue of our nature alone; they are 
correlated to negative duties on determinate people; and they are able to trump 
collective goals. It is my view - a view for which I shall soon argue - that some natural 
rights are absolute and may never justifiably be overridden. Other natural rights, while 
very strong, are not absolute. 
In addition to natural rights, the moral landscape is populated by other concepts. For 
example, there are non-natural rights (chapter 0.3). These too are characterized by 
correlative duties on determinate people and by their trumping power but, unlike 
natural rights, they are not possessed ab initio by creatures in virtue of their nature 
alone. They may be either positive or negative (chapter 1.3). 
In addition to rights - both natural and non-natural - there are also moral claims which 
cannot correctly be called rights. Such claims can differ from rights in a couple of 
ways. They may be too weak to be considered trumping claims. In this case they would 
lack the strength which rights have. Alternatively, they may lack correlative duties. 
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Such claims are claims "against the world" 1, even if against no one in ~articular. 
Feinberg illustrates this by saying that to have some important need unfulfilled gives 
one a claim even if nobody is in a position to do anything about it. Such claims lack the 
correlativity of rights. 
There are also ordinary correlativeless obligations. These are owed, but not to any 
particular person. They are moral requirements which arise because their adverse effect 
on the well-being of the duty-bearer would not be too great and their benefit to some or 
other individual would be great. I think that the obligation to give charity is such an 
obligation. 
Another concept is that of morally neutral acts. These are actions which are neither 
praiseworthy nor contemptible, morally speaking. Whether someone plays golf, for 
example, is morally neither here nor there (unless in a particular circumstance he plays 
golf.when he should be fulfilling some pressing moral obligation that he has). 
Then there are morally desirable acts which, although not a requirement of duty are 
morally praiseworthy. Here we can imagine, for example, the person who rises early 
every morning to crack the ice on the bird bath so that the birds can drink. He has no 
moral duty to do this, but it is morally commendable that he does. 
Finally, there are morally heroic acts which are those where (usually great) benefit is 
brought to another person at great cost or risk to the well-being of the moral hero. An 
example of such a person is Miep Gies, the woman who risked her life to bring food 
rations to the Frank family who were in hiding in Nazi-occupied Amsterdam. As it 
happened, she was not caught (though the Franks were), but many people like her were 
executed for similar actions. 
1 . J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, pg 67. 
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Each of these moral concepts has a different character, but can be brought to bear in 
moral situations and decisions. I think that it is safe to assume that if these concepts can 
be justified they will connect with well-being in different ways. In other words, they 
will each have a different foundation in well-being. Were this not the case, then they 
would be morally indistinguishable from each other, which they are not. 
I shall not give an account of how each concept attaches to well-being. This is not the 
aim of my inquiry. I shall examine just one moral concept ·- that of natural rights. 
Because the claim that there are absolute natural rights is more controversial and more 
difficult to justify than the claim that there are non-absolute natural rights, most of my 
argument will be directed to supporting the former claim. I shall then show why, given 
the existence of absolute natural rights, we should also accept the existence of non-
absolute ones. 
6.2) THE IMPORTANCE OF RIGHTS 
I have already argued that morality must be connected to well-being and more 
specifically that it must be connected to the well-being of individuals (chapter 4). I 
shall now argue why absolute natural rights, as I understand them, are required to moor 
morality to individual well-being. 
Just as natural rights, given their nature, can only be negative (chapter 1.3), so 
correlativeless duties, given their nature, can only be positive. Correlativeless duties 
are owed to indeterminate people (precisely because they are correlativeless) .. If, for 
example, one has a positive duty to give charity, then if one gives to some people one 
need not be expected to give to others as well. This is because the obligation is not 
owed to them. However, if one has a natural negative duty, such as the duty not to beat 
i 
. ' 
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up old people, it is not enough that one simply desists from beating up some old 
people. To have a natural negative duty not to beat up the aged is to have a duty to 
each and every old person (that is, to determinate people) not to beat them up. We see 
that the only correlativeless duties there can be are positive ones. Any natural negative 
duty cannot be correlativeless. 
The consequence of this observation is important because it follows that if all moral 
obligations were correlativeless it would be possible for morality to become detached 
from the well-being of individuals. Positive obligations ·owed to indeterminate 
. individuals are insufficient to anchor morality to the well-being of individuals. This is 
so for two reasons. Firstly, some individuals may be completely overlooked in the 
fulfilment of positive obligations. For example, everyone may fulfil their obligation to 
give charity by giving to some poor people. (One does not have to give to all poor 
people in order to fulfil one's duty.) The result could be that some poor people are left 
out and do not receive charity, even though everyone has fulfilled their duty to give 
charity. Secondly, there would be no restriction on how any individuals may be treated. 
One might, for example, fulfil a duty to feed the starving and then, after their meal, go 
on to satisfy one's own appetite by eating them, perhaps something like the plan of the 
witch in the Hansel and Gretel story. There would be nothing wrong with this because 
(1) one would have fulfilled one's positive duty and (2) there would be no negative 
duty not to eat them (because such a duty. cannot be correlativeless). In other words, if 
there were only correlativeless obligations, one may feed a person one moment and eat 
it the next moment. 
It is apparent that a moral tool that entails a correlativity of obligation and claim is 
required to moor morality firmly to individual well-being. However, this does not yet 
show that claims with the trumping strength of rights are required to tie morality to 
individual well-being, let alone that natural rights are required for this purpose. I shall 
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argue in what follows not merely that claims with the trumping strength of rights are 
required to moor morality to individual well-being, but that some of these rights must 
be absolute. Since these rights are rights which individuals must possess, it follows that 
they are natural rights. I have already shown (chapter 0.3) that only natural rights are 
held necessarily, in virtue of the right-bearer's nature alone. Since non-natural rights 
are rights which are not possessed in virtue of a creature's nature alone, and are 
acquired contingently, they are rights which a creature might not come to have. Thus, 
if individuals must possess certain rights to ensure that morality remains moored to 
individual well-being, then these rights must be natural rights. · 
The well-being of different individuals will inevitably conflict. For example, different 
individuals will compete for limited resources and will have different and conflicting 
conceptions of the good. Utilitarianism resolves this conflict of interests by determining 
what constitutes the well-being of society as a whole. It models the state of inter-
personal resolution on the state of resolution which exists in the case of each individual 
considered separately. The psychology of each of us is not unmarked by dissonance. 
We are not without inner conflict. For example, we may have conflicting desires. 
These tensions and conflicts are resolved in the individual, pictured as a whole. This 
resolution is determined by the individual's calculating what is in his overall interest. 
Just as this is an individual prudential calculation, utilitarianism prescribes a social 
prudential computation. Such a calculation is relatively straightforward. Admittedly it 
does involve problems of accurately determining the consequences of a proposed course 
of action and accurately calculating the social utility which will be produced. However, 
in theory, all a utilitarian calculation is about is simply weighing up desires, by 
counting them and measuring their intensity. It seems, however, that the real problems 
of morality are more complicated than this. The simple calculation of the utilitarian is 
an acceptable method in the intra-personal case because we are dealing with one 
individual - a moral unit. However, in the case of conflicting interests between such 
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units, a more sophisticated moral calculation is required. It must take cognizance of 
more than simply the weight and number of desires. For example, it must consider not 
merely desires but other interests too. It must recognize the fact that the interests to be 
considered are the interests of different people. It must also resolve intra-personal 
conflicts of interests. 
Given the inevitable conflict of individual interests, individuals must expect and must 
be expected to make some concessions. Everyone's interests cannot be served all the 
time. Compromises will have to be made. But what concessions by one individual can 
be required for what benefits to other individuals? Utilitarianism sets no conceptual 
limits here. Any sacrifice can be required of an individual if this maximizes social 
utility. An individualist view rejects this. Determining what sacrifices of some can be 
required for what benefits to others is, I think, what moral debate and discourse is 
about. However, my inquiry is into just one aspect of moral discourse - that is, natural 
rights. If, as I think, there is a limit to what sacrifices by some can be required to bring 
benefit to others, then there are absolute natural rights. Let me explain why I think that 
there is such a limit. 
The individual must remain primary. We are attaching morality t? the well-being of 
individuals. If there is no limit to what sacrifices some must make for others, then 
morality will become unhinged from individual well-being. The focus will be shifted 
from individuals to society. This, I have argued, is unacceptable, because of the 
distinctness of individuals' subjectivity and the moral significance of this. 
We determine the limit of acceptable sacrifice by looking at the sacrifice from the 
perspective of a subject. By this I do not mean that we adopt a subjective view of well-
being by asking a subject what sacrifices he is not prepared to 'make. Rather we look 
objectively at his well-being. I shall now explain why this is so. 
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Natural moral rights, as I conceive them, must be connected to well-being objectively 
viewed. Natural moral rights exist ab initio. Such rights do not vary from individual to 
individual, but are shared· by a class (or classes) of individuals. Thus, while their 
correlative duties are owed to determinate individuals, it is to all individuals of that 
kind. Since the right is common to all, it cannot be founded on a conception of well-
being which varies from one individual to another. The right must be founded on a 
conception of well-being applicable to all individuals who have that right. On a 
subjective view, the account of well-being inevitably varies from individual to 
individual. To this it may be objected that a subjective view may have some universal 
formula of well-being which is true of all individuals. An example of such a formula 
would be: "An individual's well-being is what he takes it to be". However, such a 
formula provides the form; but not the substance, of a particular individual's well-
being. The substance of well-being varies from individual to individual. On an 
objective view, by contrast, the substance of well-being varies only in matters of detail. 
The broad structure of the substance of well-being is common to all members of a 
species. It is to this broad structure of well-being, objectively understood, that rights 
must be connected. 
Were there rights which were connected to well-being subjectively understood, not only 
would rights vary from individual to individual but there could well be a bizarre range 
of rights. If, for example, an eccentric valued his collection of Beatles records above 
all else, he could turn out to have a right not to have these removed from him no matter 
what the benefit to others. Of course, if a right were framed in a very general way - for 
example, a "right to what one deems to be most important to one's well-being" - then 
this right would be shared by all individuals and would not vary from individual to 
individual. However, such a general right would issue in a multitude of specific rights 
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which would differ from individual to individual. It is these substantial, particular 
rights that could be obviously bizarre. 
On an objective view, the different aspects of well-being are objectively stratified. 
Rights will attach to the most basic levels. We look objectively at a subject's well-being 
and ask ourselves if there are any sacrifices which would be too disadvantageous to a 
subject - qua subject - irrespective of the advantages it would bring others. If so, this 
would fix the threshold at which an absolute right comes into effect. In the next chapter 
I shall discuss which sacrifices I think would be too disadvantageous. 
To say that rights must be founded on well-being, understood objectively, is not to say 
that the right bearer has no control over his right. It seems that although rights must be 
rooted in an objective account of well-being, an individual may forgo whatever rights 
which it may be shown he has, if he so chooses. However, he would not be morally 
permitted to choose some other right either in addition or instead. Rights morally 
guarantee a certain minimum standard. While one would be free to forgo this 
guarantee, one would not be free to extend its scope. 
6.3) AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT AS EXISTING FROM A THRESHOLD ON A SCALE 
OF HARM 
An absolute right comes into existence at a particular threshold on a scale of harm. 
There is, of course, more than one scale because there is more than one kind of harm. 
Thus, for example, there can be a pain scale, an injury scale, and a (restriction of) 
liberty scale. Some pains, injuries and restrictions of liberty may be required or, at 
least, justified, if other moral considerations (including social utility) are sufficiently 
·weighty. However, there comes a point on each of these scales where the sacrifice for 
the individual is so great that under no circumstances can it be justified - that is, no 
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matter how weighty the counter-vailing moral considerations are. This point is the 
threshold at which an absolute right comes into existence. In other words, individuals 
have a right not to have harm of the particular kind (pain, injury, restriction of liberty) 
at and above this threshold inflicted on them. Lesser harm of the same kind (that is, 
lesser pain, injury, or restriction of liberty) may, as I have said, be justified if sufficient 
social utility would thereby be achieved. Thus there can be no absolute right to liberty, 
for example; there can only be an absolute right against violations of liberty beyond a 
certain degree. Major infringements of liberty below the threshold would be protected 
against by non-absolute rights. Minor infringements of liberty,· such as being locked for 
twenty seconds in a room, would be justified more often. 
Following is a graphic illustration of how the threshold works. I take as my example 
the scale of restrictions on liberty. 
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Diagram 1 
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Below the threshold, infringements of liberty can be required or justified if the 
competing moral considerations are sufficiently weighty. The line emanating from and 
at an acute angle to the horizontal axis represents the minimum weight of competing 
moral considerations that can justify each degree of restricted liberty. The shaded area 
, to the right of this line represents the circumstances under which infringements are 
morally justified. The unshaded area to its left represents those circumstances under 
which such infringements are unjustified, not because absolute rights are operative in 
this area but simply because the competing moral considerations are not strong enough. 
Were they stronger, then a sacrifice of this degree would be justified. This would not 
be the case if the individual had a:n absolute right against that degree of harm of that 
kind being inflicted on him. The permitted restrictions of individual liberty are not 
determi~ed by a straightforward utilitarian calculation. Claims against infringement of 
individual liberty have greater weight than those of social utility. I think that it is 
appropriate that claims against restrictions of individual liberty should be presumed to 
have sufficient strength to outweigh very small increases in social utility. However, I 
am not committed to this view. Those who wish to reject it could alter Diagram 1 so 
that the line indicating permissible infringements of liberty below the threshold 
originates from the origin of both axes rather than from its current position on the 
horizontal axis. Either way, the threshold terminates the line, indicating the point on 
the liberty scale at which no matter what further increments of social utility there are to 
be derived, that or greater sacrifices cannot be required of the individual. 
I want to distinguish the kind of threshold I have described from another kind with 
which it may be confused, and for which many people, including sophisticated 
utilitarians and Dworkin, may have sympathy. This latter kind of threshold has, in an 
important sense, the reverse effect to the one I have described. It purportedly marks the 
point up to which rights trump other ·moral considerations (such as social utility). Once 
the accumulative strength of these considerations exceeds this point, rights no longer 
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trump them2. This view, if it is a view about all rights, has as a consequence the idea 
that no rights are absolute. This is a view which Dworkin seems to hold. I do not deny 
that some rights may be overridden justifiably by other rights or by consequentialist 
considerations. All I wish to claim is that some rights are absolute and may never be 
overridden justifiably. 
The alternative view of the threshold can be represented in the following diagram. 
Once again, I take as my example, the scale of restrictions on individual liberty. 
Individual's 
Liberty 
Scale 
I noreaslngly 
severe 
infringements 
................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Increasing V'v'6ight 
Scale of competing mor61 considerations 
(especially social utility) 
Diagram 2 
Rights are operative to the left of the threshold, in the unshaded area. In other words, 
they are operative until the threshold of social utility is reached. At this point they are 
overtrumped by the competing moral considerations. The strongest rights - those 
protecting individuals from infringements at the top of the liberty scale - can, of 
course, always be overtrumped by a sufficiently weighty position on the social utility 
2~ See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 92. 
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scale. The opposite is not true. That is, the most weighty considerations of social utility 
cannot be overridden by any, even the strongest, right. 
The reason why the origin of the threshold is where it is, rather than at the origin of 
both axes, is ·that a right has some trumping ability. Thus, on this view, a minor 
infringement of liberty would not be justified by the mere fact that the infringement 
would maximise utility. However, the prospect of a substantial increase of social utility 
would justify overriding the right. 
The above diagram is the most plausible representation of the non-absolutist view of a 
threshold. Less plausible interpretations of this view would not give the threshold a 
gradient. The effect of having a gradient is to give differing strengths to a right against 
different degrees of infringement of liberty. Some non-absolutist views of the threshold 
are not as sophisticated as this. They would not determine the point at which rights 
become operative by weighing up the severity of the infringement of the individual's 
liberty against the amount of social utility that stands to be gained. They would say, for 
example, that a right to liberty protects its bearer against all violations of liberty no 
matter how small or great until a certain threshold of social utility is reached. Thus a 
degree of social utility immediately below the threshold could no more justify a mild 
infringement of liberty than it could justify a severe infringement. From the threshold, 
the right ceases to be operative so that even very severe infringements of liberty are not 
protected against. This view of the threshold can be represented as follows: 
1 · .................. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Threshold::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
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·.·.·.·.·:.·.·::.·.·.·:.·:.·.·.··~ 
..... ; .... : .. ; ..... ; 
I ncraasing social utility 
Diagram 3 
The threshold in Diagram 1 is not determined by weighing up the severity of the 
infringements of the individual's liberty against the amount of social utility to be 
gained. Such considerations are operative below the threshold. The threshold marks the 
beginning of the absolute right. Any infringement at and above the threshold is 
protected by a right of fixed strength - an absolute right. It protects the individual 
against any infringement of his liberty above the threshold, irrespective of 
considerations of social utility. 
In summary, then, the kind of threshold I first described (Diagram 1) differs from the 
one with which it may have been confused (Diagram 2) in two important ways: (1) On 
the first account the threshold is a point on a scale of individual sacrifice (or individual 
utility). On the other view, the threshold is a point on the scale of social utility. (2) On 
the first account, rights are operative - that is, trump other moral considerations - from 
the threshold. On the other view, they are operative - that is trump other moral 
considerations - until the threshold is reached. 
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A point I made earlier about the value of rights (chapter 6.2) bears on the above two 
differences and shows why there must be some rights that can be represented by the 
first view of the threshold. I said that it is absolute rights that ensure that morality 
remains moored to the well-being of individuals rather than dnfting into the sea of 
social utility. The first threshold-account links rights to individual well-being. Rights 
come into existence at a threshold on the scale of individual well-being. This is not true 
of the other threshold view. 
6.4) QUALIFYING THE IDEA THAT ABSOLUTE RIGHTS EXIST FROM 
THRESHOLDS ON SCALES OF HARM 
Rights do not guarantee against all impairments of well-being beyond the threshold. 
Some such impairments are not the responsibility of agents as in the case of death by 
"natural" causes. These are clearly beyond the scope of morality. One cannot have a 
right against nature that one should not die by its hand. 
Other onslaughts on individual well-being above the thresholds may also not be 
protected by rights. These are when the individual concerned is not innocent. Rights 
protect the innocent. One loses the protection of rights to the extent of one's guilt. By 
stealing a car, one does not lose the protection of a right to life. (In chapter 7.2, I shall 
show why such a right is amongst those rights we have). However, having stolen a car 
one may justifiably have one's liberty curtailed by being imprisoned for a while. 
That some actions constitute rights-violations when the person against whom they are 
performed is innocent but do not constitute rights-violations when he is guilty, provides 
one reason why great importance must be placed on a due process of law to determine 
whether a person is guilty, and if so to what extent. We do not live in a world in which 
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a person's innocence or guilt is transparent to everybody. We need a reliable 
mechanism to establish innocence or guilt. Failure to follow a due process of law is not 
only to run the risk of inflicting unjustifiable punishment and violating rights, but also 
to be guilty of failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that one's punitive actions do 
not constitute such evils. 
Why should rights protect only the innocent? Why should guilt cost one some of one's 
rights? Here I am not speaking simply of punitive cases in the judicial system, but also 
of instances where aggressors are harmed in the act of unjustified aggression. Such 
cases of defence and protection seem as morally acceptable as just punishment, if not 
more so. The issue in all these cases is really part of a broader issue - the issue of how 
an agent's actions interact with the fabric of moral obligations and claims, altering 
these in the process. Since this is not the place to pursue this issue, I have simply 
asserted the common sense view that one loses the protection of rights to the extent of 
one's guilt and of one's moral crime. 
I have argued that there are some natural rights which have absolute strength. Some 
people may find the latter conclusion hard to accept and believe that my arguments for 
it are not sufficiently convincing. They may believe that, in at least some cases, so 
much good can be achieved by violating rights that there are no rights that may not 
ever be overridden justifiably. I shall consider such cases in the conclusion (chapter 
11.2), showing why even in the light of them, I think that there are some absolute 
restrictions on the way we may treat individuals. 
6.5) NON-ABSOLUTE NATURAL RIGHTS 
Individuals have a variety of interests in virtue of their nature. These interests ground 
claims which they have against others. Some of these interests are very strong - such as 
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the interest in. not being killed. Other interests are much weaker - such as the interest in 
always having one's own way. Because these interests have varying strengths, the 
claims which they generate also vary in strength. In arguing for absolute natural rights, 
I have argued that some of these individual interests may never be overridden. No 
doubt, there are also interests and claims which are so weak that they may regularly be 
overridden. It makes sense to think that between these points on the spectrum of 
interest-strengths there will be some interests we have in virtue of our nature which are 
sufficiently important they they may on rare occasions be overridden but not so 
important that they may never be overridden. The natural rights that protect these 
interests, while not absolute, will none the less be very strong. Such rights can be 
represented in Diagram 1 (chapter 6.3) as points higher up on the line emanating from 
and at an acute angle to the horizontal axis. They could also be represented by the 
threshold line in Diagram 2. Such rights protect us against sacrifices which would be 
too disadvantageous to us to be justified merely because those sacrifices would serve 
collective goods. By contrast, those interests which ground only weak claims - ones 
that may regularly be overridden either by rights or by consequentialist considerations -
cannot be said to be protected by rights of any kind because part of the meaning of a 
"right" is that it is a strong moral tool. However, these weak claims can nonetheless be 
natural and can be referred to rather transparently as "weak natural claims'' in order to 
differentiate them from natural rights - whether they be absolute or very strong but not 
absolute. 
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CHAPTER 7 
WHAT ABSOLUTE RIGHTS ARE THERE? 
. 7.1) INTRODUCTION 
I have argued that there is a limit to the sacrifices that can be required of one individual 
for the benefit of others. I have said that absolute rights are the moral tools that provide 
a moral guarantee for the individual against having to make these sacrifices. If my 
argument has been successful, then I have shown that there is a justification not only 
for natural rights, but for absolute ones. There is, however, a further question: What 
natural rights are there? Given the fact that those natural rights which are absolute are 
the most controversial and that the existence of non-absolute rights is relatively 
unproblematic, I shall focus on the more specific and interesting question: What 
absolute natural rights are there? 
If an absolute right is, as I have said, a moral tool that comes into existence at a 
particular threshold on a scale of individual well-being, then to determine this threshold 
is to determine that there is such and such a right of absolute strength. Different rights 
are associated with thresholds on different scales. One has absolute rights against harm 
above these thresholds. Although absolute rights come into effect at the level of the 
threshold, we may (though we need not) speak of a number of rights above that 
threshold - that is, rights against increasing degrees of the same kind of harm. Of 
course, these rights will all be equally strong against competing moral considerations. 
All that distinguishes them is their object - that is, the exact degree of harm (of that 
kind) against which they are rights. For example, if one had a right against pain and 
the threshold at which it came into effect was pain of degree X, then one would have a 
right against pain of degree X. One may then wish to say that one also has a right 
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against pain of degree 2X. Both rights would be equally strong. They only vary in the 
degree of pain against which they morally guarantee. Of course, one need not speak of 
more than one right above a threshold. One may prefer to say that there is a single right 
against all pain above the threshold. Which approach one prefers makes no practical 
difference and little conceptual difference. I prefer the latter approach because it is 
more economical. 
If there is a right-threshold on a particular scale, at which point on that scale is it to be 
found? This is a difficult question. Before I deal with it, let us examine the possibility 
of there being an absolute right to life, because this kind of absolute right is the most 
easy to establish. We can reason in the following way. 
7.2) LIFE 
If there is any way in which the importance of the individual may not be overridden, it 
would appear to be the taking of his life against his wishes. Life is essential to well-
being, not only because it is the necessary condition for all other aspects of well-being 
(except perhaps posthumous interests), but also because its loss is in itself the greatest 
loss an individual can sustain. It is, after all, the cessation of the individual - at least on 
a common sense view. The prospect of this matters very much to the individual 
concerned. 
There are not degrees to which an individual can lose his life. One either loses one's 
life or one does not. There is nothing in between. The advantage this has for my 
account is that fixing the point on a scale at which the right to life comes into existence 
is quite clear and uncontroversial. I am not saying that it is uncontroversial which 
creatures have a right to life. (In the next chapter I discuss the question of which 
creatures have rights.) I am claiming that it is relatively uncontroversial what 
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constitutes a fatality, and thus when a creature has a negative right to life what exactly 
it is a right against. There are degrees of pain and degrees of liberty, but not degrees of 
death. It is true, of course, that risks to life can either be greater or lesser, but this does 
not alter the fact that loss of life is itself not a matter of degree. If one risks someone's 
life, then one is gambling with his right to life. One may be morally lucky and not 
violate his risht, or one may be morally unlucky, as in those cases where the gamble 
results in death. 
It might seem that the fact that loss of life is not a matter of degree is also 
disadvantageous for my account. This is because it might be thought that since there are 
no degrees to which one can lose one's life, there is no life-scale and consequently 
there can be no threshold. If absolute rights come into existence at. thresholds, then it 
would appear that there can be no absolute right to life. 
I think that while the advantage is real, the disadvantage is only apparent. The reason 
for the latter is that, while a moral threshold may be viewed as a point on a scale, it 
need not be. It may indicate a morally outlawed action - such as killing - that does not 
admit of degrees. It is a threshold of moral impermissibility or unjustifiability. 
Given the indispensability of life to well-being, the sharp distinction between life and 
its loss, and the importance of a life to the individual whose life it is, an absolute right 
to life is relatively easy to establish. It is far more difficult to establish what other 
absolute rights there are - if indeed there are any others. Clearly, there is considerable 
room for debate. However, this obviously does not mean that all opinions are equally 
acceptable. As in all philosophical debate, it is the strength of the justification for one's 
view that counts. 
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The greater sacrifices, higher up the scales, are less controversially considered above a 
right-threshold. However, the lower down the scales one looks, the less the sacrifice 
and the more difficult it is to say that such a sacrifice is never justified. This can be 
illustrated by looking at a few examples on different scales. 
7.3) INJURY 
Consider first an injury-scale consisting of non-fatal injuries. Some of these injuries, 
such as losing a limb or being blinded, are very severe. They inake a radical difference 
to an individual subject qua subject. For example, in the case of being blinded, his 
ability to perceive his environment is severely impaired. The excision of visual images 
and data from his consciousness is not only an intrinsic loss. It compromises his 
functioning in many ways. It seriously affects his ability to effect his ends by traversing 
and manipulating his environment in required and desired ways. His life is radically 
altered for the worse. The seriousness of these effects is compounded by the fact that 
they are not temporary, but lasting. If morality is to be connected to the well-being of 
individuals and there are consequently some ways in which individuals may not be 
treated for 'the benefit of others, then it would seem that an action that results in an 
injury such as being blinded or maimed, is unjustified. Its effects on the individual are 
just too unacceptable. It would seem then that blinding and maiming fall above the 
right-threshold on the injury-scale and there is therefore an absolute right against being 
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blinded or maimed. 
Other injuries, such as a little nick on the finger, are not very severe (except to a 
haemophiliac in which case a nick on the finger can be like a slit throat). Clearly, while 
minor injuries may not be inflicted without justification, it seems that such injuries are 
not so serious to the individual as to never or only rarely be justified. Therefore, these 
injuries fall well below the right-threshold. There can be no absolute rights to protect 
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. the individual against such minor injuries, though there can be non-absolute rights and 
weaker claims not to be so treated. In other words, though there are no absolute rights 
against minor harms, they may not be inflicted without sufficient justification - that is, 
without the presence of sufficiently strong competing moral considerations (such as 
social utility or competing rights). Increasing harm below the threshold can only be 
justified by corresponding increases in the benefit to be derived. (See Diagram 1 in 
chapter 6.3) 
7.4) PAIN 
Distinct from the injury-scale is the pain-scale. While it is true that pain often 
accompanies injury, there may be pain without injury (as in the case of psychosomatic 
disorders), and injury without pain (as in the case of amputations under anaesthetic). 
On the pain-scale, some pains seem to be too horrible ever to be justifiably inflicted on 
an individual. Torture seems to be a case in point. If we look at the aim of torture we 
see why this is so. While some people torture others for the sheer satisfaction of 
sadistic desires, torture is usually for the purpose of breaking people down, as a means 
of ensuring conformity or extracting either information or a confession - often a false 
one. These are achieved by forcing the tortured person to overlook all desires and 
interests other than the immediate alleviation of the pain. All aspects of individual well-
being may be brushed aside _by the victim of torture simply to avoid any further pain. 
He may even make a false confession that will result in his death. The pain of torture 
is, therefore, designed to override completely the individual and his well-being. As 
such, it is unjustified. 
Other pains, such as the pain suffered as a result of a pin-prick, are far less severe. 
They have none of the kinds of effects on individual well-being that torture has. Thus, 
while one may not inflict even mild- pain without justification, such pain is not so 
149 
damaging to individual well-being that its justification on at least some occasions can be 
categorically ruled out. In other words, while there cannot be absolute rights against the 
infliction of mild pain, there can be non-absolute rights and weaker claims not to have 
such pain inflicted on one. 
7.5) LIBERTY 
We can consider too a liberty-scale. Minor violations of liberty are inevitable and 
justifiable. For example, my liberty to drive across an intersection is curtailed by the 
red traffic light facing in my direction. I am not legally or morally free to drive in 
contravention of the traffic light's signal. This restriction on my freedom is minor - I 
wait my turn with the green light and then I may proceed. I am not too seriously 
disadvantaged and must expect to make such sacrifices, given the competing equal 
interests of many individuals. (Clearly, were there special circumstances, such as in the 
case of the ambulance rushing a seriously ill person to hospital, then the extent of the 
red light's restriction on liberty would be greater, but such circumstances would then . 
require the ambulance driver to proceed with caution in spite of the red light.) 
Other violations of liberty are far more serious. Take, for example, prolonged 
incarceration in solitary confinement. It seems that such treatment of an innocent 
person can never be justified, because its effect on his well-being is simply too 
disastrous. The individual is deprived of vital social stimuli. Such isolation from other 
people usually causes severe mental imbalance. The individual is prevented from living 
out his life-plans at even a relatively basic level. He cannot lead a life. He is the 
subject of a life in barely any significant way. 
Dworkin denies that those infringements of liberty that are protected by rights receive 
this protection because the deprivation of liberty is greater, either in amount or in 
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impact, than infringements of liberty that are not protected by rights. In support of this 
view he says that if, on the one hand, we try to think of liberty as a commodity and try 
to measure its diminution by the frustration this induces, then we are forced to concede 
"that laws against theft and even traffic laws, impose constraints that are felt more 
keenly by most men than constraints on political speech would be" 1. This is in conflict 
with what we ordinarily think - that is, that people's rights to liberty do not include 
protection against criminal and traffic restrictions, but do include protection against 
political restrictions. If, on the other hand, we measure the degree of infringement of 
liberty by its impact - on future choices, Dworkin says - then once again we have to 
admit that traffic laws reduce choice more for most men than laws which prohibit 
fringe political activity. 
I am not sure that I would accept an absolute natural right to political activity, though I 
certainly think that everyone has a strong moral claim of some sort to it. Nevertheless, 
in case Dworkin's point applies equally to some absolute natural right which I do 
recognize I must reply to it. 
Dworkin takes his argument to show that it cannot be true that the difference between 
those infringments of liberties that are protected by rights and those which are not, is a 
matter of degree. I suggest an alternative understanding of the kind of "degrees" it is 
about which we must speak. I do not think that liberty is simply a commodity and that 
losing more is straightforwardly worse than losing less. I am concerned with the 
seriousness of an infringement of liberty. This has something to do with how much a 
person's liberty is restricted, but it also has to do with whether the restriction is 
intolerable. When dealing with the seriousness of an infringement of liberty, we are not 
concerned with whether the general imposition of this infringement causes more 
frustration or is felt more keenly by more people. We are not concerned, in other 
1. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 270. 
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words, with the general level of inconvenience that results from there not being a right 
against such a restriction of liberty. Rather we are concerned to rule out restrictions of 
liberty that are intolerable (and not simply inconvenient) for individuals. The 
restrictions which traffic laws impose may be felt by more people, but they are not an 
intolerable imposition on individual well-being. The kind of restrictions on liberty 
which I think should be protected by absolute rights are those whose seriousness is of 
such a degree that they would be an intolerable sacrifice for individuals to have to 
make. 
7.6) WHY THERE IS NEITHER A NATURAL NOR AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO 
PROPERTY 
Many philosophers have thought that there is a natural right to property. One such 
philosopher is John Locke2. In this section I shall outline his argument and show why 
rights to property cannot be natural in the sense in which I have spoken about natural 
rights. My arguments will not be extensive, but rather impressionistic. Given the 
magnitude of the issue of property rights, an extensive treatment would be beyond the 
scope of my inquiry. 
According to Locke, G-d has given the world to mankind "in common"3. However, he 
claims, if any individual is to make use of anything in the world he must be able to 
appropriate it .for himself. For example, two people cannot both eat the same whole 
apple. Thus, if a person wants to eat an apple he must be able to remove it from the 
common realm and make it his own. Locke's argument for how people come to acquire 
property (and the rights to that property) starts from the claim that everybody owns 
himself and his labour. In Locke's words: "The labour of his body and the work of his 
2. Robert Nozick is another. 
3. J. Locke, Two Trearises of Government, 11, 26. 
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hands, we may say, are properly his"4. By mixing his labour with objects in the world, 
a person acquires those objects. This is because he has attached something which is his 
- his labour - to something to which no other individual has a private claim. Locke does 
place a restriction on such appropriation - a restriction which, he says, obtains only 
until the invention of money. He says that one may mix one's labour and acquire 
property only "where there is enough, and as good left in common for others"S - that 
is, where there are sufficient resources of comparable quality left for others to 
appropriate. 
Locke's argument has been subject to much criticism. For example, why should we 
think that mixing something which belongs to a person - his labour - with something 
which does not belong to him, makes the latter his property? Why should we not think 
the reverse - that rather than gaining property, he loses his labour? Even if we accept 
that Locke is right about this, is justifiable acquisition of property possible any more? 
In Held's words "the unowned wilderness no longer exists116• Thus when we mix our 
labour it is rarely with objects in nature to which no private claim has been made. 
Finally, the Lockean proviso that ample resources of equal quality be left for others can 
almost never be met in our times, given the overpopulation and scarcity of resources 7. 
I shall not examine these criticisms because whether or not Locke's argument succeeds 
it does not justify natural rights to property as I understand them. There are a number 
of senses in which a right can be said to be natural. Firstly, some people call all non-
legal rights naturals. Given this taxonomy Locke's rights to property are. natural. 
Secondly, the property rights for which Locke argues are natural rights in the sense that 
they are acquired in the Lockean state of nature. However, I have been using the 
4. Ibid, II, 27. 
5. Ibid. 
6. V. Held, Rights and Goods, p. 172. 
7. Ibid. 
8. J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 19. 
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expression "natural right" in neither of these senses. In my taxonomy legal rights are 
distinguished from what I call moral rights. Some moral rights are natural while others 
are not (chapter 0.3). What distinguishes natural from non-natural moral rights is that 
the former are necessarily possessed by a creature in virtue of its nature alone, while 
the latter are acquired contingently. The property rights for which Locke argues are 
acquired in the state of nature and as such they are not natural rights in the sense in 
which I have been speaking about natural rights9. 
Although these rights are acquired, Locke also recognized ariother right to property 
which is not acquired and is possessed by all humans. This is a right to those goods 
which are necessary for subsistencelO. He says that "men, being once born, have a 
right to their preservation and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things, 
as nature affords for their subsistence1111 • This right is operative when a person ·has 
insufficient resources of his own to save him from extreme want and from death. It is 
"a right to the surplusage" 12 of the private property of another person. 
This right to subsistence is also not a natural right on my view. I have claimed that 
natural rights are exclusively negative (chapter 1.3). The right to subsistence which 
Locke claims all people have is a positive right. Its correlative duty is not simply one of 
non-interference. It does not require us merely to abstain from tampering with or 
stealing other people's property. It requires us to provide food and perhaps shelter and 
clothing for the destitute. Those with surplus have a positive duty and those in dire 
need have a positive right. 
9. Waldron calls the rights that allegedly result from mixing one's labour with resources 
"special rights" (J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 127), by which he 
means rights which are acquired (Ibid pp. 107ff). These are to be distinguished from 
"general rights" which are possessed ab initio. 
10. Waldron calls this a "general right" (Ibid, pp. 128, 139). 
11. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II, 25. 
12. Ibid, I, 42. 
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Perhaps what is natural - in my sense of the term - is neither a positive right to be 
given property nor a negative right to the property which one acquires, but rather a 
negative right not to be interfered with in one's pursuit of property acquisition. On this 
view 13 there is something about the nature of human beings which makes it wrong to 
prevent them from acquiring and owning property. However, the right to property is 
then simply another kind of right to liberty - a right to be free to appropriate. 
So far I have argued that Locke's arguments do not yield a natural right to property in 
the sense of the term "natural right" which I have explicated in this thesis. Now I want 
to argue that an absolute guarantee for private property cannot be morally justified. 
To have one's property interfered with or removed from one may be a very bad thing. 
However, it can never in itself be so disastrous for an individual subject qua subject as 
to warrant being protected against by a moral tool as strong as an absolute right. 
This is mainly ascribable to the "distance" that characterizes the relationship between a 
person and his property. The relationship of a person to his life, his pain, his bodily 
integrity, and even his liberty is very close. There is a difference between a person and 
the world around him. Persons are capable of distinguishing between themselves and 
their environment. Things like a person's life, pain and injury are part of himself rather 
than part of the world that surround him. It is possible to determine, without recourse 
to the world beyond the person, whether or not he is alive, whether he is in pain or 
whether he is injured. By contrast, a person's property is not part of him. It exists 
independently of him. It is because of this that any property one has is property one has 
acquired. Furthermore, it is because a person's property is distinct from him that 
although he may have strong interests in his property, taking it is not like taking his life 
or inflicting pain on him. Interfering with a person's property cannot affect the 
13. J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, pp. 20 -22. 
155 
person's subjectivity in the disastrously severe way that killing him, torturing him or 
maiming him can. As such, absolute rights cannot be used to protect a person's 
interests in property. As important as those interests may be, they are not of the 
magnitude that warrant the protection of an absolute right. 
I realise that sometimes the removal of a person's property - say his last morsels of 
food - may condemn him to unbearable suffering or death. In such cases the property 
ought not to be taken, not because there is an absolute right to property, but because 
the person's negative rights of life and liberty, etc, would be violated were one to 
remove the property. Likewise, if the government confiscates a diver's oxygen tank, 
they may do wrong and violate a non-absolute right. If they violate any absolute rights, 
however, it would be a right to life, not a right to property. This would be the case if 
the diver were underwater using the tank at the time that it was confiscated. 
We can need property to satisfy the kind of vital interests that rights protect. However, 
the absolute rights we have are not to the property but rather to the protection of those 
vital interests - such as life and the absence of excruciating pain - which our property 
can serve. The absolute right is not to the property because it is not the loss of the 
property as such that is so disastrous for the subject. To some degree this is because 
property is not part of a subject. Property is merely of instrumental value to the 
subject. 
Now it might be objected that although property is only of instrumental value, because, 
as a matter of contingent fact, property is essential to fulfil vital interests such as the 
interest in life, this justifies there being an absolute negative right to that property 
which is necessary to satisfy those interests. My response to this is that a parsimonious 
ascription of rights seems correct. Why multiply rights-ascriptions when a more 
economical ascription of rights will do the same work? The diver's right to life 
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prevents his oxygen tank justifiably being removed from him while he is underwater 
using it. Ascribing a property right to him not to have his oxygen tank taken under 
these conditions does nothing extra. In cases where the removal of his oxygen tank 
would not result in his death then his right to life would not provide him with absolute 
protection from having his oxygen tank removed. Under these circumstances there 
would be no vital interests that would then be thwarted so the protection of an absolute 
property right would be inappropriate under these conditions. 
By saying that there are no natural and no absolute property rights, I am not saying that 
we may behave in any way as far as people's property is concerned, even when this 
does not affect their vital interests. While there may not be natural or absolute rights to 
property, there will still be moral obligatio_ns and claims - including non-natural and 
non-absolute moral rights - governing property. 
7. 7) DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF RIGHTS THRESHOLDS 
In the examples which I gave of scales of harm, I attempted to argue that certain 
sacrifices are so great that they can never be justified because of their effect on 
individual well-being, and that other, much less severe, sacrifices may sometimes be 
justified. It is hard enough to make such determinations at the polar ends of the scale. It 
is far more difficult to draw a line demarcating the threshold at which absolute rights 
come into effect. 
This is a significant theoretical problem. While one can perhaps work out some of the 
absolute rights that there -are, it is near impossible to provide a comprehensive list of all 
absolute rights or, more accurately, the thresholds at which they come into existence. 
However, in practice the problem is less severe. Those proposed actions closer to the 
polar extremes of the spectrum are relatively easily identified as being above or below 
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the threshold. The closer a proposed action is to the centre of the spectrum's grey area, 
the more doubt there will be. One consequence of this is that moral agents will be less 
likely to decide in favour of performing such actions. This is because even if such an 
action falls just below the threshold, it would require such extreme countervailing 
advantages that it would seldom be justified. As far as proposed actions below the 
threshold are concerned, the more doubt there is about them, the closer they will be to 
the threshold and therefore the less often they will seem justified. 
Obviously there will still be problems. For example, there will be some occasions on 
which a particular action is performed by one who believes that it falls just short of the 
threshold. This same action will be condemned by another who believes either that it is 
on the threshold or lies immediately above it. While this is unfortunate, it seems 
inevitable. In ethics, we can use moral reasoning to hone down onto an issue to attain a 
clarity and precision which would not otherwise be possible. Aristotle cautions against 
demanding more precision in an inquiry than the subject matter permits. Ethics, he 
claims, is not an exact science 14. Thus, given the nature of ethical inquiry, there will 
inevitably be areas where precision cannot be attained beyond a certain degree. Fixing 
absolute rights-thresholds seems to be just such an area. 
The problem of precision is absent from some other accounts of rights. This is the case, 
for example, in theories (such as those of Locke and Nozick) that argue for (or simply 
assert) rights to life, liberty and property. In such accounts, any violation of liberty or 
property is a violation of a right and is therefore morally unacceptable. One is absolved 
of the problem of having to decide which violations, of liberty for example, are 
violations of rights. 
14. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, chapter 3. 
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There is obviously a large price to pay for this relative precision. Rights, so 
understood, are too extensive to have appeal. This is because social utility and the 
competing interests of other individuals are accorded no importance. It is true that it is 
the trumping power that is essential to rights. However, it is an error to confuse a 
moral tool's having trumping power with its being maximally extensive. Moreover, it 
is an error which costs the concept of rights much of its appeal. Understanding rights as 
I have suggested, enables one to preserve the appeal of an absolute trumping tool and 
yet not to treat social utility and competing interests of other individuals as completely 
irrelevant to moral decision-making and action. 
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CHAPTER 8 
WHAT CREA TURES HA VE RIGHTS? 
8.1) INDIVIDUALS AND MORALLY RELEVANT WELL-BEING 
I have argued that morality should be connected to the well-being of individuals rather 
than that of society. The assumption so far has been that the individuals whose well-
being is concerned are human individuals. However, this has not been explicitly stated 
- and for a specific reason. While what I have said is true of human individuals, I have 
not wanted to exclude the possibility that some of it may also be true of other kinds of 
individuals. 
The description of well-being which I provided earlier, was a description of human 
well-being (or, at least, the well-being of normal, developed humans). This kind of 
well-being is the most complicated currently known to us, though it may well be that 
someday we may discover a creature whose well-being requires a far more 
sophisticated description. The description of human well-being is not true in its entirety 
of non-human individuals, but some aspects of it are. Other aspects of the description 
of human well-being can be adapted to non-human individuals. 
The word "individuals" is very broad. It may refer, in addition to humans, also to 
inanimate objects, plants and animals, for example. It is, however, only in a very 
limited sense that we can speak about the well-being of inanimate objects. Consider a 
car, for example. In some sense a car has interests and one can therefore speak of its 
well-being. For example, we can speak quite meaningfully about rust's not being good 
for a car. However, the sense in which a car has interests is very limited and morally 
insignificant. A car, being an inanimate object, does not and cannot care about its own 
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interests or well-being. It makes no difference to a car whether or not its interests are 
' 
served or its well-being advanced. Morality, I said much earlier (chapter 4.5), is 
unconcerned with such well-being. It is concerned with the well-being of creatures for 
whom their well-being makes a difference. Thus, while there may be things we should 
not do to a car, such restrictions are not based on the intrinsic well-being of the car but 
on its instrumental value to conscious creatures. Much the same can be said for plants 
and the moral restrictions that govern their treatment. 
The well-being of animals - especial! y more sophisticated ones - comes closest to that 
of humans. Is morality then also to be connected to the well-being of individual 
animals? This is a question, not only for my account, but also for other theories such as 
utilitarianism. Thus, if it poses a problem, this problem is not uniquely mine. I think 
that the question must be answered affirmatively. Animals are not mere objects that 
may be treated in any way. However, they do not count for as much as humans. In 
fact, I think that the nature and extent of an animal's well-being is an excellent formula 
for what strength we should accord its interests in moral decisions. Because animal 
well-being is less sophisticated than human well-being, it will inevitably be less potent 
in moral calculations, both on my account and on a utilitarian account. Thus, for 
example, since a human has sophisticated desires, such as for philosophical reflection, 
these desires can enter into moral decisions. An animal has no such desires which can 
be entered into moral calculations. The more interests and the more sophisticated 
interests a creature has, the more its interests will count in moral determinations. 
I shall now take a closer look at the different aspects of an animal's well-being. Since I 
am concerned specifically with rights (rather than with any other moral principle), I 
shall argue which, if any, animal interests merit the protection of rights. What I have to 
say will concern primarily those rights which are both natural and absolute, in order to 
determine to what extent those absolute natural rights which I argued humans have 
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(chapter 7) are also shared by (some) animals. However, my discussion will also have 
implications for the question of non-absolute natural· animal rights. This is because it 
seems reasonable, as in the case of humans, that those strong interests which are not 
quite strong enough to merit absolute trumping power, should be protected by non-
absolute rights. 
8.2) ANIMAL PAIN 
Higher, vertebrate animals probably feel pain much as we do. Of course, we cannot 
have the subjective feel of animal pain, so we cannot be sure of the qualitative 
similarity. However, neither can each one of us be sure that pain has the same 
qualitative feel for other humans as for himself. This is the problem of other minds. I 
concede that other minds are closest to mine if they are human minds, but I still have as 
little subjective access to other human minds as to animal minds. In the same way that I 
quite justifiably infer that other humans feel pain as I do, I have good grounds for 
believing that the pain of animals - at least the higher vertebrate ones - feels to them the 
way my pain feels to me. 
If pain, above a certain threshold, is never justifiably inflicted on innocent humans 
because in itself it is just too horrible and overrides the individual, then, by extension, 
this pain can never be justifiably inflicted on animals. If the feel of the pain is the 
-
same, then how can it be justifiably inflicted on one individual but not on another, 
simply because the one individual happens to be an animal whereas the other happens 
to be a human? 
It is true that subjecting an individual to excruciating pain may have more extensive 
effects if that individual is a human than if it is an animal. Although a human and an 
animal may feel exactly the same pain, a human may suffer more from it. This would 
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clearly not be because of the intrinsic feel of the pain but because of certain features of 
humans which animals lack. In other words, the psychological effects of physical pain 
could be greater for humans than for animals. For example, a human, unlike an animal 
is able to distinguish between pain which is willingly and even sadistically inflicted 
(such as torture) from pain which is inflicted by accident (such as stubbing one's toe) or 
by nature (such as the pain of end-stage terminal disease). While the qualitative feel of 
the pain is unaffected by knowledge of whether or not it was willingly brought about, 
knowing that the pain was willingly inflicted could cause additional mental suffering. 
Where a human right against a particular degree of pain is justified in part by the 
effects of the pain and not merely by its intrinsic feel, animals might not have a right 
against that degree of pain. This would be the case when they were incapable of 
suffering the effects. However, where the human right is justified by the mere feel of 
the pain - because the pain itself is so horrendous - an animal capable of feeling that 
same degree of pain must also be protected against it by a right of the same strength. If 
a certain pain is unjustifiably inflicted on one individual because of how it feels to him, 
it is also unjustifiably inflicted on another individual who will have a very similiar 
feeling. 
8.3) ANIMAL LIBERTY 
The same cannot be said for the other scales and the right-thresholds I discussed earlier. 
The liberty of an animal may be justifiably curtailed to a degree that would never be 
justified in the case of humans. Unlike a pain, a violation of liberty is not a particular 
feeling which is necessarily transparent to its subject. Thus one cannot say that a 
particular violation of liberty means the same to two different kinds of individual. It 
usually means far more to a human to have his liberty infringed than it does to an 
animal. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, liberty has greater intrinsic value for 
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humans than for animals (if, indeed, it has any intrinsic value for animals). Humans 
care about having liberty for liberty's sake. They want to know that they are free to do 
certain things even if they do not actually want to do these things. Secondly, because 
liberty has considerable instrumental value and because humans have more goals and 
more sophisticated goals than animals, liberty is dearer to them. A restriction on liberty 
which does not affect an animal may prevent a human from pursuing important goals. 
So long as the restriction of an animal's liberty does not cause it great physical pain or 
mental suffering, or prevent it from reaching needed food, from engaging in healthy 
exercise, or from satisfying its sexual desires, an animal wiil hardly care about its 
liberty. It may be mildly inconvenient for a horse to be in a paddock, but a human 
would care a great deal more about being restricted to an area the same size. 
8.4) ANIMAL INJURY 
Like restrictions on liberty, being injured is not a particular feeling which is transparent 
to its subject. Thus we cannot say that a particular injury means the same to an animal 
as it does to a human. Being injured has both intrinsic and inst:umental disadvantages. 
An injury of degree X may constitute greater intrinsic harm for a human than for an 
animal. For example, a human suffers more anguish over the amputation of a toe or 
finger, irrespective of the consequences, than a dog or a cat does. Lesser injuries also 
seem to cause greater instrumental disadvantage for humans than for animals. Once 
again, this is because an animal has less goals and less sophisticated goals. As a result it 
requires less to attain these goals. However, it would seem that some injuries are 
sufficiently severe never to be justifiably inflicted on animals.· Consider, for example, 
amputating all four limbs of a dog, horse or monkey. 
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8.5) ANIMAL LIFE 
It would appear that there are certain things which may never be done to an animal 
while it lives. It is a separate question, however, whether or not an animal has an 
absolute right to life. While an animal may care about its pain and its injury while it is 
alive, it may well not care about life itself. Although animals have a survival instinct, 
avoiding that which endangers their life and pursuing that which enhances it, it is just 
an instinct. A normal human is capable of caring about his life in a far more significant 
way. He is conscious of his own existence and of its continuation through time. He is 
capable of remembering, of imagining the future, and of imagining in the future 
remembering that which is currently his present. He is capable of making plans and of 
having a conception of the good. He knows what death is and realizes that although 
when he is dead he will not be able to care about this, he is currently alive and cares 
very much about his continued existence. He knows that without his life he cannot care 
for anything. To kill him is to override his individual existence in a way which matters 
a great deal to him. This is not the same with animals. 
An animal lives very much in the present. Severe pain and drastic injury, both of which 
affect an animal life in the present as it is being led, are capable of making too drastic a 
difference to the animal whose life it is. Thus individual animals, like humans have 
absolute rights against such treatment. However, to kill an animal, so long as it is done 
painlessly and without mental anguish, would harm it far less than killing a normal 
human would harm him. Thus, I think that while humans have an absolute right to life, 
animals do not share this right. 
While an animal may not have an absolute right to life, this does not mean that it may 
be killed without cause. To say that a creature has no absolute right to life is simply to 
say that there are some occasions on which killing it is justified. This is all that I am 
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allowing. Although I do not think that animals may never be killed justifiably, I do not 
think that their lives may be taken without considerable justification. This is because 
even though an animal's life does not mean as much to it as a human's does to him, it 
still means more than a plant's life means to that plant or a chair's existence to itself. 
Thus an animal life counts for something, but it does not count enough for there to be 
an absolute right against its deprivation. What justification would be required to take an 
animal's life is another question which falls beyond the scope of my inquiry. If, as I 
have suggested, considerable justification would be required - sufficient to override 
significant competing interests or substantial degrees of social utility - then we could 
say that animals have non-absolute rights to life. If they may be killed permissibly with 
only minimal justification, then though they may have claims not to be killed, these 
claims would be too weak appropriately to be called rights. 
Peter Singer's argument for the equal treatment of animals does not rely on rights at 
all. His is a utilitarian argument. While it is true that on one or two occasions he speaks 
about animal rights, such as a right to equal treatment1, he elsewhere acknowledges 
that this "concession to popular moral rhetoric" was "regrettable" and led to 
"misunderstanding 112 • 
My argument that animals, unlike humans, do not have an absolute right to life does 
not fall prey to the charge of speciesism - treating creatures adversely simply because 
they belong to another species. Animals have no absolute right to life because of a 
morally relevant feature of their nature. If it could be shown that I have misrepresented 
the relevant feature of their nature, and that, like humans, they care very much about 
their own death then I would concede that kinds of animals possessing this feature also 
have an absolute right to life. I am simply claiming that the facts of their nature are 
1. P. Singer, "All animals are equal" in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics, p. 221. 
2. P. Singer, "The parable of the fox and the unliberated animals" in Ethics, Vol. 88 No. 2, 
January 1978, p. 122. Quoted by T. Regan, The Case/or Animal Rights, p. 219. 
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such that they do not. The same applies to the disparities between human and animal 
rights against injury and infringements of liberty. That these rights are fixed at different 
thresholds for different species is determined by morally relevant differences between 
the species. Again, if it could be shown that I have misdescribed the factual differences 
between the species, I would willingly change my mind about the thresholds at which 
the rights of the various species comes into existence. 
8.6) THE MORAL STATUS OF DIFFERENT CREATURES 
The moral status of animals is not what it is because there is another species with a 
more sophisticated well-being. The status of each species is determined by its own kind 
of well-being, and not how this stands relative to that of another species. Thus the 
discovery of a superhuman species would not reduce the rights of humans, though this 
more sophisticated species may well have more rights or absolute rights fixed at lower 
thresholds. 
I have tried to show in this chapter that not only humans have rights (both absolute and 
non-absolute). At least some animals also have rights (though absolute animal rights are 
not always fixed at the same threshold as human rights). I have said, however, that not 
all kinds of rights which humans have are had by animals. In arguing for all this, I 
have focused on normal humans and higher vertebrate animals. This is why some 
measure of success can be achieved. Clearly, though, there are problems when it comes 
to some abnormal humans, to human infants, to human foetuses (and to other intra-
species exceptions). These are the problems raised by the moral issues of euthanasia, 
infanticide and abortion. The latter two issues, in particular, have highlighted some 
severe problems in our thinking about the moral status of various creatures. Those 
features of normal developed humans which animals lack and which cause such humans 
not to have an inferior moral status are the very features which human foetuses and 
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even infants also lack. The consequence of this is that there is no intrinsic reason why 
one should not do to human infants and foetuses whatever one does to animals, and 
perhaps more. This we take to be an unacceptable moral conclusion. Although 
arguments that refer to the side effects of treating human foetuses and infants in the 
way we treat animals provide strong grounds for not adopting such a policy, the fact 
remains that given the nature of human foetuses and infants there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with it. The alternative is to grant the same privileged status to 
human foetuses and infants as we do to normal developed humans. This would have the 
effect of also granting such a privileged status to all animals, even very unsophisticated 
ones such as insects, because there is no morally relevant difference between insects 
and human foetuses at an early stage of their development. However, this view too is 
unacceptable. Privileged moral status seems to be enjoyed by either too broad or too 
narrow a class of creatures. 
I shall not even attempt to try to solve this difficulty here. I shall simply make two 
remarks. Firstly, this problem is not that serious for a view such as mine which denies 
that rights exhaust morality. Thus a creature may not qualify as a bearer of absolute 
rights or as a right-bearer at all and yet be protected by other moral tools such as 
weaker claims. Secondly, what rights any kind of creature has depends on the nature of 
that creature's well-being. I have mentioned the sorts of considerations that need to be 
pondered in determining whether a particular kind of creature has a certain right. 
Ongoing moral debate must· settle these individual practical questions as best as 
possible. 
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CHAPTER 9 
GROUP RIGHTS 
9.1) GROUPS AND RIGHTS 
The concept of group rights is contentious, particularly in South Africa, where it has 
been applied in an oppressive and discriminatory manner, and where it is seen by some 
as a vital tool for the protection of whites from "cultural domination" under a black 
government elected under conditions of universal adult suffrage. While the 
controversial nature of the concept of group rights is explicit in the South African 
context and some other places, it is of theoretical importance and interest anywhere. 
This provides good grounds for a discussion of whether, on my view of rights, there 
are any absolute group rights. 
It is a truism that advocates of group rights regard groups as being important - but not 
all do so for the same reason. An extreme view is the non-reductionist view of groups 
or society which I discussed in chapter 4.2. This is the view that groups are important 
because they, rather than individuals, are the significant units of existence. Groups are 
regarded as "mass-persons" that are not reducible without remainder to the individuals 
that constitute them. Accordingly, groups should have rights rather than, or (on a 
milder view) in addition to, individuals' having rights. 
There is also a more moderate view which constitutes the foundation for some group 
rights theories. This view accepts, at least tacitly, that individuals, not groups, are the 
significant unit of existence and it views the importance of groups in terms of the 
interests of individuals. It claims that at least for most individuals, membership of a 
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group is an important component of their well-being. Therefore, an individual has a 
great interest in the flourishing of the group. 
Amongst those advocates of group rights who hold this more moderate view, some 
believe that the bearers of group rights are groups, while others believe that group 
rights are a species of individual rights. Raz is an example of the first view. Although 
he thinks that groups are important because individuals have important interests in 
them, he maintains that each individual's interest in group goods is not sufficiently 
strong to justify holding other persons subject to a duty and therefore no individual's 
interest can ground a group right1. How then does Raz justify group rights? He says 
that such a "right rests on the cumulative interests of many individuals"2. He believes 
that a group right can be grounded on the sum of individuals' interests in the collective 
good. On this view it is groups that have rights, even though they have these rights 
because of the interests of their individual members. 
The alternative moderate view is that group rights are simply another kind of individual 
right. Group rights are the rights of individuals to certain group goods. 
Those who ascribe group rights usually ascribe them to linguistic, religious and national 
groups (or, in the case of the second moderate view, to the members of such groups). 
However, there are no conceptual limitations on which kinds of group (or the members 
of which groups) can have rights. Thus, sporting teams, orchestras and philosophy 
departments (or their members) could, in theory, be the bearers of rights. The reason 
why rights are not actually ascribed in such cases is that membership of these groups is 
believed to mean less to their individual members than national identity, for example, 
means to the individual members of nations. 
1. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 207, 208. 
2. Ibid, p. 209. 
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The rights which groups (or their members) are believed to possess vary according to 
the kind of group in question. Thus, for example, linguistic groups are often claimed to 
have a right to preserve their language. Religious groups are believed to have a right to 
educational facilities to teach their beliefs and practices to their children. National 
groups are claimed to have the right to national self-determination. The belief in this 
kind of group right has been particularly powerful. It has been the fuel on which 
twentieth century nationalism has run, and has accounted for the independence of 
) 
· numerous nation-states and the demise of colonial empires, as well as the violent deaths 
of millions. 
9.2) THE APPEAL OF GROUP RIGHTS 
Many commonly accepted individual rights and claims afford groups some protection. 
For example, if every individual has a right or a claim to freedom of worship, then the 
prayer of each religious group is ipso facto protected by these rights. Similarly, if 
every individual has a right or a claim to freedom of association, the integrity of the 
group is protected because the members of the group cannot justifiably be prevented 
from associating with each other. Given this, what is the appeal of group rights? The 
answer is that these commonly accepted individual rights and claims are believed to 
provide inadequate protection for certain groups or for the interests which individuals 
have in certain groups. 
Kymlicka thinks that minority and other disadvantaged cultural communities require the 
protection of group rights in order to ensure that their members are treated genuinely as 
equals. He claims that minority cultures in a society can need special rights to prevent 
their being "outvoted on matters crucial to their su~ival as a cultural community"3. 
This same threat does not face a majority culture. The majority group can, for 
3. Ibid, p. 183. 
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example, simply vote resources in its own direction. Without the protection of group 
rights, the individual members of the minority group are disadvantaged in relation to 
the individual members of the majority group. It is significant, he claims, that the need 
for group rights does not result from particular choices which some groups make, but 
from the inequality of circumstance which characterizes different cultural communities. 
Were the need for group rights to have arisen from particular choices the group made, 
then the group would be responsible for those needs and would not deserve group rights 
to satisfy those needs. However, since the need for group rights arises from an 
inequality for which the minority group is not responsible, it deserves the protection of 
those rights. Kymlicka takes the case of the Indians in Canada to be an important 
example of a disadvantaged minority group that requires the protection of group rights. 
Another reason why group rights may be regarded as necessary is that they are usually 
held to be positive, and not only negative4. Positive rights have correlative positive 
duties - duties actually to do something, not simply to abstain from doing something. If 
group rights are positive, they place positive obligations on, for example, the state. 
Thus, if the French-speaking group in Canada has a right to French language 
education, then it does not simply have the right not to have its teaching of French 
prevented, but also to active assistance from the state, in the form of funding at least. 
Individual rights, by contrast, are classically seen as being negative, at least in so far as 
they protect cultural interests. On this view, while individuals could have a negative 
right to learn French they could not have a positive right to state funding for this 
purpose. Thus, it is argued that one of the advantages of group rights is that they can 
. constitute positive claims which individual rights do not. 
4. J. Degenaar, "Nationalism, Liberalism and Pluralism" in J. Butler, R. Elphick, D. Welsh 
(eds.), Democratic Liberalism in South Africa, p. 247; I. Macdonald, "Group Rights" " 
in Philosophical Papers Vol. 18 No. 2, September 1989, pp. 123, 124. 
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9.3) WHY THERE ARE NO ABSOLUTE GROUP RIGHTS 
Non-reductionism about groups or society was one view, I said, which leads some 
people to embrace the concept of group rights. If groups are the basic unit of existence, 
then groups need rights. In chapter 4 I examined and rejected such a non-reductionist 
view of groups. I said there that groups have no morally significant existence of their 
own. There are no group-creatures. I did not argue that it is impossible for there to be a 
group with a mind of its own - that is, a group with a mind distinct from the minds of 
the individuals which constitute it5 - and therefore a group with its own morally 
significant well-being. I simply denied that there are actually any such groups. If there 
were such group-creatures, I might concede that they have rights (depending on their 
sentient and sapient qualities). However, since the only groups that there are - classes, 
teams, societies, nations - are not such creatures, they cannot have rights on the 
grounds that they are such creatures. In other words, because I reject a non-reductionist 
view of groups or society, I reject any group rights theory that is based on such 
mistaken ontological premises. 
However, not all arguments in favour of group rights start from0 such ontological 
premises. What about the more moderate views that group rights are based on the 
interests of individuals? There are, I said, two such views. On Raz's view, an 
individual's interest in some group good is not sufficient to justify a right, but the 
cumulative interests of many individuals in such a good can ground a right. I disagree. 
A right cannot be grounded on the sum of interests of separate individuals. Doing so 
violates the individualist view that underlies rights in my analysis. Rights are meant to 
protect very special interests of each separate individual. If an individual's interest is 
not strong enough to warrant right-protection, then it is simply not strong enough. 
Adding interests of distinct individuals to ground group rights may open the way to 
5. David Brooks has argued for this possibility. See D. Brooks, "Group Minds" in 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64 No. 4, December 1986. 
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defeating the whole purpose of individual rights. If the sum of interests of separate 
people can ground a right because of their combined weight, then if there are sufficient 
people in the group who have similar interests, might their group right not override the 
individual right of either a dissenter within the group or an alien to the group? This 
priority of the group right over the individual right would then apply even if each 
individual interest which plays a part in grounding the group right is far less important 
than the interests of the one person which conflict with the group right. The interests of 
the group could outweigh the vital interests of the individual. Thus group rights could 
possibly override even a right to life if the combined group interests of individuals were 
sufficiently strong. 
What about the alternative moderate view of group rights? This view, I said, 
understands group rights as a species of individual rights. They are rights which protect 
the interests which individuals could have in various group goods. However, I deny 
that any such rights could be absolute. I shall now explain why. Absolute rights exist to 
protect only the most sensitive interests an individual subject has qua subject, and they 
protect against only severe violations of such interests. 
What are these sensitive interests of a subject qua subject? They are the interests in 
being able to lead a life, in a minimal sense. To lead a life is not merely to exist, but to 
freely decide what one wants to do, and to do it. I say "in a minimal sense" because 
being able to lead a life is a matter of degree. One can be more or less able to lead a 
life, depending upon what constraints are operative upon one. Minor constraints are 
protected against by various moral claims, but only severe constraints on one's ability 
to lead one's life receive the protection of absolute rights. In chapter 7 I dealt with the 
kinds of interest that are important to a subject qua subject, and with the violations of 
these interests which are sufficiently severe to justify the protection of absolute rights. 
Without one's life one is unable to lead a life at all. Similarly, if one is tortured, 
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maimed or if one has one's liberty severely infringed, one is unable to lead a life in a 
minimal sense. These assaults either severely curtail one's ability to make a free 
decision (as in the case of torture) or they severely impair one's ability to act on one's 
decisions (as in the case of maiming and severe liberty restriction). 
The kinds of interest which individual subjects have in the particular groups to which 
they belong are not the kind of interest that require the trumping protective power of 
absolute group rights (over and above the protection which I have shown they already 
receive from commonly accepted individual rights and claims). If, for example, one's 
nation is not self-determining, it may well be very unfortunate for one, but objectively 
the kind of evil which the subject qua subject suffers from this is not sufficiently severe 
to justify an absolute right. His ability to make free decisions about how to act is not 
affected. His ability to act on those decisions is not so severely infringed that he cannot 
be said to be capable of leading a life in a minimal sense. Absolute rights must exist to 
protect against only the worst evils an individual subject qua subject can suffer. 
I am aware that advocates of group rights take the interests which individuals have in 
their group membership to be very important. I am not denying that they are correct. I 
am simply claiming that these interests, however important they are, are not as 
important as our interests in not being killed, tortured, maimed or not having our 
liberty severely infringed. It is only interests of this order of importance that merit the 
protection of absolute rights. In response to this claim, group rights theorists may point 
to the fact tha~ vast numbers of people have been and are prepared to make great 
sacrifices, including giving up their lives, for the sake of their cultural or national 
interests. I acknowledge that this is so. However, all this shows is that many people 
perceive their national interests to be at least as important as, if not more important 
than, their interests in not being killed, tortured and maimed. In chapter 5.3 I argued 
for an objective view of well-being and in chapter 6.2 I argued that rights must be 
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connected to well-being viewed in this way. Although people's perceptions of their 
well-being are relevant to determining what objectively is in their interests, it is not the 
sole determining factor (chapter 5.3). Thus, simply because people may think that their 
national interests are as important as their interests in life, for example, it does not 
mean that they are correct. I have attempted to show that they are wrong. No doubt 
there are some people for whom cultural or national interests are objectively more 
important, but that is not some natural feature they have because of the kind of creature 
they are. It is objectively in their interests because of the particular beliefs, desires and 
goals they they have. For the vast majority of people, the interests in not being killed, 
tortured or maimed are objectively much stronger. 
9.4) THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUP INTERESTS 
I have argued that there are no absolute group rights. This is because there are no 
group creatures and because the interests which individuals have in cultural 
communities are not sufficiently important, objectively speaking, to justify the 
protection of absolute rights. However, the fact that these interests are not sufficiently 
important to warrant the protection of absolute rights does not mean that they are not 
important at all. 
Kymlicka believes that cultural communities are very important. Liberals have tended 
to downgrade the importance of cultural communities. Kymlicka argues that liberalism, 
correctly understood, highlights the importance of such communities. An important 
idea of liberalism, he says, is that we should be free to choose to act and live in a way 
we decide is valuable. However, he claims, we.cannot choose the range of options that 
is open to us since these are determined by our cultural heritage. Thus he concludes 
that liberalism should seek to preserve cultural communities because it is "only through 
having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid 
176 
way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value"6. 
Kymlicka clarifies what he means by a cultural community or cultural structure. He 
means the community or structure itself and not the particular character of a community 
at a particular time 7. On his conception of a cultural community, the culture can 
withstand changes within the community. Accordingly his conception of a cultural 
community facilitates and reinforces the idea that a cultural community provides a 
context for choice. On the alternative conception of a cultural community, a change in 
the character of the cultural community amounts to the demise of the culture. Such a 
view of community restricts choice and is in conflict with liberalism. 
My problem with Kylmicka's argument is that I think that his view about why cultural 
communities are important to individuals is wrong. Cultural communities are not 
valuable to individuals because they provide a context of choice but rather because they 
provide a sense of identity and belonging. Kymlicka is not insensitive to the fact that 
communities provide an identity and sense of belonging. In fact, he cites this as the 
reason why it is not membership of any cultural community that is valuable but only 
membership of one's own cultural community8. It is simply that for him this feature of 
the value of community is secondary. In my view not only is it primary, but it also 
undermines the idea of cultural communities being valuable to a liberal on the grounds 
that they provide contexts of choice. It is not that I think that cultural communities, 
understood in the way Kymlicka understands them, do not constitute contexts of 
choice. It is simply that if one is interested in the broadest possible range of choices -
and this is what Kymlicka must say is important to liberalism - then cultural 
communities are not the best way of achieving that. Because membership of a particular 
cultural community is more determined than chosen, and can mean so much to an 
individual, he will be restricted to the range of choices which his cultural community 
6. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Culture and Community, p. 165. 
7. Ibid, pp. 166, 167. 
8. Ibid, pp. 172-5. 
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provides. This Kymlicka acknowledges. What he does not acknowledge is that were we 
to place less emphasis on preserving the identity of the distinct cultural communities 
that exist within a particular state and put more emphasis on actively pursuing 
multiculturalism - perhaps even by "importing" cultures - a greater range of choices 
would be provided. I am not in fact advocating such a policy. I am merely suggesting 
that if the importance of community is that it provides a range of choices, and choice is 
important, then sharpening the divisions between cultures by preserving distinct cultural 
identities is not the best policy. A far better policy would be to promote 
multiculturalism and blur the distinctions between the different cultures. Blurring the 
divisions between cultures would facilitate moving from one culture to another, thereby 
enhancing the range of choices. Having rigidly distinct cultural communities restricts 
the range of choice. 
Although I think that Kymlicka's reasons for valuing cultural communities are wrong, I 
think that such communities are valuable for other reasons. Cultural communities -
whether they be national, linguistic or religious - are important because they provide 
the individual with a sense of identity and belonging. These can satisfy important 
psychological needs. For example, belonging to a group and having an identity can 
infuse meaning into a person's life. Individuals have interests not simply in being 
members of cultural communities but also in the well-being of their communities. It is 
not sufficient that one be a member of a cultural community that merely exists. One · 
wants one• s community to thrive if it is to benefit its members fully. 
Now the question is whether the cultural interests which individuals have can ever 
justifiably override other important interests which individuals have. In other words, 
are there non-absolute group rights - group claims which are sufficiently strong to 
override some competing individual interests but not so strong as to always override 
such interests? Take Kymlicka's example of the Indians of Canada. Because of their 
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minority status and a history of oppression the Canadian Indians are in danger of losing 
their cultural identity. Circumstances have forced many Indians into the non-Indian 
culture of the rest of Canada. Other Indians remain on reservations, but even there their 
cultural community is in danger of disintegrating without certain restrictions on the 
mobility, property and voting rights of non-Indians. Are such and other restrictions 
ever justified in order to further cultural interests of individuals? 
I am in agreement with Kymlicka that there is no in-principle answer to this question. 
The matter would have to be decided in_ each case given the relevant facts particular to 
that case. No doubt the proposed restrictions could not be justified under some 
circumstances. However, under other circumstances they could be justified. Conflicts 
between cultural claims and other claims are just like any other conflict of individuals' 
interests. Where an interest is protected by an absolute right it will always prevail over 
other interests. However, where an interest is not protected by an absolute right it can 
sometimes justifiably be overridden and on other occasions it may not be justifiably 
overridden. If the importance of the cultural interests is very great and conflicting 
interests are of less importance, restrictions of the proposed kind would be justified. 
However, if the weight of the conflicting interests is reversed so that the cultural 
interests are of negligible importance and the conflicting interests very great, the 
proposed restrictions would be ruled out. One example of an important interest which 
individuals can have which will rarely, if ever, be justifiably overridden by group 
interests is the interest in religious freedom. Contrast restrictions of such freedom with 
restrictions on one's property. I think that the latter - especially mild restrictions of this 
kind - could be justified far more often. 
Another relevant consideration in determining whether group claims should prevail is 
the extent to which the claim is genuinely required to protect the important cultural 
interests of a given group, and not simply to bring unfair advantage. The Canadian 
179 
Indians no doubt have cultural interests in having an autonomous state in all of Canada, 
but these interests could not override justifiably the interests of non-Indian Canadians to 
their cultural, political and property interests. This is partly because such an extensive 
claim is simply not required to do the job of preserving the Indian cultural community. 
In fact, the Canadian Indians are not claiming such a state. Theirs is a lesser claim 
involving lesser sacrifices from non-Indians. As such it stands a greater chance of being 
justified. This Kymlicka thinks is the difference between the group claims of Canadian 
Indians and those of white South Africans. The latter - or, more accurately, the 
Afrikaner nationalists amongst them - claimed the bulk of the land for the minority, 
forcing the black majority into small homelands that are politically and economically 
dependent on South Africa9. Cultural claims are there to protect people's legitimate 
interests in the light of competing claims. Cultural claims are not there to protect unfair 
advantage and greed 10. 
9. Ibid, p. 247. 
10. Ian Macdonald mentions five criteria which group claims must satisfy if they are to be 
valid. Amongst these criteria is the condition that group claims must not be bound 
up with unequal political power and privilege. See I. Macdonald, "Group Rights" in 
Philosophical Papers, Vol. 18 No. 2, September 1989, p. 128. 
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CHAPTER 10 
ANSWERING OBJECTIONS TO RIGHTS 
10.1) INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters, I have provided a theory of natural rights. That is, I have 
given an account of their nature and justified their existence. In describing what natural 
rights are, and providing a foundation for them, I have mentfoned and argued against 
rival theories of rights. However, another task remains. 
There are a number of standard kinds of objection that are raised against theories of 
natural rights in general. In this chapter, I shall consider a few of these objections. In 
the case of some objections, I shall show that they are unjustified. In the case of others, 
I shall argue that while they may be appropriately directed against some theories of 
rights, they cannot be levelled successfully at my theory. My intention, therefore, is 
not to defend all theories of rights. I do not think that all such theories are defensible. I 
intend merely to show why my theory is immune to these criticisms. 
10.2) BENTHAM: MORAL RIGHTS AS ANARCHICAL FALLACIES 
One cannot think of objections to natural moral rights without Jeremy Bentham and his 
famous description of "natural and imprescriptible rights" as "nonsense upon stilts" 1 
coming to mind. However, Bentham's rejection of natural rights is on account of more 
than their alleged meaninglessness. In his view they are also morally odious. Thus, he 
refers to them as "a bastard brood of monsters, 'gorgons and chimeras dire'"2 . 
1. J. Bentham "Anarchical Fallacies" in J. Waldron (ed.) Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 53. 
2. Ibid, p. 69. 
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These two kinds of criticism which Bentham levels against natural rights - that they are 
meaningless, and that they are morally odious - are reflected in the title of his 
Anarchical Fallacies. The moral odium of natural rights is a function of their alleged 
anarchical nature. Their meaninglessness makes arguments which appeal to them 
fallacious. Although Bentham's criticism of natural rights runs through all his writings, 
it was in this work that he devoted special attention to the topic of natural rights. Here 
he provided a comprehensive and detailed criticism of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen issued by the Frenc~ revolutionaries. 
The underlying nature of Bentham's objections to natural rights is far from clear. What 
philosophical view underpins his claim that natural rights are anarchical fallacies? It is 
sometimes assumed that it is some form of legal positivism that leads Bentham to his 
views about natural rights. I shall argue that the essential doctrine of legal positivism, 
to which Bentham does subscribe, does not entail a rejection of natural rights. I shall 
also argue that additional doctrines which Bentham adopts are not essential to legal 
positivism and are, in fact, quite distinct views. Finally, I shall argue that the 
combination of doctrines which Bentham must hold in order to reject natural rights 
makes his overall position an incoherent one. 
The term "legal positivism" encompasses a number of doctrines. Hart cautions against 
confusing these various views3. I shall not consider each of them. I shall restrict myself 
to the one central doctrine of legal positivism which is essential to all forms of legal 
positivism. This doctrine is the claim that there is no necessary connection between law 
and morality. What is legal and what is moral are not necessarily one and the same 
thing. This view is what Coleman calls the separability thesis4. Legal positivism gets 
its name because it recognizes, by way of the separability thesis, a law which is not 
3. H. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" in R. Dworkin (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Law, p. 1 8; H. Hart, "Legal Positivism" in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
p. 418. 
4. J. Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism" in Markets, Morals and the Law, p. 4. 
---------------~ 
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necessarily moral. It is because this law is not natural, but rather posited, that it is 
known as positive law. 
The separability thesis stands in opposition to a central principle of natural law theory, 
namely its refusal to recognize as law anything which violates the (moral principles of) 
natural law, including its natural rights. Positive "laws" which violate the natural law 
are not simply immoral; they are not laws at all. 
Bentham clearly accepted something like the separability thesis. This is evident, for 
example, from his attack on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen for its 
claim that all men are born free. How, he asks, can this be reconciled with the fact that 
many people are born slaves? Bentham says that some people do so by accepting the 
natural law doctrine that positive laws that conflict with natural laws are not really 
laws. According to a natural law view, the slavery into which people are born and in 
which they live is a slavery created by human-made "laws" - positive "laws". Because 
these laws conflict with the natural law that all men are born free, they are, in fact, not 
laws at all. They do not have the status of law. Therefore, people are born free. 
Bentham rejects this natural law view, and claims that . the positive laws that enslave 
people are valid laws5. He says that the fact of human enslavement and subjection 
conflicts with the claim that all men are born free. 
I agree with the legal positivists that it is possible for the law to be what it ought not to 
be. It is possible for there to be evil laws. However, this certainly does not entail that 
there are no natural rights. All that it entails is a rejection of the natural law thesis that 
laws in conflict with natural rights are not valid. 
5. J. Bentham, "Anarchical Fallacies", in J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 50. 
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In describing my view of rights, I have spoken of natural rights as those rights which 
exist ab initio, rights which are possessed by a creature in virtue of its nature alone. 
For example, I have argued that it does not make sense to speak of the rights of an 
inanimate object because the nature of such a thing is such that it cannot care about its · 
own well-being. On the other hand, creatures with a certain degree X of sentience 
have, for example, a right against torture. They have this right in virtue of some 
feature(s) of their nature - that is, the degree of sentience they have. Were they to have 
a different nature - perhaps by being drastically less sentient - it would_ make no sense 
to ascribe to them the same right (or a right fixed at the saine threshold). It is not 
natural rights which are challenged by the separability thesis - it is the claim that they 
have the power to invalidate positive laws which violate them. 
What about Bentham's claim that natural law and natural rights are anarchical? 
According to Bentham to deny the validity of the human-made law is to call "upon 
mankind to rise up in a mass, and resist the execution .. 6 of this so-called law, or at 
least to justify such a course of action. Bentham seems to be reasoning in the following 
way: If something is not law, why should it be obeyed, especially if it is evil? Thus, 
this doctrine of natural law is pernicious, because it encourages "disobedience" of 
positive "law" on every occasion that this conflicts, even in the minutest way, with the 
natural moral law. It is, in Bentham's words, "the extremity of mischief'?. Its 
purported anarchical consequences provide the name for his critique. 
This Benthamite criticism of natural law as anarchical is prone to a misrepresentation 
against which I shall now caution. The positivist distinction between law and morality 
is often misconstrued as requiring blind obedience to the law, whether the law be good 
or evil. This misconstrual has resulted in much of its lack of popularity. The truth, 
however, is that a positivist is not committed to an uncompromising adherence to the 
6. Ibid. 
7. ibid, p. 52. 
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law. Positivism does not entail such a conclusion and, if coupled with other theses, can 
yield the conclusion that disobedience of the law is· sometimes desirable, if not even 
required. I shall show how this is possible, using Bentham as an example. 
Bentham did not claim that the law must be obeyed on every occasion. Firstly, as a 
positivist, he acknowledged that the law could be evil. This is entailed by the positivist 
distinction between the law as it is, and the law as it ought to be. Secondly, as a 
utilitarian, Bentham had criteria for judging whether the law was what it ought to be. 
However, the difference between Bentham's attitude to disobedience and the attitude he 
imputes to the natural law theorists is that for Bentham a simple divergence of the law 
from the requirements of utility would not be sufficient to justify disobedience to the 
law. Disobedience to the law has significant disutility. For Bentham, positive law is all 
that protects humans from the Hobbesian state of nature. Thus while disobedience to 
this law could be justified in extreme circumstances, it could not be justified in every 
instance of conflict with moral principles. It is· the widespread and frequent 
disobedience of the positive law, which natural law sanctions, and even encourages, 
according to Bentham, which poses the threat of the anarchy of Hobbes's state of 
nature. In Bentham's words, the point of claiming natural rights is "to excite and keep 
up a spirit of resistance to all laws - a spirit of insurrection against all govemments"8. 
However, Bentham seems to misconstrue the natural law position in just the way that 
positivism is misconstrued. Just as positivism does not entail slavish obedience to the 
law, so natural law theory does not entail disobedience of all positive laws that conflict 
with natural law. All that natural law theory claims is that positive laws which violate 
the moral principles of natural law are not real laws. However, this does not entail 
rebellion against these positive "laws". It is compatible with natural law theory to 
maintain that even in instances where the positive "law" violates the natural law, that 
8. Ibid, p. 54. 
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one is nevertheless under a moral obligation (arising from the natural law) to obey the 
positive "law". There are a number of possible reasons for this. These could include an 
argument very similar to Bentham's own: for example, natural law may be viewed as 
imposing a duty on us to obey our rulers within certain limits. These limits need not be 
identical with the precise limits of the natural law. Rather they would protect an 
essential core of the natural law. Thus, if a positive "law" conflicts with a peripheral 
feature of the natural law by requiring us to do something only mildly wrong, 
disobedience need not be required. Such a violation of the natural law would not 
constitute a justification for overiding the presumptive naturcil obligation to obey the 
government. 
We see that neither natural law nor legal positivism entails any view about obedience to 
the positive law. We have also seen that legal positivism does not commit one to the 
view that there are no non-positive rights. Therefore Bentham could not have justifiably 
rejected natural rights simply because he accepted something like the separability 
thesis. He must have held some stronger view as well. 
This stronger view was not any kind of legal positivism, but rather a positivism of 
another kind - a positivism about meaning. Although logical positivism is a modem 
philosophical school, Bentham was probably influenced by Hume, the philosophical 
ancestor of the logical positivists. Bentham's meaning-positivism supports the claim 
that legal rights are the only rights. He applies the same criteria of meaningfulness to 
rights as he does to law. 
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For Bentham, meaningful talk of law and of terms such as "obligation" and "rights" 
must satisfy certain empirical conditions9. In one place Bentham says: 
For expounding the words duty, right, power ... that abound so much in ethics 
and jurisprudence, either I am much deceived; or the only method by which any 
instruction can be conveyed, is that which is here exemplified. An exposition 
framed after this method I would term paraphrasis. A word may be said to be 
expounded by paraphrasis when not that word alone is translated into other 
words, but some whole sentence of which it forms a part is translated into 
another sentence; the words of which latter are expressive of such ideas as are 
simple, or are more immediately resolvable into simple ones that those of the 
former ... This, in short, is the only method in which any abstract terms can, at 
the long run, be expounded to any instructive purpose: that is in terms 
calculated to raise images either of substances perceived, or of emotions; -
sources, one or other of which every idea must be drawn from, to be a clear 
one10. 
The simple ideas to which Bentham refers are part of the Lockean taxonomy. Locke 
distinguished simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas, he said, arise particularly 
through sensory perception. The mind uses them to form complex ideas. Bentham's 
view is that words can only be "expounded" satisfactorily if they are expressive of 
simple ideas. 
If the conditions of observability could not be satisfied, then one's talk would be 
referentless and meaningless. These conditions are what Hart callsl 1 the criteria of the 
law. These are the empirically identifying marks of the law. These criteria concern the 
origin of law and the motivation to obey it. 
9. J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 35. 
10. J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, chapter V, p. 495 in Burns and Hart edition. 
11 . H. Hart, Essays on Bentham, p. 82. 
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An imperative theory of law is one kind of theory which embodies claims about the 
origin of law and the motivation to obey it. Such a theory claims that law is the 
commands and prohibitions - that is, respectively, positive and negative imperatives -
issued by a sovereign via a required process. These imperatives, which express the will 
of the sovereign (about the way in which its subjects should behave), have coercive 
sanctions attached to them to provide a motivation for obedience to them. What is 
important to note is that the sovereign (whether it be a democratic parliament, an 
,oligarchy or an autocrat), the sovereign's imperatives and the attendant sanctions are 
all, in some way, empirically discernible. 
Although the imperative theory is associated with the jurist John Austin, a philosophical 
heir of Bentham, Bentham himself is sometimes viewed as having had an imperative 
theory of law. Although Austin was undoubtedly influenced by Bentham, their 
conceptions of the law are not the same, as Lyons observes12. In many ways Austin's 
is a more rigorous and developed theory 13. However, Bentham's seems to be more 
inclusive in the sense that it takes account, not only of prohibitions and (positive) 
commands, but also of what Lyons calls "permissive" laws - laws "which say what may 
or need not be done, rather than what ought or ought not to be done1114. Bentham even 
takes account of judicially determined law and conventional law. Strictly speaking, 
these are not commands or prohibitions, but they are empirically discernible, which 
Bentham claims natural law is not. In the case of natural law one cannot observe any 
sovereign, nor any commands. Nature is purported to be the sovereign, but neither its 
imperatival acts, nor its imperatives can be experienced. Furthermore, it has no 
sanctions. Failure to obey the natural law does not result in punishment (unless the 
presumed natural law is given positive endorsement and enforcement). 
12. D. Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed, pp. 108ff. 
13. Ibid, p. 108. 
14. Ibid. 
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How does all this relate to Bentham's rejection of natural rights? The answer seems to 
me to be something like the following. Rights have correlative obligations or duties. To 
have a right is to be the beneficiary of a duty. For Bentham, sense can only be made of 
this or any other duty if there is an action (or an omission) that the sovereign requires 
of the duty-bearer15 on pain of some sanction. Thus the only duties of which we can 
meaningfully speak are legal duties. Therefore, given the correlativity of rights and 
duties, the only rights of which we can meaningfully speak are legal rights. A right 
which is claimed to be prior to, not dependent on, or contrary to positive law is an ·. 
impossibility, Bentham says. "A natural right is a son that never had a father"16. 
Although meaning-positivism is not uncontroversial, I shall not subject it to criticism. 
My intention is to show how the combination of views which Bentham held entails an 
incoherence in his overall theory. 
So far, although extreme, his position is at least coherent. Meaning-positivism is 
compatible with legal positivism. The problem arises when we consider that Bentham 
was also a utilitarian and therefore that he accepted a non-positive morality. As a legal 
positivist, Bentham accepted the separability thesis - that the law is not necessarily 
moral. As a utilitarian, Bentham would determine whether or not the law was moral 
depending on whether or not it conformed to utilitarian standards. In this way, he could 
also determine what laws there ought to be. 
Either the utilitarian principle - that the good action is the one that maximizes happiness 
- satisfies Bentham's criteria of meaningfulness or it does not. If it does not, then 
Bentham's acceptance of the utilitarian principle conflicts with his meaning-positivism. 
Alternatively utilitarianism does satisfy the kind of criteria Bentham required for 
15. J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 35. 
16. J. Bentham, n Anarchical Fallacies" I in J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 73. 
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meaningful talk of law and rights 17. Those who hold this view could say that the whole 
point about the potential pains and pleasures that are entered into a Benthamite 
utilitarian calculation is that they can be experienced. However, if we accept this view, 
that Bentham's acceptance of the utilitarian principle does not conflict with his 
meaning-positivism, the question arises why Bentham was so opposed to moral rights. 
Surely he could have given a utilitarian account of rights? 18 Of course, it is possible 
that he held the view which I have advocated - that utilitarianism cannot properly 
account for rights. But this is not his professed reason for rejecting natural rights. He 
rejected them because they supposedly are meaningless. 
Hart argues that it is because Bentham tied the notion of obligation to coercive 
sanctions that he would not accept a utilitarian theory of rights l 9. There is, for 
Bentham, no obligation without the prospect of punishment if one fails to fulfil it. 
Natural rights, even if they are possible on a utilitarian account, do not require legal 
recognition. Where legal recognition is absent, there will be no punishment of those 
who violate natural rights. Consequently there are no natural rights, according to 
Bentham. 
While I agree with Bentham that punishment plays an important role in an 
understanding of legal rights, I do not think that the same is true of moral rights. He 
wishes to impose the punitive force that is characteristic of legal obligations and legal 
rights on moral obligations and moral rights. 
17. See H. Hart, "Natural Rights: Bentham and John Stuart Mill" in Essays on Bentham, p. 
85. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Lyons points out that Bentham theoretically allowed for rewards instead of coercive 
sanctions. However, he did believe that punishment was a more effective motivation 
than reward (0. Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed, p. 134). Since this point is 
not central to my argument, I shall not pursue it. 
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Bentham says that the fact that there ought to be a right does not imply that there 
actually is a right. There are two problems here. Firstly, if one cannot give an account 
of obligation without coercive sanctions, then how can one make sense of a statement 
that there ought to be a particulcu- (legal) right or law, a statement which Bentham must 
have held as meaningful, given his views about the desirability of legal reform? In 
other words, how can one make sense of utilitarian obligations? This problem aside, 
though, there is another. In one sense, Bentham is correct. There is a difference 
between saying that there ought to be a right and saying that there actually is a right. If 
there ought to be a legal right, it does not follow that there· is a legal right. That is 
because of the character of legal rights. However, to say that there ought to be a legal 
right may be an implication of saying that there is a moral right. Let me explain why I 
think that this is so. 
Why do we want legal rights? We want them because they can be enforced. 
Enforcement is what legal rights offer over and above the dictates of morality and 
moral principles. It is not enough to know that one ought to have a legal right, that one 
ought to be protected on pain of punishment. One wants actually to be protected in this 
way. However, simply because a moral right lacks this protection does not mean that it 
is not a right. It is not a legal right, but it is a right. 
It is interesting to note that. not even legal rights protect us sufficiently. 
Notwithstanding legally entrenched negative rights to life, people are murdered every 
day. Obviously the coercive power of the law is not sufficient to deter the murderers. If 
we were someday to discover a legal way to ensure that people were not murdered, we 
could perhaps then say that people had super-duper legal rights. This would not mean 
that the legal rights that people had until then were not legal rights. True, they would 
not be super-duper legal rights, but they would be rights and they would be legal 
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rights. There are degrees of enforcement. If a right is not recognized by anybody it will 
not be enforced at all, but it is still a right - a moral one. 
I shall conclude by way of a summary. Bentham held the following views: 
1) The separability thesis. 
2) The thesis that there are no non-positive rights. 
3) Utilitarianism. 
Bentham's acceptance of the separability thesis of legal positivism does not entail his 
rejection of natural or moral rights, but only of the idea that natural rights have the 
power to invalidate positive laws. His claim that there are no non-positive rights 
follows from a positivism about meaning and is not essential to legal positivism. 
Coleman describes positivism about meaning as a "dubious metaphysical" claim20. 
Although I share his view, I did not provide an argument to this end because it was not 
required to defeat Bentham's criticism of moral rights. I pointed out that acceptance of 
Bentham's second thesis either conflicts with his utiliarianism, - the third thesis - or it 
does not. Either way there is an incoherence in Bentham's overall view. If his meaning-
positivism does conflict with his utilitarianism, then the incoherence is in accepting 
both these views. If, on the other hand, these views do not conflict, then we need to 
ask how Bentham could assert both 2) and 3). How can Bentham reject moral rights on 
the grounds of meaninglessness when he accepts the non-positive morality of 
utilitarianism? In other words, why are rights meaningless but other moral principles 
not? Of course, Bentham could have accepted utilitarianism and rejected moral rights 
on the grounds that they are incompatible with utilitarianism, but this is not what he 
did. He rejected rights because he took them to be meaningless. This seems 
incompatible with his acceptance of utilitarianism. 
20. J. Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism" in Markets, Morals and the Law, p. 12. 
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10.3) AGAINST RIGHT-BASED THEORIES 
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin writes in one place about goals, rights and 
duties, claiming that it "seems reasonable to suppose that any particular theory will give 
ultimate pride of place to just one of these concepts", though he exempts an 
"intuitionist" theory, in Rawls's sense of this term21. Rawls understands intuitionist 
theories as having two features: a) "they consist of a plurality of first principles which 
may conflict"22; b) they have "no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing 
these principles against one another"23 - they are weighed by means of intuition, by 
means of what feels right. We see, therefore, that by definition intuitionism (as 
understood by Rawls) does not give ultimate pride of place to a particular concept, as 
Dworkin suggests other theories do. Dworkin goes on to speak about "goal-based", 
"right-based" and "duty-based" political theories24. In a right-based theory, for 
example, some right or set of rights will be most basic. Any other moral principles that 
such a theory contains will be derived from this right or set of rights. 
Dworkin does not simply claim that a right-based political theory is logically possible. 
He thinks that there are in fact some right-based theories. He cites as an example, Tom 
Paine's theory of revolution25 . I think that we could add to that list both Locke's and 
Nozick's theories, in which the rights to life, liberty and property are basic. 
Mackie regards these theories as being distinctly political, and he argues that right-
based moral theories are also possible26. He claims that a right-based moral theory is 
more plausible than a goal- or duty-based alternative. I shall not say why he thinks this. 
21. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 171. 
22. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 34. 
23. Ibid. 
24. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 171. 
25. Ibid. 
26. J. Mackie, "Can there be a right-based moral theory?" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of 
Rights. 
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Here I am concerned to consider criticisms of right-based theories. Raz is a philosopher 
who argues that morality is not right-based27. He argues that rights, duties and goals 
are all to be found among the most fundamental precepts of morality, and that a theory 
that was right-based would be deficient. For example, he claims that a right-based 
theory cannot allow for the moral significance of supererogation. A supererogatory act 
is one that goes beyond the requirements of duty. While duties are derivable from 
rights, the value attached to going beyond one's duty is not. 
What makes this criticism more interesting is that Feinberg· claims not simply that 
having rights can allow for supererogation, but that it is a necessary condition for 
supererogatory virtues28. According to Feinberg, the knowledge that one has rights 
makes it possible to release people from their correlative duties. One has no duty to 
release people from their duties to one, but part of the idea of having a right is that one 
is at liberty to waive it. According to Feinberg, exercising this liberty is that in which 
supererogation consists. Without rights supererogation is not possible. 
I agree with Feinberg that having rights can allow for supererogation. We can act 
supererogatorily by waiving rights. However, I think that his claim that having rights is 
necessary for supererogation is wrong. We can act supererogatorily without rights. 
Imagine that there were no rights, but only duties (uncorrelated to rights). We could 
then say that supererogation was doing more than one's duties required one to do. It 
would be a case of going beyond the call of duty. So while having rights can allow for 
supererogation, they are not a necessary condition for supererogation. 
Furthermore, to say that the existence of rights can allow for supererogation is not to 
say that the existence of rights can account for the moral significance of 
27. J. Raz, "Right-based moralities" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights. 
28. See "Postscript" to J. Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights" in Rights, Justice and 
the Bounds of Liberty. 
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supererogation. The fact that we can act supererogatorily by waiving our rights does 
not explain why we should be supererogatory and waive our rights. Theories of rights 
do not explain why going beyond the call of duty is so important. Some rights-waivings 
are in the interests of the rights:-bearer and are therefore not cases of supererogation. 
For example, in extreme circumstances, such as end-stage terminal disease, a person 
may wish to waive his right to life. In such a situation the inability to waive the right 
could count against one's interests. Such instances of rights-waivings are explained by 
the rights themselves. The rights are there to protect one's interests. When the right 
stands in the way of one's interests, then one needs to be at liberty to waive it, if the 
purpose of the right is not to be self-defeating. However, such instances of rights-
waivings are different from those which occur for supererogatory purposes. Nothing 
about the purpose or nature of the right tells us why we should value supererogatory 
rights-waivings. 
As Raz points out29 , this problem is not unique to right-based theories. For example, 
duty-based theories would encounter this same problem. While duty-based theories can 
also allow for supererogation, they too do not tell us why it is sometimes valuable or 
commendable to go beyond the call of duty. It cannot be said without contradiction that 
sometimes one has a duty to go beyond the call of duty. However, if one does not have 
such a duty, then it is hard to see how duty-based theories can explain the value of such 
actions. 
The failure to account for the value of supererogation is not Raz's only criticism of 
right-based theories. He says that a right-based theory also "cannot allow intrinsic 
moral value to virtue and the pursuit of excellence"30. In right-based theories, only 
rights have intrinsic value, though other principles may have derivative or instrumental 
value. 
29. J. Raz, "Right-based Moralities" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 182. 
30. Ibid, p. 185. 
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Expanding these criticisms, one could argue that right-based theories are often 
minimalist. They provide a very narrow view of morality. In Nozick's theory, for 
example, the few obligations that there are are negative. Thus all one is required to do 
is to refrain from acting in certain ways. Simply not to murder, not to steal and not to 
violate another's liberty is to lead the moral life. Some feel that this is inadequate. One 
can sit about the house day and night, and be said to be leading a morally impeccable 
life. There is much more to morality that simply not violating rights. Admittedly, 
Nozick's theory is an extreme case. It is more than merely right-based. It gives place to 
rights (and their correlative duties) only. Right-based theories can (but need not) give 
derivative importance to other moral principles. These other principles are derived 
from the basic rights of the right-based theory. Nozick simply does not take matters 
that far. He has rights at the base of his theory, but he does not derive any other 
principles from them. This does make his theory more susceptible to the criticism of 
being minimalist than right-based theories need be. However, this observation does not 
altogether immunize other, less-extreme, right-based theories against the minimalist 
criticism. Though these theories give place to principles other than rights, they do so 
only derivatively. These other principles have no intrinsic value. Ultimately they are 
not what count. Thus the charge that right-based theories are minimalist has some force 
against these theories even though not as much as it does against extreme right-based 
theories such as Nozick's. 
I believe that the conception of rights for which I have argued is immune to these 
criticisms. There is a difference between justifying rights and claiming that they are the 
most basic moral concept from which all others are derived. The theory of rights which 
I have provided is not a right-based theory. It does not claim that rights are most basic 
and all else is derivative. I have argued that rights are only one, though a very 
important, moral concept. There are, I have said (chapter 6.1), many other moral 
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principles. It is because of this that I do not need to respond to criticism of right-based 
theories. 
It may be objected that I have failed to mention an important characteristic of right-
based theories - a characteristic which my theory possesses. This feature is that (some) 
rights have supreme moral strength in the theory3 l. In cases of conflict, absolute rights 
always override other moral principles. Although my theory does indeed possess this 
feature, it is nonetheless not a right-based theory. Why is this? The moral strength 
which right-based theories accord rights stems from the fact that in such theories rights 
are basic and other moral principles are derivative. It is this attribute - rights' being the 
only non-derivative principles - which is the defining feature of a right-based theory 
and which gives rise to the objections I have described. These objections are not 
objections to the moral strength of rights but to the fact that rights are basic and all else 
is derivative. Since in my theory other moral principles and values are also non-
derivative, the objections do not apply to my theory. 
I would argue, therefore, that the problems which Raz raises for right-based moral 
theories are not faced by a theory such as mine which gives a place to rights, but does 
not make them most basic. For example, if rights are not the only basic component of 
morality, then supererogatory values may be equally basic. So may virtue be equally 
basic. I am not claiming that supererogation and virtue are basic, but simply that in a 
non-right-based theory they could be. Finally, a theory such as mine, which gives a 
place to rights and to goals (social utility) is not subject to the charge of being a 
minimalist view of morality. It can include all the important features which we think 
should be contained in a satisfactory moral theory. 
31. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 171. 
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10.4) AGAINST THE ONTOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM OF RIGHTS 
This objection "sets itself in opposition to the atomistic separateness of human selves 
that it finds in theories of human rights"32. It makes the claim that individuals are 
constituted by the communities to which they belong. According to this view the 
individualism that characterizes theories of rights ignores the fact that individuals do 
not exist separately and unrelated to each other. Rather, they are communal or social 
beings. It is said to follow from this objection that if any entities are to have rights, 
they must be groups, and not individuals33. 
There are, I believe, a number of sources of such ontological objections to individual 
rights. First, there is the non-reductionist view of society which I described in chapter 
4.2. I argued against the extreme version of this view and claimed that although 
moderate versions are more plausible they pose no threat to individual rights. 
Communitarianism also raises objections of an ontological sort. It claims that liberalism 
has a defective view of the self. Communitarians claim that individuals do not exist as 
separate, isolated entities, but that they are consituted in great part by the communities 
of which they are members. The community gives the individual self much of his 
identity. 
Once again we need to ask what the strength of this communitarian claim is. If it is as 
strong as the radical non-reductionist view of society then, like this view, I think that it 
is wrong. I have argued that individuals, and not groups, are the unit of existence. If 
the communitarian view is simply that communities and groups are of great importance 
to individuals and their interests, then I agree. But this, as I argued in the chapter on 
32. A. Gewirth, "Human Rights and Conceptions of the Self" in Philosophia, July 1988, p. 
130. 
33. Ibid. 
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group rights, does not make a case for rejecting individual rights. Even if we accept the 
importance of groups to individuals, the morally significant unit of existence is still the 
individual and not the group. 
Buchanan has argued that even if one were to accept the communitarian thesis, 
individual rights would still have great value34. They provide considerable protection 
for communities. For example, individual rights provide a strong, effective protection 
against totalitarianism. The totalitarian state can be and has been a great threat to the 
communities within its domain because these communities limit citizens' dependence on 
and allegiance to the state. So individual rights should be important even for 
communitarians. 
10.5) MORAL OBJECTIONS 
The concept of rights is seen by some as being morally defective. Gewirth discerns two 
types of moral objection to rights35. The first is what he calls the "egoistic" objection. 
This is the view that rights doctrines are self-centred and pre-occupied with the 
fulfilment of one's own desires and needs. More radical forms of this criticism are, in 
Waldron's words, "appalled" by rights because they are a "celebration of the claims 
that the individual might make on his own behalf, asserting his own exclusive interests 
against those of the communities that had nurtured him ... "36. 
34. A. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism", in Ethics, July 
1989. 
35. A. Gewirth, "Human Rights and Conceptions of the Self" in Philosophia, July 1988, p. 
132. 
36. J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, pp. 1, 2. 
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The second moral objection to rights is the "adversarial" objection. This is the view 
that claims of rights "thrust persons into combative and ·potentially coercive 
relations"37. Claiming rights makes people into adversaries. 
Bentham, as I showed in chapter 10.2, is someone who launches a moral objection 
against rights - a moral objection that incorporates both the "egoistic" and the 
"adversarial" objections. According to Bentham, society is held together by the 
sacrifices which people make. It is because government ensures these sacrifices by 
positive law that public peace and order can be established: "The great enemies of 
public peace", he says, "are the selfish and dissocial passions"38. He claims further 
that the purpose of declaring (moral) rights is to "add as much force as possible to these 
passions, already but too strong ..... 39. Elsewhere he says that the source of such rights 
is "self-conceit1140 and that the purpose of claiming them is to have things go one's 
own way41 . 
Another moral critique of rights which embodies both the "egoistic" and "adversarial" 
objections and which deserves some discussion is Marx's. His view of rights is by no 
means clear. Although there are substantial criticisms of rights that are bound up with 
his view of the predicament of man in capitalist society and although these seem to 
constitute the foundation for the conventional wisdom on Marx's view of rights - that 
is, that he is hostile to rights - there are other claims he makes which complicate such a 
straightforward depiction. Waldron claims that "Marx's views on rights were never 
formulated with the clarity or unequivocality that modern analysis presupposes1142• 
Leaving aside the questions whether rights are compatible with Marxism and whether, 
37. A. Gewirth, "Human Rights and Conceptions of the Self" in Philosophia, July 1988, p. 
132. 
38. J. Bentham, "Anarchical Fallacies" in J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 48. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid, p. 54. 
41. Ibid, p. 73. 
42. J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 135. 
200 
viewed as a whole, Marx rejected all rights, I shall attempt to provide an accurate (but 
brief) account of that strand of Marx's thought which is hostile to rights, irrespective of 
the weight this strand has in the entire Marxist picture. 
The Marxist critique of rights is, as I have said, part of the Marxist criticism of 
capitalist society and its atomistic view of the individual. According to Marx, man's 
"species-being", or true self, is social. Marx says that this means more than that man is 
a social being; it means that he can develop into an individual only in society43. 
Capitalism, he suggests, obscures this fact, and provides the illusion that we are self-
sufficient individuals who are essentially independent of others44. Rights are a product 
of the material life of capitalist society. Thus, Marx says, "the so-called rights of man 
... are nothing but the rights of the member of civil society, ie egoistic man, man 
separated from other men and the community"45. This egoism is a result of the conflict 
of individuals that is part of the condition of capitalist society. The human condition in 
capitalist society is one of alienation. One form of this alienation is alienation from 
other people. In capitalist society people exist not as the social beings they are, but 
rather as isolated and competing individuals. Individual rights, with their egoistic and 
adversarial nature, are the products of such alienation, but they also facilitate 
alienation. They preserve the separation between people and legitimize their 
selfishness. 
Marx examines some individual rights to illustrate his view. Looking at the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, he notes that the right to liberty is the 
right to do whatever does not infringe on the rights of others. He says that "the 
freedom in question is that of a man treated as an isolated monad and withdrawn into 
himse1r·46. He concludes that this freedom is based on a separation of men, rather than 
43. Ibid, p. 129. 
44. Ibid, p. 128. 
45. K. Marx, "On the Jewish Question", in J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 145. 
46. Ibid, p. 146. 
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on their union. It is a right to be limited to oneself, without having any obligation to 
anybody else. Similarly, the right to private property is, Marx says, a right to do with 
one's property whatever one wishes, without regard for other men and for society. It is 
the right to possess property and to use and dispose of it as one sees fit - even 
wastefully or arbitrarily - irrespective of the needs of others. There may be people 
starving to death and yet the right to private property entitles Scrooge to hoard wealth 
or farmers to destroy "excess" produce in an attempt to keep prices up. Thus, the right 
to private property is, Marx says, a right of "selfishness1147. The right to equality is 
simply an extension of the right to liberty. It is the claim thaf everybody has the right 
to be "a self-sufficient monad"48. The right to security is the right to have one's other 
rights guaranteed (by force if necessary). It is the "assurance of egoism1149• 
Lukes accuses Marx of having a "narrow and impoverished view of the meaning of the 
rights of man"50. He says that while some of the rights enumerated in the French 
Declaration, to which Marx refers, concern the individual unrelated to society51, m~y 
others presuppose community. He cites, for example, the right to free expression of 
one's ideas. This, he maintains, is a right to go beyond oneself and to relate to others. 
According to Waldron, such criticism is unfair. Marx in fact distinguishes between the 
rights of man and the rights of the citizen52. The rights of the citizen are political rights 
and they are only exercised in community with other men. The right to freedom of 
expression is, Waldron claims, just such a right. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid, p. 147. 
50. S. Lukes, Marxism and Morality, p. 63. 
51. The right to private property seems the most plausible example. 
52. J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 129; K. Marx, "On the Jewish Question" in 
J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, p. 144. 
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However, even if we take note of Marx's distinction between the rights of man and 
those of the citizen and include amongst the latter those that are exercised in 
community, we would still not have a class of rights that is immune to Marxist 
criticism. Marx's attitude to the rights of the citizen, although more favourable than his 
view of the rights of man, is still uncomplimen~3. Although there is some 
ambiguity in his view of the rights of the citizen, there seems to be agreement that he 
thinks of them as being in some way defective. While they are an improvement on the 
rights of man and indicate a measure of community and human freedom, they are still 
very much part of capitalist society. It is the conflicts and egoism of capitalist society 
that make these rights necessary. 
A comprehensive defence of rights against the Marxist critique would have to involve a 
refutation of some key Marxist doctrines. This is clearly a vast subject, and one which 
is beyond the scope of this work. I shall rather respond to the moral objection to rights 
in a more general way. 
I think that the charge that rights are egoistic is wrong for three reasons. While it is 
true that rights are trumping claims of individuals to be treated in certain ways, any 
acceptable theory of rights does not accord rights to a single individual or allow him to 
claim that he alone has rights. Natural rights theories are theories which claim that an 
entire class of creatures has rights. Thus the trumping claim which is a natural right is 
not the preserve of a solitary creature. To say that I, and I alone, have rights may be 
egoistic. To say that I have rights, but so do all others who are like me in all morally 
relevant ways, is not. I have to respect their rights, just as much as they have to respect 
mme. 
This response may not be at all convincing for the Marxist. He will claim that it is this 
very withdrawal from community into the individual, this marking off of boundaries 
53. J. Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts, pp. 132 - 136. 
203 
between members of a community by rights, which explains why they are so egoistic. I 
turn, therefore, to the next reason why it is wrong to see rights as egoistic. 
This reason is that in a theory such as mine, which gives place not only to rights, but 
also to other aspects of morality, including obligations uncorrelated to rights, people 
are morally less separated from each other than they are in moral theories which make 
room for rights alone. Although individuals have certain claims against each other (and 
the correlative negative duties of these), they can also have positive obligations towards 
others. These duties or obligations unite them with other men and with their 
community, rather than separating them. 
To this the Marxist may respond that those components of a moral theory that do unite 
are not egoistic, and those - such as rights - which separate, are egoistic. To this I wish 
to reply that although rights are trumping claims that protect certain interests of 
individuals, these claims are justified. (It has been the aim of this thesis to show that 
they are justified.) There must be a limit to self-negation. The individual has some 
value - I think a great deal. It is not egoistical for an individual to assert himself when 
he is justified in doing so. We cannot say that a person is an egoist simply because he 
believes that he has some value. One can believe that one's life counts for something 
without being branded an egoist. 
What about the "adversarial" objection? I think that this too is doomed to failure. 
Rights do not promote adversarial or combative relations between people. Rather what 
they do is handle already existent adversarial relations. I think that there is an inevitable 
clash of interests between people, though Marx would, of course, disagree with this. 
Morality has to cope with these conflicts and resolve them in a justifiable way. 
Different moral theories represent various attempts to do just that. In defending rights I 
have accorded a place to them in the resolution of this conflict. If there were no 
conflicts of interests, there would be no need for rights, nor for any other moral tool. 
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While Bentham would disagree that rights handle already existent adversarial 
conditions, Marx would not. Marx maintained that rights were a way of handling the 
conflict of interests that characterizes bourgeois society. For the Marxist, it is because 
capitalist society is defective, that these conflicts exist, and that rights are necessary. 
However, in the Marxist view, they are not natural because they are limited to 
capitalist society. They will have no place or function in communist society54. 
I do not share Marx's utopianism - his view that it is possible for a society, communist 
or otherwise, not to have conflicts between its individual members or, more accurately, 
that a society could be sufficiently conflict-free to make rights superfluous55. 
However, it is not this point that I shall pursue. Rather, I want to mention a 
philosophically more interesting point which Buchanan raises. 
He argues that it is not only in defective societies that rights are needed56. · For 
example, if we did not have rights, minorities and individuals could be disadvantaged 
in important ways by the democratic law-making processes of the society in which they 
live. The mass of people could vote for a course of action which would significantly 
disadvantage a minority. This is prevented by rights. 
This argument assumes, of course, that a democratic society is not a defective one. A 
democratic society where the majority are malefactors certainly is defective. However, 
even in a society in which everybody was perfectly altruistic, there would be a need for 
rights. One altruist, A, might wish to act in the interests of another, B. He believes that 
it is in B's interests to attend a rugby match as an important part of his education about 
the mentality of South Africans. However, B does not wish to watch a rugby match and 
believes that to do so would, at best, be a bore. Rights protect B from being dragged 
54. Ibid, pp. 126, 127. 
55. A. Buchanan, Marx and Justice, p. 57. 
56. Cited by S. Lukes, Marxism and Morality, p. 65. 
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off to a rugby match on the altruistic grounds that it is in his own interests. Here, rights 
serve to mediate in a conflict of perceived interests. 
I believe that neither the egoistic nor the adversarial objection to rights succeeds. The 
concept of rights is not inherently morally defective. This is not to say that the concept 
cannot be abused. The proliferation of alleged rights is such an abuse. Claims of rights 
have escalated to ridiculous extremes. People are often alleged to have numerous and 
bizarre rights. However, to reject these particular rights is not to condemn all rights, or 
the concept of rights. 
10.6) OBJECTIONS THAT RIGHTS ARE HISTORICALLY LIMITED AND 
ETHNOCENTRIC 
A legal right is a right which is enacted through the legal process. If it does not pass 
through this process, it does not exist. To determine what legal rights there are, one 
must examine the law. It is, according to legal positivism at any rate, an empirical 
question whether a particular legal right exists. By contrast, a moral right is one which 
is rationally discernible. To determine whether such a right exists, one cannot simply 
look up the answer in a law book - or seek an answer in the courts. One has to 
rationally determine whether such a right exists - whether or not it can be justified. 
This thesis has been an attempt to justify natural moral rights - an attempt to show that 
there are at least some such rights. 
The fact that natural rights are meant to be rationally discernible has led to two 
objections to such rights. Firstly, there is the historical objection57. This objection 
states that, historically, the idea of natural rights is a relatively recent development. 
This is taken to indicate not only that rights are not rationally discernible, because 
57. A. Gewirth, "Human Rights and Conceptions of the Self" in Philosophia, July 1988; L. 
Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 9. 
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otherwise their recognition would not have arisen only in recent times, but also that 
moral principles change with the times. 
The ethnocentric objection has a similar form, except that it is formulated in terms of 
the differences between cultures rather than the differences between historical periods. 
It claims that (even in modern times) natural rights are only recognized by western 
culture. If this is so, the objection goes, rights cannot be rationally discernible -
otherwise all people would have discerned them. 
I wish to respond to these criticisms of natural rights with two points - one weaker and 
the other stronger. The weaker point is that even though rights do not feature overtly in 
the moral language of all cultures and in all times, the kind of moral ideas implicit in 
rights are indeed present in a number of traditions other than the western liberai one. 
For example, the concept of rights is not explicit in the Judeo-Christian tradition, yet 
the categorical prohibitions against treating individuals in certain ways - say by killing 
them - embody ideas that are central to rights theories. 
The stronger point that I wish to raise against the historical and ethnocentric objections 
is as follows: Even if it were true that rights have been recognized only in western 
liberal culture and in modern times, this would not count against the existence of 
natural rights. Agreement, either across time or cultures, is not required for their 
existence. Simply because people have not, and do not all, recognize natural rights, 
does not mean that they do not exist. There was a time when people thought that the 
world was flat. Now we know that it is round. Even though there is not agreement 
between people of different historical periods about the shape of the earth, this does not 
mean that there is not a factual answer to this question. We cannot, of course, conclude 
from this that the western liberal view of rights is correct. It is simply meant to show 
. i 
I 
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that the historical and ethnocentric objections do not show that it is wrong. It may be 
that it has taken a particular culture at a particular time to recognize rights. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
11.1) A THEORY OF RIGHTS 
Although I have argued in this thesis that rights - more specifically natural rights - can 
be justified, they have not emerged unscathed from my treatment of them. The rights 
which I have justified are not the rights of rhetoric (chapter·0.1). The natural rights 
which I have defended are numerically fewer but some of them are more powerful than 
rights are normally taken to be. 
In the course of this thesis I have mentioned three features of natural rights. I said that 
they have correlative duties (chapter 1.1), that they have great strength (chapters 1.2, 
6.2, 6.3, 6.5) and that they are exclusively negative (chapter 1.3). Each of these 
features has a role in reducing the number of natural rights on the moral landscape. 
Rhetorical rights lack the first mentioned feature and are ascribed even when 
identifying a correlative duty and duty bearer is impossible. Such rights are likely to be 
more plentiful than rights correlated to duties. Similarly, if natural rights have great 
strength then it seems plausible to decrease their number. Finally, if there are only 
negative natural rights then it is likely that there will be fewer of them than if there are 
both positive and negative natural rights. 
It must be reiterated that I am not claiming that all rights possess the combination of 
features which I have mentioned. I have been speaking about natural rights exclusively 
(see chapter 0.4). Such rights, I have said (chapter 1.1), are the most difficult to justify 
and, therefore, have been the object of my inquiry. I am sympathetic towards the idea 
I 
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of non-natural rights which are positive (chapter 1.3), though they too would have to 
have correlative dutiesl and would have to have considerable strength. 
In summary, my argument justifying natural rights goes like this. Individuals, rather 
than groups or temporal stages of an individual, are the morally significant units of 
existence. Thus morality, which must be connected to well-being, must be connected to 
the well-being of individuals (chapter 4). Rights play a vital role in ensuring this 
connection. Because absolute rights are in some cases needed to fulfil this role I think 
that some natural rights are never overridable (chapter 6.2, 6.3) and not simply very 
strong (chapter 1.2). 
Although on my view there are fewer natural rights than on other views, the moral 
landscape is not thereby denuded. It is populated by other moral principles (chapter 
6.1). Just as natural rights can fulfil roles which other moral principles cannot fulfil, 
these other moral principles fulfil functions which are sometimes inappropriately 
assigned to natural rights. Thus, as I have shown (chapter 1.2), charity is not 
appropriately translated into the language of rights. Every moral principle has its place 
and its function. It is important to use each principle appropriately. 
Although a host of moral principles should populate that ~ea of the moral lan~sca~e 
from which I think natural rights should retreat, I wish to highlight two principles 
which are most closely related to natural rights and presumably which should fill in 
much of this space. These are the principles of a non-natural right and a natural claim 
which is not a right (chapter 6.1). Very often the ascription of a non-natural right will 
be appropriate in instances where the ascription of a natural right is inappropriate. In 
1 . Feinberg speaks of a special sense of a right - what he calls a "manifesto right" - "in 
which a right need not be correlated with another's duty". See J. Feinberg, "The 
Nature and Value of Rights" in Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, p. 153. 
However, "manifesto rights" are not genuine rights precisely because they lack 
correlative duties. (See chapter 1 . 1 and chapter 6. 1 ) 
i 
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chapter 1.3 I provided the examples of feeding a person who is starving to death before 
one's very eyes and of assisting the victim of a motor vehicle accident. In such cases, I 
said, one might have strong duties to a determinate person to provide aid, but because 
these duties arise contingently, . their correlative rights cannot be said to be natural. 
Sometimes the ascription of a natural right is inappropriate, not because the proposed 
right is not natural, but because the claim is insufficiently strong to be termed a right. 
Then we ought to refer to it as a natural claim. 
I think that it is valuable to distinguish between natural rights and non-natural rights as 
well as between rights and weaker claims. People have different kinds of interests and 
interests which require different degrees of protection. Some interests are so important 
that they require the protection of an absolute trumping claim. Other interests, while 
very important, can under certain circumstances be overridden. They ought to enjoy the 
protection of strong but not absolute claims. It is important to distinguish between these 
different kinds of claim. Having such distinctions does useful conceptual work. 
11.2) THE PROBLEM OF CATASTROPHIC SITUATIONS 
Consider the following case of Bill on a runaway tram. There is a fork in the track 
ahead, but on each of the divergent paths there are people who will be killed if the tram 
takes their path. The brakes have failed so Bill cannot bring the tram to a halt. 
Furthermore, the tram is in a narrow tunnel so that it is not possible for the people on 
the track to get out of danger. This is a case of negative rights conflicting with positive 
rights. If Bill does not steer the tram in either direction, the natural non-human forces 
will lead it in one direction or the other. Those on the track which the tram would take 
without Bill's intervention will surely die, but their negative rights will not be violated. 
A negative right cannot be violated by failing to act. Those who would be killed would 
have positive rights against Bill to steer the tram away from them. However, the only 
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way Bill can satisfy these rights would be to steer the tram towards the other track 
thereby killing the people there. To do this would be to violate their negative rights. He 
would be actively steering the tram towards them when they have a negative right 
against him not to do so. Thus we have a conflict of positive rights and negative rights. 
The positive rights are claims to be actively saved and the negative rights are claims not 
to be killed. Because I have argued that a person's negative right to life is an absolute 
right (chapter 7.2), Bill must desist from steering the tram from its natural course. In 
this way he respects the negative rights to life of those on the track which the tram 
would not naturally take. 
My view that Bill must give priority to the negative natural rights over the positive 
rights is unproblematic if there are an equal number of people on each track or if there 
is a smaller number of people on the track down which the tram will run without Bill's 
intervention. However, what about cases in which there is a great discrepancy between 
the numbers of people on each track and many more lives stand to be lost by not 
violating rights? What happens if one negative right is in conflict with one hundred 
positive rights? What happens if, in another case, we can save a million lives, thereby 
satisfying a million positive rights, by killing a single person and thereby violating a 
single negative right? The greater the net number of lives that stands to be lost by not 
violating rights, the more people may feel uncomfortable about adhering to my view 
that some natural rights (such as the right to life) are absolute and must be respected 
come what may. 
Many people's intuitions suggest to them that the possibility of saving a mere majority 
of lives is not sufficient to justify violation of rights. They think that rights must be at 
least sufficiently strong to override some conflicting positive rights to be saved. The 
problem arises when the stakes are sufficiently high and we have what can be called a 
catastrophic situation. In such situations many people's intuitions do not favour the 
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non-violation of negative rights. If my view of rights, described in this thesis, has a 
problem then its problem is that it is too rigid in the face of catastrophic situations. The 
constrasting view would be that although rights are very strong moral principles, none 
of them are absolute because they can, at least in theory, be overridden. I want to argue 
that my view, that some natural rights are absolute, is to be preferred, the problem of 
catastrophic situations notwithstanding. 
However, I first want to digress in order to draw a distinction between two kinds of 
catastrophic situation. One kind is less problematic, I think. ·Sometimes a conflict of 
negative and positive rights is forced on us by natural facts beyond the control of any 
agent. The case of the tram exemplifies this. On other occasions, the conflict of 
negative and positive rights is forced on us by other agents. An example here would be 
if terrorists threatened to blow up a plane full of people unless I kill one person. The 
hostages have positive rights against me to save them, but the only way I can do so is 
to violate a negative right and kill a person. Here the conflict of positive and negative 
rights is imposed by the terrorists. If they withdraw their demands then the conflict 
disappears. I think that this latter kind of case is less problematic than conflicts forced 
on us by "nature". We should certainly not open ourselves to moral blackmail by 
violating negative rights when, for us, these have been forced into a conflict with 
positive rights by other agents. Gewirth suggests what he calls "the principle of 
intervening action"2. According to this principle, if there is a causal connection 
between A performing action X and B suffering some harm Y, then A is not morally 
responsible for Y if the action Z of some agent C intervenes between X and Y, and C 
knows the circumstances of his action and intentionally or recklessly brings about Y. 
Many people - notably utilitarians - will reject the principle of intervening action and 
will see no difference between the two kinds of case I have described. For them it 
makes no difference how a conflict arises. All that matters is that it exists and one must 
2. A. Gewirth, "Are there any absolute rights" in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, p. 
104. 
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act in the way that produces most utility. However, for those of us deontologists for 
whom personal responsiblity does not necessarily include responsibility for the actions 
of others which we fail to prevent, the distinction I have suggested is important. We 
will feel less guilty and be less guilty about not violating negative rights when evil 
agents force a conflict between these and positive rights, than when "nature" forces this 
conflict. To treat the two kinds of case alike by taking ourselves to be equally 
responsible for the outcome of both is to be blind to an important difference between 
the two cases. Nature is not responsible for what it brings about. Other agents are 
responsible for what they intentionally or recklessly bring about. Because nature is not 
responsible for what it brings about, the sole control for preventing that which it will 
bring about is in my hands. Because other agents are responsible for what they 
intentionally or recklessly bring about, I am not responsible for preventing an outcome 
which they are free to bring about or not bring about. Thus, the kind of catastrophic 
situation which I think is most threatening to my view of the strength of rights is w~ere 
the conflict that we face is not engineered by agents. 
If the right to life were very strong but not an absolute moral principle, then its 
apparently unacceptable rigidity which the catastrophic situation highlights would be 
avoided. In arguing for the absoluteness of some rights even in the face of catastrophic 
situations, I am not wanting to minimize the unease we feel about failing to save great 
numbers of lives where doing so conflicts with absolute negative rights. What I want to 
show is that although failing to violate negative rights can have catastrophic 
consequences, viewing certain rights as non-absolute would have such serious costs for 
a rights theory that we should preserve the absolute view. 
I have argued (chapter 4) that individuals are the morally significant unit of existence 
and that morality should be connected to the well-being of individuals rather than the 
well-being of society. In chapter 6.2 I argued that if there were no limit to the severity 
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of the sacrifices that people can be required to make for others then morality would 
become unhinged from individual well-being. Rights morally protect individuals from 
having to make some kinds of sacrifice. 
Now, the problem with viewing all rights as being non-absolute is that there is not a 
limit to what sacrifices can be demanded of some people for the benefit of others, in 
which case morality ceases to be connected to individual well-being. For any 
conceivable sacrifice, there will be some circumstances in which it would be justified. 
It should be obvious that this is a consequence of viewing all rights as non-absolute. 
However, to illustrate why this is so I wish to refer back to the diagrams in chapter 
6.4. For the sake of convenience, I shall repeat them here in the conclusion: 
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Diagram 1 is a representation of my view of some rights - those which have absolute 
strength. There, the threshold at which these rights come into existence is a threshold 
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on the scale of individual well-being. The threshold marks the severity of sacrifice 
which cannot be required of the individual. 
Individual's 
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Diagram 2 
In Diagram 2 I represented the view of rights which someone like Dworkin holds, a 
view which I take him to hold true of all rights. Here rights cease to be operative at the 
threshold. More significantly, the threshold is attached to the scale of social well-being 
rather than individual well-being. The threshold marks the degree of social benefit 
which overrides the interests of the individual which rights protect. 
Notice that in Diagram 1, the threshold runs parallel to and just as long as the scale of 
social utility. No matter how much social utility could be produced by infringing 
individual well-being beyond the threshold, the threshold is there to prohibit such 
action. The rights represented by diagram 1 are absolute. In Diagram 2 the threshold is 
at an acute angle to the scale of social well-being and extends as long as that scale. 
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Thus, no matter how severe an infringement of individual well-being, there is a 
possible measure of social well-being that can justify that infringement. The rights 
represented by diagram 2 are non-absolute. Because of the importance of the 
individual, and the fact that the most important aspects of his well-being cannot be 
protected unless he is guaranteed against having to make certain sacrifices, I take the 
view represented in Diagram 2 to be defective in so far as it is a representation of all 
rights. 
In the course of this thesis, I have described what I take to be the various advantages of 
my theory of rights. The overriding strength which I attribute to some rights is one 
feature that has much appeal. However, cases of catastrophic situations suggest, at least 
to many people, that to view these rights as absolute is too rigid. I too feel the gravity 
of this concern. However, to give up the absoluteness of these rights would entail 
giving up important propositions about the importance of individuals and the role these 
rights play in protecting them. This would be even more unacceptable. 
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